KANT ON PHILOSOPHICAL EDUCATION IN THE AGE OF CRITIQUE

In Announcement of the Programme of his Lectures for the Winter Semester 1765‒1766, Immanuel Kant outlined his views of how philosophical education ought to be conducted. According to him, the method of instruction in philosophy should be zetetic, which means that students should first learn to philosophize rather than (as they typically expect) to learn philosophy, that is, that learning how to think for oneself ought to be preferred over learning particular philosophical systems. Kant argued for this view by claiming that philosophy at his time was not yet a complete discipline, and accordingly, that there was no philosophical book which might be said to contain definite solutions to the main philosophical problems.Given that the claims above had been stated in 1765, and that later on (in the 1780s and 1790s in particular) Kant thought that he had practically solved (or resolved) all the important philosophical questions, it is interesting to see whether his views of philosophical education remained the same, even more so because at that time he still claimed (for example, in Critique of Pure Reason and according to some transcriptions of his lectures) that his age was the age of critique and therefore it had to be seen what will come of it. I argue in this paper that there are good reasons to believe that Kant's aforementioned claims are compatible and that the continuity of his thoughts on these things can be preserved

Ontological and epistemological assumptions of theories of understanding others

U proteklih nekoliko decenija, razvila se intenzivna debata u pogledu toga na koji način razumevamo druga bića i, u vezi s tim, predlagana su različita rešenja. Njihov cilj je da se u potpunosti objasne slučajevi za koje smatramo da smo u stanju da razumemo druge osobe ili pak da se objasni zašto ponekad grešimo kada to pokušavamo da učinimo. U radu se, u cilju boljeg razumevanja čitave debate, ispituju ontološke i epistemološke pretpostavke teorija-teorije i simulacione teorije. Posebna pažnja je posvećena pojmu razumevanja koji je u njima prisutan.In the last few decades, an intensive debate concerning how we understand others has been conducted and, relating to this, different solutions were proposed. All these solutions aimed at providing a complete explanation of the cases in which we typically hold that we do understand others or at least to explain why sometimes we make mistakes when we try to do that. In this paper, ontological and epistemological assumptions of the theory-theory and the simulation theory are assessed in order to clarify the whole debate. Special attention is paid to the notion of understanding embedded in both theories

Prognostic Models in Predicting Locall Advanced Bladder tumor

Tumori mokraćne bešike čine značajan deo urološke patologije. Radikalnu cistektomiju primenjujemo kod odmakle bolesti. Postoji značajna diskrepanca kliničkog određenja stadijuma karcinoma mokraćne bešike i patološkog stadijuma nakon radikalne cistektomije. Prediktivni modeli su važna sredstva u proceni verovatnoće proširenosti bolesti. Osnova su za formiranje nomograma sa kojima se na osnovu preoperativnih prediktora predviđa postoperativni stadijum bolesti. Prediktivni model se bazira na rezultatima binarne logističke regresije. Osim utvrđenja metrijskih karakteristika modela, njegove validnosti i kliničke korisnosti, procenjuje se i stepen slaganja sa modelima drugih istraživača. U radu se ispituju performanse postojećih modela predikcije uznapredovalog tumora MB na našoj populaciji bolesnika. Dobijeni originalni model predikcije je još jedan dijagnostičko prognostički alat pomoći u lečenju i predviđanju ishoda bolesti.Bladder tumors make a significant portion of urological pathology. Radical cystectomy is applied just with patient that are in advanced stage of disease.There is significant discrepancy between clinical diagnosis of the bladder carcinoma stage and pathological staging after radical cystectomy. It is for substantial importance to use predictive models in order to predict probability of spreading disease. They are most useful information to help prognoses postoperative stage of disease. Predictive model is based on binary logistical regression. Beside determination of metric caracteristic, validity and clinical usefulness of the model, we also predict a degree of corespodence with other resarchers models. This paper also examines performances of existing models to predict further advancing of advanced bladder carcinoma within our patients. Original, resulting model of prediction is another diagnostic and prognostic tool to help determine outcome of diseases and further patients treatments

Modal epistemology and explanatory gap : on the importance of the zombie argument

Cilj ovog rada je da se odgovori na sledeće pitanje: na koji način argument na osnovu zamislivosti zombija utiče na rešavanje problema ekplanatornog jaza u filozofiji duha? Odgovor na ovo pitanje je sledeći: argument na osnovu zamislivosti zombija je validan i zdrav, i ostavlja problem eksplanatornog jaza, i još više, problem ontološkog jaza izmeĎu fizičkog i mentalnog, nerešenim. U ovom radu se nude novi argumenti koji ovoj tezi idu u prilog. Argument na osnovu zamislivosti zombija instanca je argumenta na osnovu zamislivosti, kojim se bavi modalna epistemologija, i u kome se iz zamislivosti zombija (našeg fizičkog dvojnika koji, za razliku od nas, ne poseduje subjektivna svesna iskustva) izvodi da je metafizički moguće da takva bića postoje. Ovim argumentom se dovodi u pitanje fizikalizam u filozofiji duha, kojim se tvrdi da je čitava stvarnost fizičke prirode (u smislu da je fizičko dovoljan uslov za mentalno) i/ili da je potpuni fizički opis univerzuma dovoljan za objašnjenje celokupne prirode univerzuma. S obzirom na to da je Dejvid Čalmers ponudio najrazvijeniju verziju argumenta na osnovu zamislivosti zombija, koja je i danas predmet velikih diskusija meĎu filozofima, u ovom radu se vrši detaljna egzegeza njegove verzije argumenta. Posebna pažnja se pridaje prigovorima koje mnogi filozofi upućuju Čalmersovom argumentu, a na koje sam Čalmers nije odgovorio ili, po mišljenju autora, nije odgovorio na zadovoljavajući način. Fizikalisti na različite načine pokušavaju da ospore argument na osnovu zamislivosti zombija...The aim of this thesis is to answer to the following question: how the zombie argument affects explanatory gap problem in philosophy of mind? Author gives the following answer: the zombie argument is valid and sound, and it leaves the explanatory gap problem (and, moreover ontological gap problem) unsolved. The author provides new arguments that support this way of thinking. The zombie argument is an instance of the conceivability argument in modal epistemology, which starts with a premise that zombies (our physical duplicates, who unlike us lack phenomenal consciousness) are conceivable, and concludes that zombies are metaphysically possible. The argument challenges physicalism in philosophy of mind, a view according to which everything is physical (in the sense that the physical is a sufficient condition for the mental), and/or a complete physical description of the universe suffices in explaining its nature. Physicalists deal with the zombie argument in various ways. Some of them think that zombies are not conceivable in any relevant sense; others think that conceivability does not entail metaphysical possibility; there are also physicalists who are willing to redefine their view in a way which avoids consequences of the zombie argument. In this thesis, all these attempts are assessed, and it is shown that they are not capable of rejecting the zombie argument. Bearing in mind that David Chalmers offers the most elaborated version of the zombie argument, which is still in a great focus among philosophers, the author provides a detail exegesis of Chalmers’ argument. Special attention is given to objections to which Chalmers has not provided an answer or, according to the author’s opinion, he has not answered successfully..

