PERFECT EQUILIBRIA IN STOCHASTIC GAMES

Contains fulltext : 223740.pdf (publisher's version ) (Open Access

Discretization of information collecting situations and continuity of compensation rules

A canonical procedure is described, which associates to each infinite information collecting situation a related information collecting situation with finite state and action spaces, in such a way that the two corresponding IC-games are near to each other.Compensations for informants are then also near to each other in the two IC-situations, if they are based on continuous compensation rules.

Optimization of an n-person game under linear side conditions

This paper is concerned with n-person games which typically occur in mathematical conflict models [cf. cite{4}, cite{7},cite{9}]. These games are so called cost-games, in which every actor tries to minimize his own costs and the costs are interlinked by a system of linear inequalities. It is shown that, if the players cooperate, i.e., minimize the sum of all the costs, they achieve a Nash Equilibrium. In order to determine Nash Equilibria, the simplex method can be applied with respect to the dual problem. An important special case is discussed and numerical examples are presented