Tax Evasion, Welfare Fraud, and ”The Broken Windows” Effect: An Experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands

In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others’ behavior. Subjects have to decide between a ‘registered’ income, the realization of which will be known to the tax authority for sure, and an ‘unregistered’ income that will only be known with some probability. This unregistered income comes from self-employment in the Tax treatment and from black labor supplementing some unemployment compensation in the Welfare treatment. Subjects have then to decide on whether reporting their income or not, knowing the risk of detection. The results show that (i) individuals evade more in the Welfare treatment than in the Tax treatment; (ii) many subjects choose an option that allows for tax evasion or welfare fraud but report their income honestly anyway; (iii) examples of low compliance tend to increase tax evasion while examples of high compliance exert no influence; (iv) tax evasion is more frequent in France and the Netherlands; Walloons evade taxes less than the Flemish. There is no cross-country difference in welfare dodging.

Tax Evasion, Welfare Fraud, and "The Broken Windows" Effect: An Experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands

In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others’ behavior. Subjects have to decide between a 'registered' income, the realization of which will be known to the tax authority for sure, and an 'unregistered' income that will only be known with some probability. This unregistered income comes from self-employment in the Tax treatment and from black labor supplementing some unemployment compensation in the Welfare treatment. Subjects have then to decide on whether reporting their income or not, knowing the risk of detection. The results show that (i) individuals evade more in the Welfare treatment than in the Tax treatment; (ii) many subjects choose an option that allows for tax evasion or welfare fraud but report their income honestly anyway; (iii) examples of low compliance tend to increase tax evasion while examples of high compliance exert no influence; (iv) tax evasion is morefrequent in France and the Netherlands; Walloons evade taxes less than the Flemish. There is no cross-country difference in welfare dodging.tax evasion, social fraud, social comparisons, cross-country comparisons, experiments

Tax Evasion, Welfare Fraud, and “the Broken Windows” Effect: An Experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands

In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and theNetherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others’ behavior. Subjects have to decide between a ‘registered’ income, the realization of which will be known to the tax authority for sure, and an ‘unregistered’ income that will only be known with some probability. This unregistered income comes from self-employment in the Tax treatment and from black labor supplementing some unemployment compensation in the Welfare treatment. Subjects have then to decide on whether reporting their income or not, knowing the risk of detection. The results show that (i) individuals evade more in the Welfare treatment than in the Taxtreatment; (ii) many subjects choose an option that allows for tax evasion or welfare fraud but report their income honestly anyway; (iii) examples of low compliance tend to increase tax evasion while examples of high compliance exert no influence; (iv) tax evasion is more frequent in France and the Netherlands; Walloons evade taxes less than the Flemish. There is no cross-country difference in welfare dodging.public economics ;

Le modèle d'apprentissage et d'intervention pysychopédagogique (MAIP) pour éclairer la prise de décision dans un processus de counseling de carrière avec un enjeu d'orientation ou de réorientation.

La prise de décision n'est pas chose facile pour beaucoup de gens, particulièrement lorsqu'un enjeu d'orientation ou de réorientation se présente dans leur vie. Plusieurs personnes de tout âge se heurtent alors à l'indécision, qui elle-même s'accompagne souvent de stress et de d'anxiété. La difficulté à faire un choix de carrière et à s'y maintenir entraîne également des conséquences importantes chez l'individu. Elle affecte pour certains la poursuite des études, conduisant à des changements de programme, donc à l'allongement des études, au décrochage ou encore à l'interruption scolaire. Cette prise de décision s'inscrit dans un contexte social où l'apprentissage revêt une place fondamentale. Les gens sont de plus en plus spécialisés et plusieurs qui le sont moins, décident de retourner aux études afin de parfaire leur formation, ou encore, utilisent la formation continue. Certaines personnes éprouvent toutefois plus de difficultés à apprendre, ce qui a également des effets importants sur leurs choix en orientation et en réorientation. L'apprentissage tient donc une place importante dans la carrière et dans l'orientation professionnelle des gens. D'ailleurs, depuis quelques années, la recherche en orientation et en développement de carrière s'intéresse de plus en plus à l'apprentissage. Par contre, à notre connaissance, peu de recherches, sinon aucune, n'ont été menées jusqu'ici afin d'aider les gens, dans un contexte d'orientation ou de réorientation, à tenir compte de leur profil des styles d'apprentissage pour arriver à faire un choix de carrière

Tax Evasion, Welfare Fraud, and "The Broken Windows" Effect: An Experiment in Belgium, France and the Netherlands