GUEST EDITOR’S LETTER

GUEST EDITOR'S LETTE

Epiphenomenalism, causation and explanation

Epifenomenalizam je stanovište po kome su mentalni događaji uzrokovani fizičkim događajima, a da pritom nemaju nikakvu uzročnu ulogu u fizičkom svetu. Ovo stanovište je jedna od opcija na raspolaganju filozofima koji iz različitih razloga ne prihvataju fizikalizam. Jedan od uobičajenih prigovora epifenomenalizmu, koji se može naći kod Ričarda Tejlora, jeste taj da on vodi neprihvatljivoj posledici da mentalni događaji ne igraju nikakvu ulogu u objašnjenju čovekovog postupanja, s obzirom na to da se, ako bi epifenomenalizam bio tačan, ništa ne bi promenilo i da ti mentalni događaji nisu bili prisutni prilikom vršenja odgovarajućeg postupka. U radu se pokazuje da ovakav prigovor u najboljem slučaju počiva na pretpostavci da objašnjenja moraju biti uzročna, koja je, u kontekstu savremenih rasprava u filozofiji nauke, u kojoj se navode mnogi primeri nekauzalnih objašnjenja, sporna. Takođe, korišćenjem analogije koja je zasnovana na jednoj mogućoj interpretaciji Aristotelovog shvatanja prirode geometrijskih objekata, ilustruje se kako bi epifenomenalizam mogao biti artikulisan.Epiphenomenalism is a view that mental events are caused by physical events yet they themselves do not play any causal role in the physical world. This view is worth considering for those philosophers who do not accept physicalism for some reason or another. However, a common objection to this view, which can be found in Richard Taylor's work, is that it leads to an unacceptable consequence that existing mental events are not important in explaining or understanding our behaviour, given that it predicts that nothing would change even if corresponding mental events had not occurred. In this paper, a response to this objection is provided. It is argued that the objection above at best relies upon the assumption that all explanations have to be causal, which is rather implausible in the context of present debates in the philosophy of science that make room for noncausal explanations. Furthermore, by using an interpretation of the Aristotelian view of the nature of geometrical objects as analogy, a model of how noncausal (and nonphysical) phenomenal consciousness could be explanatorily powerful is provided, which renders epiphenomenalism intelligible

The semantics of indicative conditionals: A counterexample to the horseshoe analysis

U radu se navodi kontraprimer za Potkovicu (teoriju po kojoj indikativni kondicionali '→' imaju iste istinosne uslove kao i materijalna implikacija '?'), koji je modifikovana verzija 'kondicionala sa igrališta' koje je konstruisao Džejson Deker. Pokazuje se zašto Dekerov primer nije dobar ako se prikaže u izvornoj formi, a zatim se, uz pomoć misaonog eksperimenta sa inverznim spektrom, nudi poboljšana verzija Dekerovog primera. Na kraju rada se ukazuje da modifikovani primer 'kondicionala sa igrališta' ne predstavlja problem za epistemičku verziju dvodimenzionalne semantike (E2-D), i da u tom smislu treba dati prednost E2-D u razumevanju semantike indikativnih kondicionala.The paper examines a counterexample of the horseshoe analysis of indicative conditionals (according to which indicative conditionals '→' have the same truth-conditions as the material implication '?'). The example is a modified and improved version of Jason Decker’s 'playground conditionals' case. The paper aims to show why Decker’s original example is wrong, and how it can be improved by using the inverted spectrum thought experiment. It is also shown in this paper that playground conditionals do not pose any problems to the epistemic version of the two-dimensional semantics (E2-D), which leads to the conclusion that we should prefer E2-D to the horseshoe analysis of indicative conditionals

Zombies Slap Back: Why the Anti-Zombie Parody Does Not Work

In his “anti-zombie argument”, Keith Frankish turns the tables on “zombists”, forcing them to find an independent argument against the conceivability of anti-zombies. I argue that zombists can shoulder the burden, for there is an important asymmetry between the conceivability of zombies and the conceivability of anti-zombies, which is reflected in the embedding of a totality-clause under the conceivability operator. This makes the anti-zombie argument susceptible to what I call the ‘Modified Incompleteness’, according to which we cannot conceive of scenarios. In this paper I also argue that conceiving of the zombiesituation is a good starting point for rendering the zombie argument plausible