Soul's Tools

This paper explores the various ways Aristotle refers to and employs “heat and cold” in his embryology. In my view, scholars are too quick to assume that references to heat and cold are references to matter or an animal’s material nature. More commonly, I argue, Aristotle refers to heat and cold as the “tools” of soul. As I understand it, Aristotle is thinking of heat and cold in many contexts as auxiliary causes by which soul activities (primarily “concoction”) are carried out. This, as I argue, is what it means to call them “tools” of soul. An upshot of this investigation is the fuller picture of Aristotle’s conception of efficient causation it provides in general, and the better understanding of the efficient causal operation of an organism’s nature or soul it provides in particular

Philoponus: on Aristotle physics 41-5

Aristotles account of place, in which he defined a things place as the inner surface of its nearest immobile container, was supported by the Latin Middle Ages, even 1600 years after his death, though it had not convinced many ancient Greek philosophers. The sixth century commentator Philoponus took a more common-sense view. For him, place was an immobile three-dimensional extension, whose essence did not preclude its being empty, even if for other reasons it had always to be filled with body. However, Philoponus reserved his own definition for an excursus, already translated in this series, T

Maleische spraakkunst

Mode of access: Internet

Tata bahasa melayu

Judul asli : Maleische Spreakkunstxxx, 251 p.; 23 cm

Tata bahasa melayu/ Ophuijsen

xxx, 250 hal. ; 23 cm

Tata bahasa melayu/ Ophuijsen

xxx, 250 hal. ; 23 cm