EU Commission participation in the Troika mission: is there a European Union price to pay?

The article is intended to debate two questions regarding the involvement of the Commission in the Troika's action: firstly, considering the nature of financial assistance programs, it aims to discuss the effect of the Commission's participation in Troika negotiations on the balance of power of the EU institutions; and secondly, the article raises the issue of the Commission's liability for the results achieved by the financial assistance program, taking into account the extent of the conditions imposed, as well as the intensity of scrutiny by the Troika

The legal orders of the European Community and of the Member States: peculiarities and influences in drafting

Article on legislative drafting of legal orders in the European Community and its Member States based on the Fourth Annual Sir William Dale Memorial Lecture given by Jean-Claude Piris, Director-General, Legal Service, Council of European Union. Published in Amicus Curiae - Journal of the Society for Advanced Legal Studies. The Journal is produced by the Society for Advanced Legal Studies at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London

L'interdiction du recours à la force contre les aéronefs civils, l'aménagement de 1984 à la Convention de Chicago

Piris Jean-Claude. L'interdiction du recours à la force contre les aéronefs civils, l'aménagement de 1984 à la Convention de Chicago. In: Annuaire français de droit international, volume 30, 1984. pp. 711-732

La Unión Europea, Cataluña y Escocia (Cuestiones jurídicas sobre las recientes tendencias secesionistas en los Estados Miembros de la UE)

Este estudio surge de los acontecimientos producidos en 2014 y 2015 en Escocia (referéndum sobre la independencia) y en Cataluña («consulta informal» y elecciones autonómicas). En ambos casos, los movimientos secesionistas deseaban que un nuevo Estado nacido de la secesión llegara a ser (según ellos, «siguiera siendo») parte de la UE. Esta convicción les fortalece, ya que la UE es vista como un «refugio seguro », que permite la independencia sin la amenaza de quedar aislado. Los Tratados de la UE ni prevén ni prohiben la división de un Estado miembro. No obstante, para llegar a ser parte de la UE, la región secesionista debería primero ser reconocida como Estado por la comunidad internacional, y específicamente por los 28 Estados miembros de la UE (incluyendo España y el Reino Unido). Esto sería legalmente posible si el nuevo Estado naciera respetando completamente el Estado de Derecho, pero en cambio excluiría un «Estado» que hubiera declarado unilateralmente su independencia violando la Constitución nacional. Así, un nuevo Estado reconocido podría ser candidato a incorporarse a la UE. El autor muestra que debería seguirse el procedimiento del artículo 49 del Tratado de la UE y no el del artículo 48 (enmiendas a los Tratados). Tomando Escocia como ejemplo, el autor describe los pasos legales necesarios que deben darse después de la secesión. Señala que la división de un Estado de la UE ya no debería verse como un asunto estrictamente nacional; dadas sus consecuencias sobre la UE en conjunto y sobre otros Estados miembros, es un asunto que no puede ser ignorado por la UE.This study starts from the 2014-2015 events in Scotland (referendum on independence) and in Catalonia («informal consultation» and regional elections). Secessionists movements in both cases wished that a new State born from the secession would become (according to them «continues to be») part of the EU. That conviction strengthens them, as the EU is seen as a «safe haven», allowing independence without the threat of being isolated. The EU Treaties neither provide for, nor prohibit the partition of a Member State. However, in order to become part of the EU, the secessionist region should first be recognized as a State by the international community, and specifically by the 28 EU Member States (including Spain and the UK). This would be legally possible if the new State was born in full respect of the Rule of Law, but would exclude a «State» having unilaterally declared its independence in violation of the national Constitution. Then, a new State recognised could be a candidate to the EU. The author shows that the procedure of article 49 of the Treaty on EU woud have to be followed (accession of a new State) and not that of article 48 (amendments to the Treaties). Taking Scotland as an example, the author describes the necessary legal steps to be accomplished after the secession. He stresses that the partition of an EU State should not anymore being regarded as a strictly national matter. Given its consequences on the EU as a whole and on other Member States, it is a matter that cannot be ignored by the EU

The Amsterdam Treaty: Overview and Institutional Aspects

The overall picture presented by the media regarding the two day and two night Amsterdam meeting of the Heads of State and Government in June 1997 was largely negative. The main reason for the negativity was that the Intergovernmental Conference (“IGC”), by failing to agree on Treaty amendments concerning the size of the Commission and the weighting system for qualified majority voting in the Council, supposedly could not produce satisfactory responses as to the need to reform the institutions of the European Union with a view to its next enlargement. Is this picture justified in light of the actual outcome of the IGC? It certainly would be if the IGC\u27s scope had been limited to institutional reform and if the IGC had not produced any concrete results in the institutional field. But neither of these statements is true. One only needs to look at the changes brought about by the Treaty of Amsterdam to appreciate the extent of the reform. The purpose of this Article is to provide such an illustrative overview of the reform, with particular emphasis on institutional aspects. This will be done against the background of the preparation and development of the IGC

In vivo germination of Bacillus anthracis spores during murine cutaneous infection.

International audienceBACKGROUND: Germination is a key step for successful Bacillus anthracis colonization and systemic dissemination. Few data are available on spore germination in vivo, and the necessity of spore and host cell interactions to initiate germination is unclear. METHODS: To investigate the early interactions between B. anthracis spores and cutaneous tissue, spores were inoculated in an intraperitoneal cell-free device in guinea pigs or into the pinna of mice. Germination and bacterial growth were analyzed through colony-forming unit enumeration and electron microscopy. RESULTS: In the guinea pig model, germination occurred in vivo in the absence of cell contact. Similarly, in the mouse ear, germination started within 15 minutes after inoculation, and germinating spores were found in the absence of surrounding cells. Germination was not observed in macrophage-rich draining lymph nodes, liver, and spleen. Edema and lethal toxin production were not required for germination, as a toxin-deficient strain was as effective as a Sterne-like strain. B. anthracis growth was locally controlled for 6 hours. CONCLUSIONS: Spore germination involving no cell interactions can occur in vivo, suggesting that diffusible germinants or other signals appear sufficient. Different host tissues display drastic differences in germination-triggering capacity. Initial control of bacterial growth suggests a therapeutic means to exploit host innate defenses to hinder B. anthracis colonization

What determines demand for European Union referendums?

Notwithstanding elite opposition to referendums as inconsistent with theories of representative democracy, the 27-nation European Election Study finds that 63 per cent of EU citizens want a vote on EU treaties. One explanation is that the majority want more popular participation in politics; another is that referendums are demanded by those negative about the performance of their governors at national and EU levels; a third is that demand is higher where referendums are part of the national context. Multi-level statistical analysis shows greater support for the hypotheses that citizens dissatisfied with government performance are more likely to want referendums to check their governors and that national context matters. However, dissatisfied EU citizens are a minority; most who endorse EU referendums are actually pro-EU. This lowers the risk of defeat if the EU consulted its citizens in a pan-European referendum