26 research outputs found
When Optimal Centralized Mechanism Prescribes<br />to Follow Agent's Recommendation
Working Paper du GATE 2003-05This paper investigates to which extent the optimal centralized mechanism as defined by the Revelation Principle may optimally prescribe to follow the agent's recommendation. We define two sub-cases, called delegation and authority, being parts of the consideredcentralized organization, a decision being delegated to the agent when his recommendation is followed by the principal. We assume that there are both adverse selection and moral hazard under delegation and moral hazard under authority and the agent is risk neutral but protected by limited liability on utility. We find that delegation can be efficient even if the principal'stalent is higher than the expected talent of the unknown agent.Dans quelle mesure le mécanisme centralisé optimal défini par le principe de révélation peut-il prescrire de suivre la recommandation de l'agent? Deux sous-cas, délégation et autorité, faisant partie de l'organisation centralisée optimale sont définis, une décision étant déléguée à l'agent lorsque sa recommandation est suivie par le principal. On suppose qu'il y a à la fois sélection adverse et aléa moral dans le cas de la délégation, et aléa moral dans le cas de l'autorité. L'agent est neutre vis à vis du risque et protégé par une contrainte de responsabilité limitée. On montre que la délégation peut être efficace même lorsque le talent du principal estsupérieur à l'espérance du talent de l'agent
When Optimal Centralized Mechanism Prescribesto Follow Agent's Recommendation
This paper investigates to which extent the optimal centralized mechanism as defined by the Revelation Principle may optimally prescribe to follow the agent's recommendation. We define two sub-cases, called delegation and authority, being parts of the consideredcentralized organization, a decision being delegated to the agent when his recommendation is followed by the principal. We assume that there are both adverse selection and moral hazard under delegation and moral hazard under authority and the agent is risk neutral but protected by limited liability on utility. We find that delegation can be efficient even if the principal'stalent is higher than the expected talent of the unknown agent.incentives; delegation
Un effet pervers de la responsabilité limitée
La loi limite la responsabilité des salariés même lorsque ces derniers disposent de suffisamment de fonds propres pour supporter une punition de la part de leur employeur en cas de sinistre grevant la production. Un modèle d'agence généralisée est analysé afin de montrer que ce type de législation, bien que censé accroître le bien-être de tous les salariés, peut nuire aux individus les plus productifs. Imposer une contrainte de responsabilité limitée sur les niveaux de rémunération peut entraîner un effet pervers lorsque les agents les plus productifs, en participant au financement d'un fond couvrant la responsabilité limitée de tous, subventionnent ainsi les agents les moins productifs.Asymétrie d’information, agence généralisée, responsabilité limitée
Removing noise from pyrosequenced amplicons
Background
In many environmental genomics applications a homologous region of DNA from a diverse sample is first amplified by PCR and then sequenced. The next generation sequencing technology, 454 pyrosequencing, has allowed much larger read numbers from PCR amplicons than ever before. This has revolutionised the study of microbial diversity as it is now possible to sequence a substantial fraction of the 16S rRNA genes in a community. However, there is a growing realisation that because of the large read numbers and the lack of consensus sequences it is vital to distinguish noise from true sequence diversity in this data. Otherwise this leads to inflated estimates of the number of types or operational taxonomic units (OTUs) present. Three sources of error are important: sequencing error, PCR single base substitutions and PCR chimeras. We present AmpliconNoise, a development of the PyroNoise algorithm that is capable of separately removing 454 sequencing errors and PCR single base errors. We also introduce a novel chimera removal program, Perseus, that exploits the sequence abundances associated with pyrosequencing data. We use data sets where samples of known diversity have been amplified and sequenced to quantify the effect of each of the sources of error on OTU inflation and to validate these algorithms
On the generalized principal-agent problem: a comment
International audienceFaynzilberg and Kumar (Rev Econ Design 5(1):23–58, 2000) show that the usual Mirrlees–Rogerson conditions to validate the first-order approach in moral hazard agency models are no longer valid in the generalized agency case. They consider the risk-averse agent case and identify one set of technological conditions, where the production technology satisfies the linear distribution function condition in actions and types, that validates ex-ante the first-order approach. With the usefulness of their decomposition approach, we show that the first-order approach in the generalized agency case can be checked ex-ante under the Mirrlees–Rogerson conditions when the agent is risk-neutral but there is a binding limited liability constraint on the agent's wage
Un effet pervers de la responsabilité limitée
International audienceAlthough legal restrictions limiting the workers' liability are made to increase their welfare, we show that they may lead to a perverse effect when more productive workers cross subsidize less productive workers. A generalized agency model is analyzed and used to show that exonerating a wealthy agent from liability for damages caused during the execution of the contract decreases the more productive workers' expected utility in the pooling equilibrium of the combined model.La loi limite la responsabilité des salariés même lorsque ces derniers disposent de suffisamment de fonds propres pour supporter une punition de la part de leur employeur en cas de sinistre grevant la production. Un modèle d'agence généralisée est analysé afin de montrer que ce type de législation, bien que censé accroître le bien-être de tous les salariés, peut nuire aux individus les plus productifs. Imposer une contrainte de responsabilité limitée sur les niveaux de rémunération peut entraîner un e.et pervers lorsque les agents les plus productifs, en participant au financement d'un fond couvrant la responsabilité limitée de tous, subventionnent ainsi les agents les moins productifs
When Optimal Centralized Mechanism Prescribes<br />to Follow Agent's Recommendation
Working Paper du GATE 2003-05This paper investigates to which extent the optimal centralized mechanism as defined by the Revelation Principle may optimally prescribe to follow the agent's recommendation. We define two sub-cases, called delegation and authority, being parts of the consideredcentralized organization, a decision being delegated to the agent when his recommendation is followed by the principal. We assume that there are both adverse selection and moral hazard under delegation and moral hazard under authority and the agent is risk neutral but protected by limited liability on utility. We find that delegation can be efficient even if the principal'stalent is higher than the expected talent of the unknown agent.Dans quelle mesure le mécanisme centralisé optimal défini par le principe de révélation peut-il prescrire de suivre la recommandation de l'agent? Deux sous-cas, délégation et autorité, faisant partie de l'organisation centralisée optimale sont définis, une décision étant déléguée à l'agent lorsque sa recommandation est suivie par le principal. On suppose qu'il y a à la fois sélection adverse et aléa moral dans le cas de la délégation, et aléa moral dans le cas de l'autorité. L'agent est neutre vis à vis du risque et protégé par une contrainte de responsabilité limitée. On montre que la délégation peut être efficace même lorsque le talent du principal estsupérieur à l'espérance du talent de l'agent
Un effet pervers de la responsabilité limitée
Although legal restrictions limiting the workers? liability are made to increase their welfare, we show that they may lead to a perverse effect when more productive workers cross subsidize less productive workers. A generalized agency model is analyzed and used to show that exonerating a wealthy agent from liability for damages caused during the execution of the contract decreases the more productive workers? expected utility in the pooling equilibrium of the combined model.