Differential effects of dairy snacks on appetite, but not overall energy intake

Dietary regulation of appetite may contribute to the prevention and management of excess body weight. The present study examined the effect of consumption of individual dairy products as snacks on appetite and subsequent ad libitum lunch energy intake. In a randomised cross-over trial, forty overweight men (age 32 (sd 9) years; BMI 27 (sd 2) kg/m2) attended four sessions 1 week apart and received three isoenergetic (841 kJ) and isovolumetric (410 ml) servings of dairy snacks or water (control) 120 min after breakfast. Appetite profile was determined throughout the morning and ad libitum energy intake was assessed 90 min after the intake of snacks. Concentrations of amino acids, glucose, insulin, ghrelin and peptide tyrosine tyrosine were measured at baseline (0 min) and 80 min after the intake of snacks. Although the results showed that yogurt had the greatest suppressive effect on appetite, this could be confounded by the poor sensory ratings of yogurt. Hunger rating was 8, 10 and 24 % (P < 0·001) lower after the intake of yogurt than cheese, milk and water, respectively. Energy intake was 11, 9 and 12 % (P < 0·02) lower after the intake of yogurt, cheese and milk, respectively, compared with water (4312 (se 226) kJ). Although there was no difference in the postprandial responses of hormones, alanine and isoleucine concentrations were higher after the intake of yogurt than cheese and milk (P < 0·05). In conclusion, all dairy snacks reduced appetite and lunch intake compared with water. Yogurt had the greatest effect on suppressing subjective appetite ratings, but did not affect subsequent food intake compared with milk or cheese

Langage Juridique et Langage Usuel: Vrais ou Faux Amis?

La présente contribution tente de mettre en lumière l’illusion selon laquelle les termes que le droit emprunte au langage ordinaire et auxquels il ne donne pas explicitement une portée spécifique conserveraient le sens qu’ils possèdent dans le cadre de celui-ci. Si langage juridique et langage usuel sont incontestablement de proches «amis», ils semblent nous mettre également en présence, dans une certaine mesure, de «faux amis» c’est-à-dire de mots appartenant à deux langages différents et qui ont entre eux une grande similitude de forme mais dont les significations sont au moins partiellement différentes. A cette fin, se trouve développée une analyse critique de la référence au sens usuel des termes, telle qu’elle se dégage traditionnellement en Belgique de la jurisprudence, principalement en relation avec la question de la nécessité d’une interprétation, celle du respect du principe de légalité, ainsi que celle de l’autonomie conceptuelle, au moins relative, du droit pénal par rapport aux autres branches du droit