RIGHT TO COUNSEL/CRIMINAL LAW--WISHING FOR RIGHTS: INTERPRETING THE ARTICLE 12 RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASSACHUSETTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF MONTEJO v. LOUISIANA

This Note reviews Montejo v. Louisiana (2009) and discusses its implications on Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, particularly related to post-arraignment waivers of a defendant’s right to counsel at a police-initiated interrogation. Montejo’s appeal relied upon a bright-line rule (Jackson rule) established 26 years before, which makes post-arraignment waivers of a defendant’s right to counsel at a police-initiated interrogation presumptively invalid. In Montejo, the Supreme Court did away with the Jackson rule, while allowing that a state may continue to adhere to the Jackson rule under its state constitution. The Author finds that historically the right to counsel in Massachusetts demonstrates the Commonwealth’s longstanding record of being proactive in both affording indigent criminal defendants the right to counsel before the Supreme Court and expanding the right to counsel when the Supreme Court has limited it. While Montejo has affected “a sea change in the law,” the Author argues that following the Supreme Court’s holding in Montejo would degrade the right to counsel and Massachusetts courts should continue the prohibition that is in place forbidding police-initiated interrogations of represented defendants. Further, adherence by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to pre-Montejo law would continue to provide a bright-line, workable rule thereby ensuring that the protections afforded by Article 12 do not become mere abstractions

RIGHT TO COUNSEL/CRIMINAL LAW--WISHING FOR RIGHTS: INTERPRETING THE ARTICLE 12 RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASSACHUSETTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF MONTEJO v. LOUISIANA

This Note reviews Montejo v. Louisiana (2009) and discusses its implications on Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, particularly related to post-arraignment waivers of a defendant’s right to counsel at a police-initiated interrogation. Montejo’s appeal relied upon a bright-line rule (Jackson rule) established 26 years before, which makes post-arraignment waivers of a defendant’s right to counsel at a police-initiated interrogation presumptively invalid. In Montejo, the Supreme Court did away with the Jackson rule, while allowing that a state may continue to adhere to the Jackson rule under its state constitution. The Author finds that historically the right to counsel in Massachusetts demonstrates the Commonwealth’s longstanding record of being proactive in both affording indigent criminal defendants the right to counsel before the Supreme Court and expanding the right to counsel when the Supreme Court has limited it. While Montejo has affected “a sea change in the law,” the Author argues that following the Supreme Court’s holding in Montejo would degrade the right to counsel and Massachusetts courts should continue the prohibition that is in place forbidding police-initiated interrogations of represented defendants. Further, adherence by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to pre-Montejo law would continue to provide a bright-line, workable rule thereby ensuring that the protections afforded by Article 12 do not become mere abstractions

RIGHT TO COUNSEL/CRIMINAL LAW--WISHING FOR RIGHTS: INTERPRETING THE ARTICLE 12 RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASSACHUSETTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF MONTEJO v. LOUISIANA

This Note reviews Montejo v. Louisiana (2009) and discusses its implications on Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, particularly related to post-arraignment waivers of a defendant’s right to counsel at a police-initiated interrogation. Montejo’s appeal relied upon a bright-line rule (Jackson rule) established 26 years before, which makes post-arraignment waivers of a defendant’s right to counsel at a police-initiated interrogation presumptively invalid. In Montejo, the Supreme Court did away with the Jackson rule, while allowing that a state may continue to adhere to the Jackson rule under its state constitution. The Author finds that historically the right to counsel in Massachusetts demonstrates the Commonwealth’s longstanding record of being proactive in both affording indigent criminal defendants the right to counsel before the Supreme Court and expanding the right to counsel when the Supreme Court has limited it. While Montejo has affected “a sea change in the law,” the Author argues that following the Supreme Court’s holding in Montejo would degrade the right to counsel and Massachusetts courts should continue the prohibition that is in place forbidding police-initiated interrogations of represented defendants. Further, adherence by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to pre-Montejo law would continue to provide a bright-line, workable rule thereby ensuring that the protections afforded by Article 12 do not become mere abstractions

RIGHT TO COUNSEL/CRIMINAL LAW--WISHING FOR RIGHTS: INTERPRETING THE ARTICLE 12 RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN MASSACHUSETTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF MONTEJO v. LOUISIANA

