Geochemistry and origin of organic-rich sediment veins in fractured granitic basement, Helmsdale, Sutherlandshire, UK

Acknowledgements MB is in receipt of a PhD studentship from the Petroleum Technology Development Fund of Nigeria. LB is supported by NERC grant NE/M010953/1. C. Taylor, W. Ritchie and J. Johnston provided skilled technical support. Sulphur isotope measurements were made at SUERC. The manuscript benefitted substantially from the careful reviews of A.G. Leslie and an anonymous referee.Peer reviewedPublisher PD

Surface plasmons in metallic structures

Since the concept of a surface collective excitation was first introduced by Ritchie, surface plasmons have played a significant role in a variety of areas of fundamental and applied research, from surface dynamics to surface-plasmon microscopy, surface-plasmon resonance technology, and a wide range of photonic applications. Here we review the basic concepts underlying the existence of surface plasmons in metallic structures, and introduce a new low-energy surface collective excitation that has been recently predicted to exist.Comment: 14 pages, 14 figures, to appear in J. Opt. A: Pure Appl. Op

Low-Temperature Fluorocarbonate Mineralization in Lower Devonian Rhynie Chert, UK

Funding: J.G.T.A was partially funded by the Natural Environment Research Council, grant number NE/T003677/1. Acknowledgments: We are grateful to W. Ritchie, J. Johnston, and J. Bowie for skilled technicalsupport. Samples were archived by N.H. Trewin, C.M. Rice and S. Fayers.Peer reviewedPublisher PD

Reply to the correspondence: "On the fracture toughness of bioinspired ceramic materials"

This is a reply to the correspondence of Prof. Robert Ritchie: "On the fracture toughness of bioinspired ceramic materials", submitted to Nature Materials, which discusses the fracture toughness values of the following papers: Bouville, F., Maire, E., Meille, S., Van de Moort\`ele, B., Stevenson, A. J., & Deville, S. (2014). Strong, tough and stiff bioinspired ceramics from brittle constituents. Nature Materials, 13(5), 508-514 and Le Ferrand, H., Bouville, F., Niebel, T. P., & Studart, A. R. (2015). Magnetically assisted slip casting of bioinspired heterogeneous composites. Nature Materials, 14(11), 1172-1172.Comment: 5 pages, 2 figure

Trace element geochemistry in the earliest terrestrial ecosystem, the Rhynie Chert

Acknowledgements JGTA is supported by the Natural Environment Research Council (grant NE/T003677/1). Samples were archived at the University of Aberdeen by N.H. Trewin, S.R. Fayers and C.M. Rice. Skilled technical support was provided by J. Johnston, J. Bowie, W. Ritchie and C. Taylor. We are grateful for the comments of two reviewers which improved the manuscript.Peer reviewedPublisher PD

Molecular and mineral biomarker record of terrestrialization in the Rhynie Chert

The study depended on material archived by N.H. Trewin, C.M. Rice, S. Fayers and L.I. Anderson. We acknowledge C. Taylor, J. Still, J. Johnston, W. Ritchie and J. Bowie for skilled technical support. A. Schito kindly performed the Raman spectroscopy. We are very grateful to Professor Armelle Riboulleau, Universite de Lille, who provided a sample of SKT-D. The study was partly supported by the Natural Environment Research Council (grant NE/T003677/1). We are grateful for the comments of anonymous reviewers which greatly improved the manuscript.Peer reviewe

What’s wrong with the minimal conception of innateness in cognitive science?

One of the classic debates in cognitive science is between nativism and empiricism about the development of psychological capacities. In principle, the debate is empirical. However, in practice nativist hypotheses have also been challenged for relying on an ill-defined, or even unscientific, notion of innateness as that which is “not learned”. Here this minimal conception of innateness is defended on four fronts. First, it is argued that the minimal conception is crucial to understanding the nativism-empiricism debate, when properly construed; Second, various objections to the minimal conception—that it risks overgeneralization, lacks an account of learning, frustrates genuine explanations of psychological development, and fails to unify different notions of innateness across the sciences—are rebutted. Third, it is argued that the minimal conception avoids the shortcomings of primitivism, the prominent view that innate capacities are those that are not acquired via a psychological process in development. And fourth, the minimal conception undermines some attempts to identify innateness with a natural kind. So in short, we have little reason to reject, and good reason to accept, the minimal conception of innateness in cognitive science