Climate clubs: politically feasible and desirable?

The idea of a stringent climate club, once the reserve of academic debates, is quickly gaining ground in international policy circles. This reflects dissatisfaction with the multilateral UNFCCC process, but also hope that a minilateral club could increase climate policy ambition, reinvigorate the Paris Agreement process, and make future emissions pledges stick. With the Biden Presidency renewing the US commitment toward climate action and the European Green Deal proposal for carbon border tariffs, some are advocating the creation of a transatlantic climate club. What could a club approach hope to achieve, and what do we know about its political feasibility and desirability? In this article, we seek conceptual clarification by establishing a typology of different club models; we inject a greater sense of political realism into current debates on the feasibility of these models; and we consider their legitimacy in the context of international climate cooperation. Key policy insights Knowledge gaps and confusion regarding the nature of climate clubs hold back debates about what intergovernmental clubs can contribute to international climate policy. Club design matters: existing club models vary in terms of the proposed size, purpose, operational principles, legal strength, and relationship to the UNFCCC. Clubs focused on normative commitments face low barriers to establishment. They lack legal strength but can help raise policy ambition. Clubs aimed at negotiating targets and measures can increase bargaining efficiency, but struggle to deal with equity and distributional conflicts. Clubs seeking to change incentives via club benefits and sanctions face the highest hurdles to implementation. Their promise to tackle free-riding remains untested and difficult to achieve. Climate clubs face an international legitimacy deficit. Any club proposal needs to consider how to add to, and not distract from, the multilateral climate regime

Three decades of climate mitigation: why haven't we bent the global emissions curve?

Despite three decades of political efforts and a wealth of research on the causes and catastrophic impacts of climate change, global carbon dioxide emissions have continued to rise and are 60% higher today than they were in 1990. Exploring this rise through nine thematic lenses—covering issues of climate governance, the fossil fuel industry, geopolitics, economics, mitigation modeling, energy systems, inequity, lifestyles, and social imaginaries—draws out multifaceted reasons for our collective failure to bend the global emissions curve. However, a common thread that emerges across the reviewed literature is the central role of power, manifest in many forms, from a dogmatic political-economic hegemony and influential vested interests to narrow techno-economic mindsets and ideologies of control. Synthesizing the various impediments to mitigation reveals how delivering on the commitments enshrined in the Paris Agreement now requires an urgent and unprecedented transformation away from today's carbon- and energy-intensive development paradigm

Transparency and Its Discontents: How IO Transparency Influences Domestic Resistance to Government Reforms

How do international organizations influence domestic transparency? Studies typically contend that in order to be instrumental in promoting good government institutions, international organizations have to embody these norms in their own work. International organizations (IOs) have recently implemented a number of reforms to open up certain official documents and proceedings to public access. These reforms are generally expected to promote support for transparency in member countries. We suggest that one important and overlooked condition determines the ability of international organizations to meet these expectations: the quality of IO decision making, defined as its effectiveness, predictability and fairness. The paper develops these ideas theoretically and presents a study on how these reforms influence perceptions of the merits and drawbacks of transparency among senior government officials in environmental ministries, involved in projects seeking finance through the Clean Development Mechanisms and the Multilateral Fund for the Implementation of the Montreal Protocol

Does Corruption Cause Aid Fatigue?

Does corruption reduce support for foreign aid? General explanations for aid fatigue, such as meagre development results and the perception that taxpayers’ money is being wasted fail to solve what we call the aid-corruption paradox, namely that the need for foreign aid is often the greatest in corrupt environments. Corruption can be seen as an external impediment on the effectiveness of aid, but also as an internal and important target of aid-driven efforts to improve governments. This paper explores the influence of corruption on support for foreign aid and conditions under which corruption causes aid fatigue. Building on studies of the motives for foreign aid and the social acceptability of corruption, we suggest that the relationship between corruption and aid fatigue substantially depends on fundamental beliefs about the role of foreign aid. The analysis builds on data from the 2009 Eurobarometer survey. Our findings have implications for understanding the consequences of the remarkable increase in exposure of corruption in recent years, efforts to tackle global environmental challenges, and fundamental relationships between corruption and aid legitimacy

Towards Better Governments? A Theoretical Framework for the Influence of International Organizations

Although international organizations are typically seen as important actors promoting better government institutions and reducing corruption, there are few comprehensive analysis of how they promote such changes. This paper develops a theoretical framework that traces the roots of IO success or failure to factors that are internal to the strategies that they employ. We suggest that the tools used by international organizations to promote quality of government can be categorized into four groups: Inter-state competitive pressures; conditions on economic assistance; interaction with transnational actors; and the enlargement of international communities. In contrast to accounts that trace the roots of IO success or failure in member states to domestic particularities, such as the amount of domestic resistance to government reforms, we argue that the mechanisms themselves have a number of shortcomings that reduce their effectiveness. Six such factors are identified: imprecise data, market pressures, contested policy advice, incomplete internalization and lack of mainstreaming of norms by international organizations and member states, and low priority of quality of government issues. The paper thereby offers an explanation for why numerous empirical studies fail to find a positive correlation between IO measures and better government institutions

