Economic growth, law, and corruption: evidence from India

Is corruption influenced by economic growth? Are legal institutions such as the ‘Right to Information Act (RTI) 2005’ in India effective in curbing corruption? Using a panel dataset covering 20 Indian states for the years 2005 and 2008 we estimate the effects of growth and law on corruption. Accounting for endogeneity, omitted fixed factors, and other nationwide changes we find that economic growth reduces overall corruption as well as corruption in banking, land administration, education, electricity, and hospitals. Growth reduces bribes but has little impact on corruption perception. In contrast the RTI Act reduces both corruption experience and corruption perceptio

Global economic crisis and corruption

© 2014, Springer Science+Business Media New York. We study the effects of the 2008–2009 global economic crisis on the household experience of bribing public officials. The data come from the Life in Transition-2 survey, conducted in 2010 in 30 post-socialist economies of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia. We find that households hit by crisis are more likely to bribe and, among people who bribe, crisis victims bribe a wider range of public officials than non-victims. The crisis victims are also more likely to pay bribes because public officials ask them to do so and less likely because of gratitude. The link between crisis and bribery is stronger in the poorest countries of the region. Our findings support the conjecture that public officials misuse sensitive information about crisis victims to inform bribe extortion decisions

Corruption in Privatization and Governance Regimes

(ISSN 1827-3580

K/pi Fluctuations at Relativistic Energies

We report results for $K/\pi$ fluctuations from Au+Au collisions at $\sqrt{s_{NN}}$ = 19.6, 62.4, 130, and 200 GeV using the STAR detector at the Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider. Our results for $K/\pi$ fluctuations in central collisions show little dependence on the incident energies studied and are on the same order as results observed by NA49 at the Super Proton Synchrotron in central Pb+Pb collisions at $\sqrt{s_{NN}}$ = 12.3 and 17.3 GeV. We also report results for the collision centrality dependence of $K/\pi$ fluctuations as well as results for $K^{+}/\pi^{+}$, $K^{-}/\pi^{-}$, $K^{+}/\pi^{-}$, and $K^{-}/\pi^{+}$ fluctuations. We observe that the $K/\pi$ fluctuations scale with the multiplicity density, $dN/d\eta$, rather than the number of participating nucleons.Comment: 6 pages, 4 figure

Growth of Long Range Forward-Backward Multiplicity Correlations with Centrality in Au+Au Collisions at sNN\sqrt{s_{NN}} = 200 GeV

Forward-backward multiplicity correlation strengths have been measured with the STAR detector for Au+Au and $\textit{p+p}$ collisions at $\sqrt{s_{NN}}$ = 200 GeV. Strong short and long range correlations (LRC) are seen in central Au+Au collisions. The magnitude of these correlations decrease with decreasing centrality until only short range correlations are observed in peripheral Au+Au collisions. Both the Dual Parton Model (DPM) and the Color Glass Condensate (CGC) predict the existence of the long range correlations. In the DPM the fluctuation in the number of elementary (parton) inelastic collisions produces the LRC. In the CGC longitudinal color flux tubes generate the LRC. The data is in qualitative agreement with the predictions from the DPM and indicates the presence of multiple parton interactions.Comment: 6 pages, 3 figures The abstract has been slightly modifie

Greasing the wheels? The impact of regulations and corruption on firm entry

This paper investigates the question of whether corruption might ‘grease the wheels’ of an economy. We investigate whether and to what extent the impact of regulations on entrepreneurship is dependent on corruption. We first test whether regulations robustly deter firm entry into markets. Our results show that the existence of a larger number of procedures required to start a business, as well as larger minimum capital requirements are detrimental to entrepreneurship. Second, we test whether corruption reduces the negative impact of regulations on entrepreneurship in highly regulated economies. Our empirical analysis, covering a maximum of 43 countries over the 2003–2005 period, shows that corruption facilitates firm entry in highly regulated economies. For example, the ‘greasing’ effect of corruption kicks in at around 50 days required to start a new business. Our results thus provide support for the ‘grease the wheels’ hypothesis

Forward Neutral Pion Transverse Single Spin Asymmetries in p+p Collisions at \sqrt{s}=200 GeV

We report precision measurements of the Feynman-x dependence, and first measurements of the transverse momentum dependence, of transverse single spin asymmetries for the production of \pi^0 mesons from polarized proton collisions at \sqrt{s}=200 GeV. The x_F dependence of the results is in fair agreement with perturbative QCD model calculations that identify orbital motion of quarks and gluons within the proton as the origin of the spin effects. Results for the p_T dependence at fixed x_F are not consistent with pQCD-based calculations.Comment: 6 pages, 4 figure

Business unusual: collective action against bribery in international business

Collective action initiatives in which governments and companies make anti-corruption commitments have proliferated in recent years. This apparently prosocial behavior defies the logic of collective action and, given that bribery often goes undetected and unpunished, is not easily explained by principal-agent theory. Club theory suggests that the answer lies in the institutional design of anti-corruption clubs: collective action can work as long as membership has high entry costs, members receive selective benefits, and compliance is adequately policed. This article contributes to the debate by examining how these conditions manifest in the case of anti-corruption clubs in the realm of international business, with particular focus on the international dimension of many initiatives. This vertical aspect of institutional design creates a richer, more complex set of reputational and material benefits for members, as well as allowing for more credible and consistent monitoring and enforcement

Nothing at Stake in Knowledge

In the remainder of this article, we will disarm an important motivation for epistemic contextualism and interest-relative invariantism. We will accomplish this by presenting a stringent test of whether there is a stakes effect on ordinary knowledge ascription. Having shown that, even on a stringent way of testing, stakes fail to impact ordinary knowledge ascription, we will conclude that we should take another look at classical invariantism. Here is how we will proceed. Section 1 lays out some limitations of previous research on stakes. Section 2 presents our study and concludes that there is little evidence for a substantial stakes effect. Section 3 responds to objections. The conclusion clears the way for classical invariantism