Electoral administration and the problem of poll worker recruitment: Who volunteers, and why?

Elections depend on the thousands of people who give up their time to administer this crucial public service. They staff polling stations and ensure votes are issued, cast and counted. Poll workers are effectively ‘stipended volunteers’, receiving some limited financial compensation, but working for the broader public good. It is important to understand why people choose to give up their time to provide this fundamental public service to their fellow citizens. Using original data from a poll worker survey conducted in the 2015 British general election, this article investigates the motivations and incentives for poll workers volunteering to administer major elections in an important advanced democracy. Exploratory expectations are set out about the motivations of poll workers, and the relationship to their socio-economic characteristics, and levels of social capital and satisfaction with democracy. Contrary to expectations, the findings note that, earning some extra money is important to many, although motivations are more broadly structured around solidary, purposive and material motivations. The article establishes a range of relationships between each set of incentives, and poll workers’ socio-economic, social capital and satisfaction profiles

After personalism: rethinking power transfers in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan

What happens to elites when the personalistic leader they supported for so long suddenly dies? This article tackles comparatively transitions out of first presidencies in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, presenting an analytical framework that seeks to explain why these transitions unfolded in relatively smooth fashion. The overall stability defining power transfer processes instigated by the non-violent death of personalistic rulers in both contexts is explained here through the intersection of three key factors: the regimes’ resort to succession practices consolidated in the Soviet era, the emergence of temporary forms of collective decision-making in both transitional contexts, and the implementation of de-personalisation strategies pursuing the obliteration of specific pockets of cadres but stopping short of wider regime re-organisation. The findings of this article contribute to broader debates on the politics of de-personalisation, while putting forward a comprehensive framework to analyse transitions out of personalism in and beyond post-Soviet Eurasia

Gender ‘hostility’, rape, and the hate crime paradigm

This article examines whether crimes motivated by, or which demonstrate, gender ‘hostility’ should be included within the current framework of hate crime legislation in England and Wales. The article uses the example of rape to explore the parallels (both conceptual and evidential) between gender‐motivated violence and other ‘archetypal’ forms of hate crime. It is asserted that where there is clear evidence of gender hostility during the commission of an offence, a defendant should be pursued in law additionally as a hate crime offender. In particular it is argued that by focusing on the hate‐motivation of many sexual violence offenders, the criminal justice system can begin to move away from its current focus on the ‘sexual’ motivations of offenders and begin to more effectively challenge the gendered prejudices that are frequently causal to such crimes

“Tying Incumbents’ Hands”: The Effects of Election Monitoring on Electoral Outcome

Electoral observation missions (EOM) are designed to promote improvements in democratic quality by overseeing elections, but how successful are they? We argue that EOM tie the hands of incumbents, who have to adjust their electoral misconduct strategies, thus opening up political competition and making it more likely that the opposition will do well. Moreover, we propose that monitoring effects are conditioned by regime type, expecting that EOM presence has a stronger impact on electoral competition in autocracies than in democracies. Using a dataset of 580 parliamentary and presidential elections in 108 countries between 1976 and 2009 we find support for our theoretical claims. EOM increase electoral competitiveness in dictatorships by reducing margins of victory for incumbents, but leave competition unaffected in democracies. Furthermore, our analysis indicates that, contrary to previous findings, EOM increase the probability of electoral turnover in dictatorships but have no effect on democracies