Why Pay Bribes? Collective Action and Anticorruption Efforts

This paper suggests that the effectiveness of current anticorruption policy suffers from a focus on the scale of the corruption problem instead of type of corruption that is to be fought. I make a distinction between need and greed corruption. Contrary to the most commonly used distinctions this distinction focuses on the basic motivation for paying a bribe, and whether the bribe is used to gain services that citizens are legally entitled to or not. Greed corruption is used to gain advantages that citizens are not legally entitled to, build on collusion rather than extortion and can thereby remain invisible and unobtrusive. In greed corruption societies the costs of corruption are divided between a large number of actors and the negative effects of corruption on economic and democratic performance are delayed and diffuse. I subsequently use this distinction to develop three propositions about the relationship between corruption and institutional trust, and the effects of anticorruption policy. Using both cross country data and a case study of a low corruption context, I suggests a) That greed corruption can coexist with high institutional trust, and that it thereby may not follow the expected, and often confirmed, negative relationship between corruption and institutional trust b) That greed corruption may not produce civic engagement against corruption and c) That increased transparency may not produce the expected benefits in low need corruption contexts, since it can disproportionally alter expectations about the entrenchment of corruption in a society. In other words, the paper suggest that the balance between need and greed corruption in a society determines the effectiveness of traditional policy measures derived from the logic of principal agent theory, such as societal accountability and transparency, and that the relevance of collective action theory to understand the effects of anticorruption efforts can be extended to contexts where the overall level of corruption is low

Formare, Mäklare och Görare : Icke-Statliga Aktörers Dynamiska Roller i den Globala Klimatstyrningen

Non-state actors, such as international environmental organisations, business associations and indigenous peoples organisations, increasingly take on governance functions that can influence the delivery of global public goods. This thesis examines the roles of these actors in the field of global climate change governance. Specifically, the thesis examines why and how non-state actors are involved in global climate change governance, the governance activities that they may perform and are perceived to perform, and their views on climate change solutions. The thesis also discusses the implications of their roles for how authority is shared between states and non-state actors in global climate change governance. The research questions are addressed by triangulating several empirical methods. The results show that the roles of non-state actors are continuously evolving and depend on the changing nature of relations between state and non-state actors as well as efforts by non-state actors to expand their policy space by justifying and seeking recognition for their participation. Moreover, the findings point to the importance of differentiating between groups of non-state actors, as they represent diverse interests and have different comparative advantages across governance activities. Which non-state actors participate and to what extent therefore has implications for the effects of their involvement in global climate change governance. On the basis of a systematic assessment of a set of non-state actors, this thesis concludes that the key role-categories of non-state actors in global climate change governance are broadly: shapers of information and ideas, brokers of knowledge, norms and initiatives, and doers of implementing policies and influencing behaviours. Different non-state actors carry out activities within these role-categories to different extents. In addition to the empirical mapping of the roles of non-state actors in global climate change governance, this thesis contributes to two strands in the literature: one theoretical focusing on the authority and legitimacy of non-state actors in global environmental governance, and the other methodological, offering a toolbox that combines survey data with qualitative methods.Icke-statliga aktörer, exempelvis internationella miljöorganisationer, näringslivsorganisationer och ursprungsbefolkningsorganisationer, fyller alltmer framträdande funktioner i den globala klimatstyrningen. Dessa organisationer kan därmed påverka utformningen av globala kollektiva nyttigheter. Denna avhandling undersöker dessa aktörers roller inom den globala klimatstyrningen. Avhandlingen utforskar varför och på vilket sätt icke-statliga aktörer deltar i den globala klimatstyrningen, uppfattningar om vilka styraktiviteter de utför, och ifall de bidrar till en mer pluralistisk syn på klimatproblematikens lösningar. I avhandlingen diskuteras vilka konsekvenser de icke-statliga aktörernas roller har för hur auktoritet delas mellan stater och icke-statliga aktörer i den globala klimatpolitiken. Forskningsfrågorna behandlas genom att triangulera flera empiriska metoder. Resultaten från dessa undersökningar visar att de icke-statliga aktörernas roller utvecklas kontinuerligt och att dynamiken dels beror på den skiftande relationen mellan statliga och icke-statliga aktörer, dels på de icke-statliga aktörernas egna ansträngningar att öka sitt politiska handlingsutrymme och få erkännande för sitt deltagande. Dessutom pekar resultaten på vikten av att skilja mellan olika grupper av icke-statliga aktörer, eftersom de representerar skilda intressen och har komparativa fördelar i olika styraktiviteter. En konsekvens av detta är att det spelar roll vilka grupper av icke-statliga aktörer som ges tillträde till den internationella klimatdiplomatin. Baserat på en systematisk  bedömning av vad några av de icke-statliga aktörerna anses göra, dras slutsatsen att de viktigaste rollkategorierna som icke-statliga aktörer har är: formare av information och idéer, mäklare av kunskap, normer och initiativ, och görare genom att bidra till implementering och påverka beteenden, men att olika icke-statliga aktörer utför dessa roller i olika utsträckning. Utöver den empiriska kartläggningen av icke-statliga aktörers roller i den globala klimatstyrningen, bidrar avhandlingen dels till den teoretiska litteraturen kring icke-statliga aktörers auktoritet och legitimitet inom den globala miljöstyrningen, dels metodologiskt genom att utveckla analysverktyg som kombinerar enkätdata med kvalitativa metoder

Legitimacy under institutional complexity: Mapping stakeholder perceptions of legitimate institutions and their sources of legitimacy in global renewable energy governance

The legitimacy of international institutions has in recent years received growing interest from scholars, yet analyses of stakeholder perceptions of the legitimacy of institutions that coexist within a governance field have been few in number. Motivated by the proliferation of institutions in the field of global climate and energy governance, this study maps stakeholder perceptions of legitimate institutions and their sources of legitimacy in global renewable energy governance. Specifically, the article makes three contributions to the existing literature. Theoretically, it unpacks the legitimacy concept and offers a multidimensional conception of legitimacy. Methodologically, it captures these different dimensions of legitimacy by relying on three open survey questions. Empirically, it maps legitimacy perceptions among climate and energy experts and not only shows which institutions are considered most legitimate, but also why they are considered legitimate and how this varies between different stakeholders. The article thereby contributes to the literature on legitimacy by providing new insights into the sources of legitimacy among international institutions that operate under institutional complexity