28 research outputs found

    Fiscal consolidations in a low inflation environment: pay cuts versus lost jobs

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    We construct a model of a monetary union to study fiscal consolidation in the periphery of the euro area, through cuts in public-sector wages or hiring when the nominal interest rate is constrained at its lower bound. Consolidation induces a positive wealth effect that increases demand, as well as a reallocation of workers towards the private sector, which together boost private activity. However, in a low-inflation environment, demand is suppressed and the private sector is not able to absorb the additional workers. Comparing the two instruments, cuts in public hiring increase unemployment persistently in this environment, while wage cuts can reduce it. Regions with higher mobility of labor between the two sectors are able to consolidate more effectively. Price flexibility is also key at the zero lower bound: for a higher degree of price rigidity in the periphery, consolidation becomes harder to achieve. Consolidations can be self-defeating when the public good is productive.E. Pappa acknowledges the support of FCT as well as the ADEMU project, funded by the European Union's Horizon 2020 Program under grant agreement No. 649396. The views expressed here in no way reflect those of the Bank of England or the Bank of Spai

    Fiscal Consolidation in a Low-Inflation Environment : Pay Cuts versus Lost Jobs

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    We construct a model of a monetary union to study fiscal consolidation in the periphery of the euro area, through cuts in public sector wages or hiring when the nominal interest rate is constrained at its lower bound. Consolidation induces a positive wealth effect that increases demand, as well as a reallocation of workers towards the private sector, which together boost private activity. However, in a low-inflation environment, demand is suppressed and the private sector is not able to absorb the additional workers. Comparing the two instruments, cuts in public hiring increase unemployment persistently in this environment, while wage cuts can reduce it. Regions with higher mobility of labor between the two sectors are able to consolidate more effectively. Price flexibility is also key at the zero lower bound: for a higher degree of price rigidity in the periphery, consolidation becomes harder to achieve. Consolidations can be self-defeating when the public good is productive

    Fiscal consolidation in a low-inflation environment : pay cuts versus lost jobs

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    First published: June 2018We construct a model of a monetary union to study fiscal consolidation in the periphery of the euro area, through cuts in public-sector wages or hiring when the nominal interest rate is constrained at its lower bound. Consolidation induces a positive wealth effect that increases demand, as well as a reallocation of workers towards the private sector, which together boost private activity. However, in a low-inflation environment, demand is suppressed and the private sector is not able to absorb the additional workers. Comparing the two instruments, cuts in public hiring increase unemployment persistently in this environment, while wage cuts can reduce it. Regions with higher mobility of labor between the two sectors are able to consolidate more effectively. Price flexibility is also key at the zero lower bound: for a higher degree of price rigidity in the periphery, consolidation becomes harder to achieve. Consolidations can be self-defeating when the public good is productive.FCTEuropean Union's Horizon 2020 Program [649396

    Global value chains and international risk sharing

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    Unlike final-goods trade, intermediate-input trade through Global Value Chains (GVCs) creates supply-side linkages across borders. We show that, even when GVCs themselves are efficient, they have welfare implications because these linkages affect countries’ ability to share risks in incomplete financial markets. This novel interaction between trade and finance arises from a distinct channel of cross-border transmission with GVCs, the marginal cost effect. Productivity shocks, by moving relative prices, impact the marginal cost of production both at home and abroad, and therefore, in equilibrium, their relative supply. When international financial markets are incomplete, these supply side linkages will affect household wealth in both countries, and, in turn, the degree of international risk sharing. The direction and strength of this effect varies with the trade elasticity and the degree of GVC integration, with non-monotonic effects leading to ‘fragmentation traps’ in which small increases in GVC integration reduce risk sharing, while large increases would improve it. We show that in the quantitatively relevant case, GVCs reduce cross-border misalignments, and so endogenously support international risk sharing

    Essays on macroeconomic policy

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    Defence date: 18 April 2016Examining Board: Prof. Fabio Canova, EUI, Supervisor; Prof. Carlo Favero, Bocconi University; Prof. Andrea Ferrero, University of Oxford; Prof. Evi Pappa, EUI.This thesis looks at the interactions between fiscal, monetary and structural policies along three dimensions. The first paper looks at the dynamic effects of structural reforms when monetary policy is constrained. Structural reforms entail short run output costs that can be o set by a demand expansion. When monetary policy cannot carry out this short run expansion, there is a role for fiscal policy. In this case, reforms imply a fiscal cost in the short run, which can be justified by a long run improvement in public finances. This paper quantifies the short run costs and long run benefits of potential reforms in Europe. Results show that output losses from reforms can be fully o set with a modest fiscal stimulus. While for product market reforms this cost is justified by the long run fiscal gains, labour market reforms alone do not provide a sufficient boost to long run tax revenues. The second paper looks at the transmission of fisscal policy in an economy characterised by tax evasion and corruption. Cross-country evidence highlights the importance of these features in determining fiscal multipliers, and VAR evidence suggests that spending cuts reduce tax evasion, while tax hikes increase it. In a model with an underground sector, spending cuts reallocate production towards the formal sector, thus reducing tax evasion. Tax hikes increase incentives to produce in the less productive informal sector, implying higher output losses. Embezzlement of public revenues further amplifies these losses by requiring larger tax hikes to reduce debt. The model corroborates the evidence of increased levels of tax evasion during recent fiscal consolidations in southern Europe. The final paper compares price-based and quantity-based fiscal adjustments when in action is low. Focusing on the public wage bill, this translates to fiscal consolidation through cuts to public wages or public employment. In both cases, low inflation eliminates the expansionary e ects of the consolidation for the private sector. The drag in economic activity is substantially amplified, with increased debt-to-GDP levels during the consolidation