In a series of experiments conducted in Belgium (Wallonia and Flanders), France and the Netherlands, we compare behavior regarding tax evasion and welfare dodging, with and without information about others' behavior. Subjects have to decide between a "registered" income, the realization of which will be known to the tax authority for sure, and an "unregistered" income that will only be known with some probability. This unregistered income comes from self-employment in the Tax treatment and from black labor supplementing some unemployment compensation in the Welfare treatment. Subjects have then to decide on wether reporting their income or not, knowing the risk od detection. The results show that (i) individuals evade more in the Welfare treatment than in the Tax treatment ; (ii) many subjects choose and option that allows for tax evasion or welfare fraud but report their income honestly anyway ; (iii) examples of low compliance tend to increase tax evasion while examples of high compliance exert no influence ; (iv) tax evasion is more frequent in France and the Netherlands ; Wallons evade taxes less than Flemish. There is no cross-country difference in welfare dodging

Les attitudes sont-elles différentes face à la fraude fiscale et à la fraude sociale ?

En période de crise économique, les besoins de l’Etat augmentent et l’assiette fiscale se réduit ; il est alors courant de voir resurgir dans le débat public la lutte contre les diverses formes de fraude qui reduisent les recettes publiques. Dans ce contexte, on oppose régulièrement fraude fiscale à fraude sociale et la discussion porte souvent sur l’importance relative de l’une et de l’autre. On entend par fraude fiscale le détournement illégal d’un système fiscal afin de ne pas contribuer au financement des charges publiques, et par fraude sociale à le fait d’échapper au versement des prélèvements sociaux ou de bénéficier indûment de prestations sociales. Les deux formes de fraude se recoupent parfois. S’il est difficile de mesurer avec précision l’une et l’autre forme de fraude, on estime généralement que la fraude fiscale représente un manque à gagner pour l’Etat beaucoup plus important que la fraude sociale. Cependant, il est important de noter que ces deux types de fraude émanent certainement de populations aux caractéristiques différentes en termes d’activité et de ressources. Il est donc intéressant d’essayer d’identifier les facteurs explicatifs de ces deux types de fraude, à savoir s’ils répondent aux mêmes ressorts économiques et impératifs moraux. Des populations ou des groupes sont souvent stigmatisés pour pratiquer l’un ou l’autre type de fraude. Cet article se propose d’expliquer les facteurs menant à ces deux types de fraude et ce, à partir de données obtenues d’une expérience en laboratoire. De par ses exigences de contrôle et son artificialité, l’expérimentation de laboratoire peut contribuer à apporter des éléments de réponse. En effet, par le choix de valeurs de paramètres appropriées, elle permet de comparer directement les deux types de fraude du point de vue économique de façon à isoler des dimensions non-économiques de la prise de décision

High order harmonic balance formulation of free and encapsulated microbubbles

The radial responses of free or encapsulated micro-bubbles excited by a plane wave of large wavelength are governed by NonLinear Ordinary Differential Equa- tions (NL-ODEs). The nonlinear frequency response details the harmonic con- tent of the time response and constitutes the expected outcome of a high order harmonic analysis. In this paper, a high order harmonic balance analysis of the ”RNNP” (bubble), Hoff and Marmottant (contrast agents) models are per- formed with the open-source Manla

Selective alteration of gene expression in response to natural and synthetic retinoids.

BACKGROUND: Retinoids are very potent inducers of cellular differentiation and apoptosis, and are efficient anti-tumoral agents. Synthetic retinoids are designed to restrict their toxicity and side effects, mostly by increasing their selectivity toward each isotype of retinoic acids receptors (RARα,β, γ and RXRα, β, γ). We however previously showed that retinoids displayed very different abilities to activate retinoid-inducible reporter genes, and that these differential properties were correlated to the ability of a given ligand to promote SRC-1 recruitment by DNA-bound RXR:RAR heterodimers. This suggested that gene-selective modulation could be achieved by structurally distinct retinoids. RESULTS: Using the differential display mRNA technique, we identified several genes on the basis of their differential induction by natural or synthetic retinoids in human cervix adenocarcinoma cells. Furthermore, this differential ability to regulate promoter activities was also observed in murine P19 cells for the RARβ2 and CRABPII gene, showing conclusively that retinoid structure has a dramatic impact on the regulation of endogenous genes. CONCLUSIONS: Our findings therefore show that some degree of selective induction or repression of gene expression may be achieved when using appropriately designed ligands for retinoic acid receptors, extending the concept of selective modulators from estrogen and peroxisome proliferator activated receptors to the class of retinoid receptors

Smartphone Based Tele-Rehabilitation

Lefebvre Thierry, Mattei Jean-Pierre, Marie Michel, Bleys Jean-Pierre. Les Journées du cinéma muet de Pordenone. In: 1895, revue d'histoire du cinéma, n°14, 1993. pp. 103-113