Absorptive Capacity and Efficiency: A Comparative Stochastic Frontier Approach Using Sectoral Data

In this paper, we investigate differences in and determinants of technical efficiency across three groups of OECD, Asian and Latin American countries. As technical efficiency determines the capacity with which countries absorb technology produced abroad, these differences are important to understand differences in growth and productivity across countries, especially for developing countries which depend to a large extend on foreign technology. Using a stochastic frontier framework and data for 22 manufacturing sectors for 1996-2005, we find notable differences in technical efficiency between the three country groups we examine. We then investigate the effect of human capital and domestic R&D, proxied by the stock of patents, on technical efficiency. We find that while human capital has always a strongly positive effect on efficiency, an increase in the stock of patents has positive effects on efficiency in high-tech sectors, but negative effects in low-tech sectors

Ranking alternatives by a fair bidding rule: a theoretical and experimental analysis

We introduce a procedurally fair rule to study a situation where people disagree about the value of three alternatives in the way captured by the voting paradox. The rule allows people to select a final collective ranking by submitting a bid vector with six components (the six possible rankings of the three alternatives). In a laboratory experiment we test the robustness of the rule to the introduction of subsidies and taxes. We have two main results. First, in all treatments, the most frequently chosen ranking is the socially efficient one. Second, subsidies slightly enhance overbidding. Furthermore, an analysis of individual bid vectors reveals interesting behavioral regularities.Bidding behavior, Procedural fairness, Voting paradox

From ancient leech to direct thrombin inhibitors and beyond: New from old

Medicinal leeches have been used in health care since before written history, with widely varying popularity over the centuries. Nowadays, medicinal leech therapy is mainly used in plastic and reconstructive microsurgery, with new interesting potential therapeutic applications in many other diseases. The leech's best-known salivary product, hirudin — one of the most powerful natural anticoagulants — was the only remedy to prevent blood clotting until the discovery of heparin. Starting from hirudin, pharmacological research succeeded in developing new anticoagulants, which represent a cornerstone of prevention and treatment of thromboembolic disease. While we are perhaps on the threshold of a new era of anticoagulation, with the development of FXI and XII inhibitors and direct reversible covalent thrombin inhibitors, which promise to achieve effective anticoagulation without bleeding risk. This review retraces the intriguing journey of these drugs in cardiovascular disease, highlighting the fil rouge that links the ancient leech to the current and oncoming antithrombotic therapy. We think that knowledge of the past is key to understanding and appreciating the present and to seize future opportunities

Self-Scanning and Self-Control: A Field Experiment on Real-Time Feedback and Shopping Behavior

Payment and checkout at retail stores is increasingly being replaced by automated systems. One recent technological invention in this area is mobile self-scanning in which customers carry a mobile scanner while shopping. Mobile self-scanners give real-time feedback on spending. The device increases price saliency and enables customers to keep track of the total amount spent. Using a field experiment, we test if mobile self-scanning affects shopping behavior. Consumers of two grocery stores were allocated randomly to use a mobile self-scanner or not. Overall, we find that using the self-scanner has a negative but insignificant effect on total amount spent. However, the response to using the scanner is heterogeneous and for customers with low self-control, it significantly reduces both their spending and number of items bought when using the mobile scanner. Moreover, we find that consumers with low self-control are more likely to use the self-scanner than individuals with high self-control. Taken together, our results suggest that sophisticated individuals, that is, individuals who are aware of their self-control problem, use the scanner to control their spending

Theory of mind in the social sciences: an experiment on strategic thinking in children

This study investigates mentalizing and strategic thinking in children in elementary school age (from 7 to 12 years old). Drawing from previous literature in behavioral and experiments economics and cognitive science, we conduct experiments in which children of different ages make choices in a series of one-shot, simultaneous move two-person games in normal form. We test the ability of our subjects to reason strategically and compare their behavioral patterns with those of adult players engaged in similar tasks (Di Guida and Devetag 2012). Our results show that even younger children are capable of perspective taking: they seem to grasp the essence of strategic thinking, to recognize similarities across games, and behave consistently. In addition, children are sensitive to the attractive power of focal points (Di Guida and Devetag 2012), which are perceived as natural coordination devices even when they are not part of the game equilibria, in line with previous results. Children are also able to perceive the risk-return tradeoffs implied in strategic decisions, as shown by their preference for \u201csafe\u201d strategies (i.e., strategies yielding an acceptable payoff for any choice of the opponent). Finally, only a minority behaves according to na\uefve heuristics such as opting for the strategy giving the maximum payoff. Our findings contribute to the interdisciplinary literature on the origin of fairness-based norms within societies and on the cognitive and social determinants of strategic interaction

Theory of mind in the social sciences: an experiment on strategic thinking in children

This study investigates mentalizing and strategic thinking in children in elementary school age (from 7 to 12 years old). Drawing from previous literature in behavioral and experiments economics and cognitive science, we conduct experiments in which children of different ages make choices in a series of one-shot, simultaneous move two-person games in normal form. We test the ability of our subjects to reason strategically and compare their behavioral patterns with those of adult players engaged in similar tasks (Di Guida and Devetag 2012). Our results show that even younger children are capable of perspective taking: they seem to grasp the essence of strategic thinking, to recognize similarities across games, and behave consistently. In addition, children are sensitive to the attractive power of focal points (Di Guida and Devetag 2012), which are perceived as natural coordination devices even when they are not part of the game equilibria, in line with previous results. Children are also able to perceive the risk-return tradeoffs implied in strategic decisions, as shown by their preference for “safe” strategies (i.e., strategies yielding an acceptable payoff for any choice of the opponent). Finally, only a minority behaves according to naïve heuristics such as opting for the strategy giving the maximum payoff. Our findings contribute to the interdisciplinary literature on the origin of fairness-based norms within societies and on the cognitive and social determinants of strategic interaction

Beware Of Popular Kids Bearing Gifts:A Framed Field Experiment

ArticleThe literature on pro-social behavior shows that older children are more generous than younger children; however, the level of individual generosity is heterogeneous even between children of the same age. This paper investigates whether a child’s popularity affects his/her generosity. Our participants – 231 children, six to twelve years old – decide how many of their four colored wristbands they want to share with another anonymous child. We manipulate the visibility of this decision: in treatment Public, the decisions are revealed to the entire class at the end of the game, whereas in treatment Private children’s decisions remain secret. In addition, we elicited each child’s network of friends using an innovative “seating map” mechanism. Our results reveal that more popular children are more generous in Public than Private decision environments, while less popular children behave similarly in both cases. Moreover, older children in Public display greater generosity than (i) older children in Private and (ii) younger children in either Public or Private. Finally, in Public, older and more popular children share more than less popular older children, and more than younger children regardless of popularity; whereas, in Private there is no effect of popularity on children of any age. Our findings point to another reason to adopt transparent decision making in teams and organizations: it may promote the generosity of some (perhaps especially popular leaders) without detrimentally impacting the pro-sociality of others