    Fiscal rules and structural reforms

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    Implementation of fiscal surveillance rules relies heavily on the proper interpretation of legal terms, creating a need to infuse economic insight into legal analysis. Rigid legal application of fiscal deficit rules may curtail structural reforms, as reforms can go against fiscal consolidation in the short run. However, if reforms are expected to improve public finances in the long run, they should not be viewed as incompatible with the legal framework. Focussing on the case of EU fiscal surveillance, this paper identifies the circumstances under which the positive budgetary long-term effect of structural reforms materialize in such a way that the legal rules should be applied with a degree of leniency, allowing for a short-term deterioration of the fiscal position. To that end, we quantify the short-run fiscal costs and long-run fiscal benefits of reforms, and investigate how the design of reforms can affect this trade-off. Results suggest that as short run output losses of reforms are alleviated by fiscal stimulus, long run output gains from the reforms imply that fiscal viability can be reached within a reasonable period of time. Product market reforms are generally preferable over labour market reforms, as they have a larger impact on fiscal revenues. These insights inform the legal analysis in several regards. First, the economic analysis is in line with teleological interpretation of legal rules aimed at ensuring long-term fiscal stability, while allowing short-term fiscal leniency. Second, the economic analysis can give contours to vague legal terms, such as 'prompt' positive budgetary effects and the legal requirement of 'major' structural reforms, showing that the type of reform matters as much as the size of the reform, and that while larger reforms have larger long run budgetary effects, they also require greater leniency in the short run. More generally, our analysis calls for the design and interpretation of legal fiscal regimes with reference to the interdependency between fiscal policy and structural economic policies.The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396

    Fiscal rules and structural reforms

    No full text
    Implementation of fiscal surveillance rules relies heavily on the proper interpretation of legal terms, creating a need to infuse economic insight into legal analysis. Rigid legal application of fiscal deficit rules may curtail structural reforms, as reforms can go against fiscal consolidation in the short run. However, if reforms are expected to improve public finances in the long run, they should not be viewed as incompatible with the legal framework. Focussing on the case of EU fiscal surveillance, this paper identifies the circumstances under which the positive budgetary long-term effect of structural reforms materialize in such a way that the legal rules should be applied with a degree of leniency, allowing for a short-term deterioration of the fiscal position. To that end, we quantify the short-run fiscal costs and long-run fiscal benefits of reforms, and investigate how the design of reforms can affect this trade-off. Results suggest that as short run output losses of reforms are alleviated by fiscal stimulus, long run output gains from the reforms imply that fiscal viability can be reached within a reasonable period of time. Product market reforms are generally preferable over labour market reforms, as they have a larger impact on fiscal revenues. These insights inform the legal analysis in several regards. First, the economic analysis is in line with teleological interpretation of legal rules aimed at ensuring long-term fiscal stability, while allowing short-term fiscal leniency. Second, the economic analysis can give contours to vague legal terms, such as ‘prompt’ positive budgetary effects and the legal requirement of ‘major’ structural reforms, showing that the type of reform matters as much as the size of the reform, and that while larger reforms have larger long run budgetary effects, they also require greater leniency in the short run. More generally, our analysis calls for the design and interpretation of legal fiscal regimes with reference to the interdependency between fiscal policy and structural economic policies.The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396

    Fiscal consolidation in a disinflationary environment: price vs. quantity-based measures

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    An important feature of the current economic conditions in the EU, which challenges the design and implementation of macroeconomic policy, is inflation uncertainty. With monetary policy at the zero lower bound, and inflation well below its target, a key issue for policy makers is the effect /nthis has on the transmission of fiscal policy. We aim to address this question, in particular comparing the effects of price-based and quantity-based fiscal instruments. In this paper we focus on the public wage bill, and consider a model of a monetary union in which the government can /nconsolidate their debt through reductions in the public wage or public employment. We find that in both cases the low inflation environment eliminates the expansionary effects of the reduction in the public wage bill for the private sector. The drag in economic activity is substantially amplified/nin the low inflation environment, with increased debt-to-GDP levels during the consolidation process

    Fiscal consolidation in a disinflationary environment : price vs. quantity-based measures

    No full text
    An important feature of the current economic conditions in the EU, which challenges the design and implementation of macroeconomic policy, is inflation uncertainty. With monetary policy at the zero lower bound, and inflation well below its target, a key issue for policy makers is the effect /nthis has on the transmission of fiscal policy. We aim to address this question, in particular comparing the effects of price-based and quantity-based fiscal instruments. In this paper we focus on the public wage bill, and consider a model of a monetary union in which the government can /nconsolidate their debt through reductions in the public wage or public employment. We find that in both cases the low inflation environment eliminates the expansionary effects of the reduction in the public wage bill for the private sector. The drag in economic activity is substantially amplified/nin the low inflation environment, with increased debt-to-GDP levels during the consolidation process
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