Children’s trust in previously inaccurate informants who were well- or poorly- informed : when past errors can be excused

Past research demonstrates that children learn from a previously accurate speaker rather than from a previously inaccurate one. This study shows that children do not necessarily treat a previously inaccurate speaker as unreliable. Rather, they appropriately excuse past inaccuracy arising from the speaker’s limited information access. Children (N = 67) aged 3, 4 and 5 years aimed to identify a hidden toy in collaboration with a puppet as informant. When the puppet had previously been inaccurate despite having full information, children tended to ignore what they were told and guess for themselves: They treated the puppet as unreliable in the longer term. However children more frequently believed a currently well-informed puppet whose past inaccuracies arose legitimately from inadequate information access

When do children learn from unreliable speakers?

Children do not necessarily disbelieve a speaker with a history of inaccuracy; they take into account reasons for errors. Three- to 5 year-olds (N = 97) aimed to identify a hidden target in collaboration with a puppet. The puppet’s history of inaccuracy arose either from false beliefs, or occurred despite his being fully informed. On a subsequent test trial, children’s realistic expectation about the target was contradicted by the puppet who was fully informed. Children were more likely to revise their belief in line with the puppet’s assertion when his previous errors were due to false beliefs. Children who explained this puppet’s prior inaccuracy in terms of false belief were more likely to believe the puppet than those who did not. As children’s understanding of the mind advances, they increasingly balance the risk of learning falsehoods from unreliable speakers against that of rejecting truths from speakers who made excusable errors

Children's working understanding of knowledge sources : confidence in knowledge gained from testimony

In three experiments children aged between 3 and 5 years (N = 38; 52; 94; mean ages 3;7 to 5;2) indicated their confidence in their knowledge of the identity of a hidden toy. With the exception of some 3-year-olds, children revealed working understanding of their knowledge source by showing high confidence when they had seen or felt the toy, and lower confidence when they had been told its identity by an apparently well-informed speaker, especially when the speaker subsequently doubted the adequacy of his access to the toy. After a 2-minute delay, 3-to 4- year olds, unlike 4- to 5-year-olds, failed to see the implications of the speaker’s doubt about his access

Best friends: children use mutual gaze to identify friendships in others

This study examined children’s ability to use mutual eye gaze as a cue to friendships in others. In Experiment 1, following a discussion about friendship, 4-, 5-, and 6-year-olds were shown animations in which three cartoon children looked at one another, and were told that one target character had a best friend. Although all age groups accurately detected the mutual gaze between the target and another character, only 5- and 6-year-olds used this cue to infer friendship. Experiment 2 replicated the effect with 5- and 6-year-olds when the target character was not explicitly identified. Finally, in Experiment 3, where the attribution of friendship could only be based on synchronized mutual gaze, 6-year-olds made this attribution, while 4- and 5-year-olds did not. Children occasionally referred to mutual eye gaze when asked to justify their responses in Experiments 2 and 3, but it was only by the age of 6 that reference to these cues correlated with the use of mutual gaze in judgements of affiliation. Although younger children detected mutual gaze, it was not until 6 years of age that children reliably detected and justified mutual gaze as a cue to friendship

The role of timing and prototypical causality on how preschoolers fast-map novel verb meanings

In controlled contexts, young children find it more difficult to learn novel words for actions than words for objects: Imai et al. (2008) found that English-speaking three-year-olds mistakenly choose a novel object as a referent for a novel verb about 42% of the time despite hearing the verb in a transitive sentence. The current two studies investigated whether English three- and five-year-old children would find resultative actions easier (since they are prototypically causative) than the non-resultative, durative event types used in Imai et al.’s studies. The reverse was true. Furthermore, if the novel verbs were taught on completion of the action, this did not improve performance, which contrasts with previous findings (e.g. Tomasello & Kruger, 1992). Our resultative actions were punctual, change-of-location events which may be less visually salient than the non-resulative, durative actions. Visual salience may play a greater role than does degree of action causality in the relative ease of verb learning even at three years

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Does the majority always know best? Young children's flexible trust in majority opinion

Copying the majority is generally an adaptive social learning strategy but the majority does not always know best. Previous work has demonstrated young children's selective uptake of information from a consensus over a lone dissenter. The current study examined children's flexibility in following the majority: do they overextend their reliance on this heuristic to situations where the dissenting individual has privileged knowledge and should be trusted instead? Four- to six- year-olds (N = 103) heard conflicting claims about the identity of hidden drawings from a majority and a dissenter in two between-subject conditions: in one, the dissenter had privileged knowledge over the majority (he drew the pictures); in the other he did not (they were drawn by an absent third party). Overall, children were less likely to trust the majority in the Privileged Dissenter condition. Moreover, 5- and 6- year-olds made majority-based inferences when the dissenter had no privileged knowledge but systematically endorsed the dissenter when he drew the pictures. The current findings suggest that by 5 years, children are able to make an epistemic-based judgment to decide whether or not to follow the majority rather than automatically following the most common view

Developing a parent report measure of social cognition from birth to 3 years

While social cognition has traditionally been measured with lab tasks (e.g., Carpenter, et al., 1998), recently, Tahiroglu et al (2014) have developed the Children’s Social Understanding Scale for 3- to 5-year-olds. They found parents reliably report socio-cognitive development. To examine earlier socio-cognitive development, we have created a parent-report measure of social cognition from birth to 3 years, the Early Social Cognition Scale (ESCS). In study 1 (exploratory, N=230) parents of 0- to 47-month-olds completed the 23-question ESCS online. Questions determined children’s level of social cognition, e.g., “Does your child follow where you point to look at the same things as you?” and, “Does your child understand what it means for others to make mistakes? E.g., that they dropped a plate by accident.” One item did not correlate with the total score, “Does your child like to look at faces?” since it was at ceiling, so was dropped. The remaining 22 items correlated with the total score with Spearman’s rho>.3, p<.05. Scale reliability was excellent, KR20=0.95. The ESCS correlated strongly with age, Pearson’s r=0.86, p<.001. In study 2 (confirmatory, N=228), scale reliability was again excellent, KR20=0.93, and again, the ESCS correlated strongly with age, Pearson’s r=0.82, p<.001. A subset of children from the above studies were tested for test-retest reliability. Children (N=48) had similar scores 6 months later, Pearson’s r=0.56, p<.001, df=45, controlling for age. Children (N=24) also had similar scores 12 months later, Pearson’s r=0.66, p=.001, df=21, controlling for age. A subset of children from the above studies were tested for inter-observer agreement by having both parents separately complete the ESCS. Both parents gave similar scores to children (N=32), Pearson’s r=0.85, p<.001, df=29, controlling for age. The final stage will involve comparing the ESCS to lab tasks for 84 children