25 research outputs found
The sound of silence: equilibrium filtering and optimalcensoring in financial markets
Following the approach of standard filtering theory, we analyse investor-valuation of firms, when these are modelled as geometric-Brownian state processes that are privately and partially observed, at random (Poisson) times, by agents. Tasked with disclosing forecast values, agents are able purposefully to withhold their observations; explicit filtering formulas are derived for downgrading the valuations in the absence of disclosures. The analysis is conducted for both a solitary firm and m co-dependent firms
Why managers with low forecast precision select high disclosure intensity: an equilibrium analysis
Abstract Shin (2006) has argued that in order to understand the equilibrium patterns of corporate disclosure, it is necessary for researchers to work within an asset pricing framework in which corporate disclosures are endogenously determined. Echoing this sentiment, Larcker and Rusticus (2010) have argued that earlier empirical results claiming to …nd a negative relationship between disclosure and cost of capital may su¤er fatally from endogeneity issues which, once addressed by a formal structural model, may reverse the sign of the relationship. The purpose of this paper is to introduce a general equilibrium model following the Black-Scholes paradigm with endogeneous disclosure in which …rms select uniquely determined optimal probabilities of early equity-value discovery in a noisy environment. As …rms may di¤er also in the uncertainty (precision) with which management can forecast the future, managers strategically increase the intensity of their (voluntary) disclosures to provide partial compensation for this perceived di¤erential risk. A positive relationship then results between disclosure and the cost of capital
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Learning from your investors: can the geographical composition of institutional investors affect the chance of success in international M&A deals?
We produce new evidence on whether management which is keen to make foreign acquisitions can benefit from consultation with information-intensive institutional investors who have expertise in the target foreign markets. This research suggests that, in such instances, management should recognise the benefit of effective two-way communication before embarking on such costly strategies. Consistent with theoretical literature, we propose that this can be explained by the fact that complex valuation information is dispersed among many economic agents and management may only have limited access to such data. This research shows that the likelihood of both cross-border deal completion and medium-term cross-border deal success through time depends upon management learning from and getting the support of key institutional investors with regional (foreign) expertise. The theoretical information economics model presented by Dye and Sridhar in 2002 states that the information flow between management and capital markets should be viewed as two way. This study offers empirical evidence in support of their theory. This study offers insights into the positive effect of establishing a proactive investor relations programme for the recruitment of dedicated foreign institutional investors before embarking on cross-border M&A. The results indicate that management should closely monitor the share register and identify those investors who are transient and those who are, in contrast, dedicated. Attention then needs to be directed to establishing effective communication with the dedicated investors with regional expertise
Voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy: determinants and outcomes. An empirical study into the risks and payoffs of communicating corporate strategy.
Business leaders increasingly face pressure from stakeholders to be transparent. There
appears however little consensus on the risks and payoffs of disclosing vital information
such as corporate strategy. To fill this gap, this study analyzes firm-specific determinants
and organisational outcomes of voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. Stakeholder
theory and agency theory help to understand whether companies serve their interest to
engage with stakeholders and overcome information asymmetries. I connect these
theories and propose a comprehensive approach to measure voluntary disclosure of
corporate strategy. Hypotheses from the theoretical framework are empirically tested
through panel regression of data on identified determinants and outcomes and of
disclosed strategy through annual reports, corporate social responsibility reports,
corporate websites and corporate press releases by the 70 largest publicly listed
companies in the Netherlands from 2003 through 2008. I found that industry,
profitability, dual-listing status, national ranking status and listing age have significant
effects on voluntary disclosure of corporate strategy. No significant effects are found for
size, leverage and ownership concentration. On outcomes, I found that liquidity of stock
and corporate reputation are significantly influenced by voluntary disclosure of corporate
strategy. No significant effect is found for volatility of stock. My contributions to theory,
methodology and empirics offers a stepping-stone for further research into understanding
how companies can use transparency to manage stakeholder relations
Absorption versus direct costing : the relevance of opportunity costs in the management of congested stochastic production systems
Includes bibliographic references (p. 24-29)
Multi-firm voluntary disclosures for correlated operations
We study the no-arbitrage theory of voluntary disclosure (Dye, J Account Res 23:123-145, 1985, and Ostaszewski and Gietzmann, Rev Quant Financ Account 31: 1-27, 2008), generalized to the setting of {Mathematical expression} firms, simultaneously and voluntarily, releasing at the interim-report date 'partial' information concerning their 'common operating conditions'. Each of the firms has, as in the Dye model, some (known) probability of observing a signal of their end of period performance, but here this signal includes noise determined by a firm-specific precision parameter. The co-dependency of the firms results entirely from their common operating conditions. Each firm has a disclosure cutoff, which is a best response to the cutoffs employed by the remaining firms. To characterize these equilibrium cutoffs explicitly, we introduce {Mathematical expression} new hypothetical firms, related to the corresponding actual firms, which are operationally independent, but are assigned refined precision parameters and amended means. This impounds all existing correlations arising from conditioning on the other potentially available sources of information. In the model the actual firms' equilibrium cutoffs are geometric weighted averages of these hypothetical firms. We uncover two countervailing effects. Firstly, there is a bandwagon effect, whereby the presence of other firms raises each individual cutoff relative to what it would have been in the absence of other firms. Secondly, there is an estimator-quality effect, whereby individual cutoffs are lowered, unless the individual precision is above average
Sell-side analyst bias when investment banks have privileged access to the board
Research on analyst bias typically identifies affiliation with reference to a subset of the mandates that could give rise to incentives for bias in a multifunction investment bank. This paper develops a new measure of affiliation based upon the UK practice of corporate broking. An advantage of this approach is that affiliation is no longer restricted to isolated equity issuance events as it is an ongoing activity. This research shows that prior US evidence regarding the "Global Settlement" is robust to this new measure and application in the United Kingdom rather than solely the United States. The paper uses a hazard rate methodology focusing on the timeliness of revisions to address selection bias concern