The Balanced Threat Agreement for Individual Externality Negotiation Problems

This paper introduces a model to analyze individual externalities and the associated negotiation problem, which has been largely neglected in the game theoretic literature. Following an axiomatic perspective, we propose a solution, as a payoff sharing scheme, called the balanced threat agreement, for such problems. It highlights an agent’s potential influences on all agents by threatening to enter or quit. We further study the solution by investigating its consistency. We also offer a discussion on the related stability issue

Beyond chance? The persistence of performance in online poker

A major issue in the widespread controversy about the legality of poker and the appropriate taxation of winnings is whether poker should be considered a game of skill or a game of chance. To inform this debate we present an analysis into the role of skill in the performance of online poker players, using a large database with hundreds of millions of player-hand observations from real money ring games at three different stakes levels. We find that players whose earlier profitability was in the top (bottom) deciles perform better (worse) and are substantially more likely to end up in the top (bottom) performance deciles of the following time period. Regression analyses of performance on historical performance and other skill-related proxies provide further evidence for persistence and predictability. Simulations point out that skill dominates chance when performance is measured over 1,500 or more hands of play

Sequencing situations with just-in-time arrival, and related games

In this paper sequencing situations with Just-in-Time (JiT) arrival are introduced. This new type of one-machine sequencing situations assumes that a job is available to be handled by the machine as soon as its predecessor is finished. A basic predecessor dependent set-up time is incorporated in the model. Sequencing situations with JiT arrival are first analyzed from an operations research perspective: for a subclass an algorithm is provided to obtain an optimal order. Secondly, we analyze the allocation problem of the minimal joint cost from a game theoretic perspective. A corresponding sequencing game is defined followed by an analysis of a context-specific rule that leads to core elements of this gam

Cost allocation rules for elastic single-attribute situations

\u3cp\u3eMany cooperative games, especially ones stemming from resource pooling in queueing or inventory systems, are based on situations in which each player is associated with a single attribute (a real number representing, say, a demand) and in which the cost to optimally serve any sum of attributes is described by an elastic function (which means that the per-demand cost is non-increasing in the total demand served). For this class of situations, we introduce and analyze several cost allocation rules: the proportional rule, the serial cost sharing rule, the benefit-proportional rule, and various Shapley-esque rules. We study their appeal with regard to fairness criteria such as coalitional rationality, benefit ordering, and relaxations thereof. After showing the impossibility of combining coalitional rationality and benefit ordering, we show for each of the cost allocation rules which fairness criteria it satisfies.\u3c/p\u3

Batch sequencing and cooperation

Game theoretic analysis of sequencing situations has been restricted to manufacturing systems which consist of machines that can process only one job at a time. However, in many manufacturing systems, operations are carried out by batch machines which can simultaneously process multiple jobs. This paper aims to extend the game theoretical approach to the cost allocation problems arising from sequencing situations on systems that consist of batch machines. To analyze the allocation problem at hand, it focusses on the existence of core elements, convexity, and the Shapley value

Internal slackening scoring methods

We deal with the ranking problem of the nodes in a directed graph. The bilateral relationships specified by a directed graph may reflect the outcomes of a sport competition, the mutual reference structure between websites, or a group preference structure over alternatives. We introduce a class of scoring methods for directed graphs, indexed by a single nonnegative parameter a. This parameter reflects the internal slackening of a node within an underlying iterative process. The class of so-called Internal slackening scoring methods, denoted by ¿^sup a^, consists of the limits of these processes. It is seen that ¿^sup 0^ extends the invariant scoring method, while ¿^sup 8^ extends the fair bets scoring method. Method ¿^sup 1^ corresponds with the existing ¿-scoring method of Borm et al. (Ann Oper Res 109(1):61-75, 2002) and can be seen as a compromise between ¿^sup 0^ and ¿^sup 8^. In particular, an explicit proportionality relation between ¿^sup a^ and ¿^sup 1^ is derived. Moreover, the Internal slackening scoring methods are applied to the setting of social choice situations where they give rise to a class of social choice correspondences that refine both the Top cycle correspondence and the Uncovered set correspondence

On a new class of parallel sequencing situations and related games

This paper considers a special class of sequencing situations with two parallel machines in which each agent has precisely two jobs to be processed, one on each machine. The costs of an agent depend linearly on the final completion time of his jobs. We describe a procedure that provides an optimal processing order of the jobs for some particular classes. Furthermore, we study cooperative games arising from these sequencing situations. Our main result will be on the balancedness of these games