This Note reviews Montejo v. Louisiana (2009) and discusses its implications on Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, particularly related to post-arraignment waivers of a defendant’s right to counsel at a police-initiated interrogation. Montejo’s appeal relied upon a bright-line rule (Jackson rule) established 26 years before, which makes post-arraignment waivers of a defendant’s right to counsel at a police-initiated interrogation presumptively invalid. In Montejo, the Supreme Court did away with the Jackson rule, while allowing that a state may continue to adhere to the Jackson rule under its state constitution. The Author finds that historically the right to counsel in Massachusetts demonstrates the Commonwealth’s longstanding record of being proactive in both affording indigent criminal defendants the right to counsel before the Supreme Court and expanding the right to counsel when the Supreme Court has limited it. While Montejo has affected “a sea change in the law,” the Author argues that following the Supreme Court’s holding in Montejo would degrade the right to counsel and Massachusetts courts should continue the prohibition that is in place forbidding police-initiated interrogations of represented defendants. Further, adherence by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court to pre-Montejo law would continue to provide a bright-line, workable rule thereby ensuring that the protections afforded by Article 12 do not become mere abstractions

Estudios sobre "Basidiomycetes". VII (Hayedo de Montejo de la Sierra, Madrid)

Se estudian un total de 14 táxones que fructifican en el hayedo de Montejo de la Sierra (Madrid). Son nuevas citas para la micoflora española: Baeospora myriadophylla (Peck) Sing. y Eichleriella spinulosa Berk. & Curtis.Fourteen taxons that grow in the beech wood of Montejo de la Sierra (Madrid) are studied. Two of them are reported for the first time in Spain: Baeospora myriadophylla (Peck) Sing. and Eichleriella spinulosa Berk. & Curtis

Caminos de Montejo – Erinnerungen und Orte des Cimarrón Esteban Montejo

Esteban Montejo was the ‘Cimarrón’ in Miguel Barnets Book Biografía de un cimarrón. He spent most of the timeof his life in the rural parts of central Cuba, where he worked and lived on several sugar cane plantations. Those places, forming stations of his life, will be presented here. In some places of his life slavery is remembered until today, in others all traces have been lost

El Hayedo de Montejo, mucho más que hayas

El Hayedo de Montejo, uno de los bosques más emblemáticos de la Comunidad de Madrid, es también uno de los mejor conocidos y más estudiados gracias a un convenio de colaboración entre la Comunidad de Madrid y la Escuela de Montes de la Universidad Politécnica de Madrid (UPM). Seguimiento del clima, inventarios forestales, estudios genéticos o ecofisiológicos y procesos de dispersión son algunos de los trabajos que vienen desarrollándose desde hace más de 17 años. Gracias a ellos descubrimos que El Hayedo de Montejo es mucho más que un bosque de hayas

Development of a high-performance W-band duplexer for plasma diagnosis using a single band with dual circular polarization

Discrepancia entre la información que aparece en el artículo que indica que el copyright es de Elsevier, y la información que aparece en la página de la revista y en el Copyright Clearance Center que indican © 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V., así como que el artículo está publicado en Open Access under a Creative Commons licenceThis work presents the design and experimental validation of a high performance, compact, waveguide duplexer operating from 91.5 to 96.5 GHz for its integration in diverse W-band microwave equipment as in plasma diagnosis applications. It uses a single frequency band, with two signals discriminated by different orthogonal circular polarization, which is generated by means of a septum orthomode transducer (OMT) polarizer. Moreover, this component is optimized loaded with the horn antenna for improving the overall system performance. It is explained how these two components are integrated into a very compact duplexer, designed using efficient numerical algorithms. The manufacturing process by mean of high precision milling, and including electrical discharge machining (EDM) has led to excellent performances. The measured return loss level and isolation are higher than 30 dB, and the insertion loss level is below 0.3 dB. Finally, the key parameter in this device, which reflects the symmetry in the manufacturing process, i.e., the axial ratio, is lower than 0.6 dB for both polarizations, an excellent result showing the potential of the presented designThis work was supported by the Spanish government under grants (ADDMATE) TEC2016-76070-C3-1/2-R (Agencia Estatal de Investigación, Spain, Fondo Europeo de Desarrollo Regional: AEI/FEDER/UE) and the program of Comunidad de Madrid, Spain S2013/ICE-3000 (SPADERADARCM