This study investigates mentalizing and strategic thinking in children in elementary school age
(from 7 to 12 years old). Drawing from previous literature in behavioral and experiments economics
and cognitive science, we conduct experiments in which children of different ages make choices in
a series of one-shot, simultaneous move two-person games in normal form. We test the ability of
our subjects to reason strategically and compare their behavioral patterns with those of adult players
engaged in similar tasks (Di Guida and Devetag 2012). Our results show that even younger children
are capable of perspective taking: they seem to grasp the essence of strategic thinking, to recognize
similarities across games, and behave consistently. In addition, children are sensitive to the
attractive power of focal points (Di Guida and Devetag 2012), which are perceived as natural
coordination devices even when they are not part of the game equilibria, in line with previous
results. Children are also able to perceive the risk-return tradeoffs implied in strategic decisions, as
shown by their preference for \u201csafe\u201d strategies (i.e., strategies yielding an acceptable payoff for any
choice of the opponent). Finally, only a minority behaves according to na\uefve heuristics such as
opting for the strategy giving the maximum payoff. Our findings contribute to the interdisciplinary
literature on the origin of fairness-based norms within societies and on the cognitive and social
determinants of strategic interaction
