1,003 research outputs found
The Travels of Marco Polo, The Venetian (1298), edited by Michael W. Charney
Marco Polo was the frst Western traveller to speak of Burma (Mien). His late thirteenth century account has been translated numerous times, one of the most popular editions being Henry Yule’s (tr.) The Book of Ser Marco Polo the Venetian Concerning the Kingdoms and Marvels of the East in the nineteenth century and the revision of this translation by Henri Cordier in the early twentieth. The Yule- Cordier edition of 1903 is widely available in reprint. Less widely available is the present translation made by W. Marsden from Ramusio’s collection of travels published in 1818 and re-edited by Thomas Wright in September 1854, published as The Travels of Marco Polo, the Venetian. (London: Henry G. Bohn). Polo’s account of events in Burma can be dated to the early-mid 1290s, for he returned to Venice in 1295, although the Travels were not put into writing until 1298. The version below has been made from the copy in the British Library
Norm Flexibility and Private Initiative
We model an enforcement problem where firms can take a known and lawful action or seek a profitable innovation that may enhance or reduce welfare. The legislator sets fines calibrated to the harmfulness of unlawful actions. The range of fines defines norm flexibility. Expected sanctions guide firms’ choices among unlawful actions (marginal deterrence) and/or stunt their initiative altogether (average deterrence). With loyal enforcers, maximum norm flexibility is optimal, so as to exploit both marginal and average deterrence. With corrupt enforcers, instead, the legislator should prefer more rigid norms that prevent bribery and misreporting, at the cost of reducing marginal deterrence and stunting private initiative. The greater is potential corruption, the more rigid the optimal norms.norm design, initiative, enforcement, corruption
Incentives to Innovate and Social Harm: Laissez-Faire, Authorization or Penalties?
We analyze optimal policy design when firms' research activity may lead to socially harmful innovations. Public intervention, affecting the expected profitability of innovation, may both thwart the incentives to undertake research (average deterrence) and guide the use to which innovation is put (marginal deterrence). We show that public intervention should become increasingly stringent as the probability of social harm increases, switching first from laissez-faire to a penalty regime, then to a lenient authorization regime, and finally to a strict one. In contrast, absent innovative activity, regulation should rely only on authorizations, and laissez-faire is never optimal. Therefore, in innovative industries regulation should be softer.innovation, liability for harm, safety regulation, authorization
INFINITy : A fast machine learning-based application for human influenza A and B virus subtyping
Influenza viruses are one of the main agents causing acute respiratory infections (ARI) in humans resulting in a large amount of illness and death globally.1, 2 The influenza viruses classification is based on the nomenclature proposed by the World Health Organization (WHO)3 that is widely accepted and used by the medical and scientific communities throughout the world. Since the pandemic in 2009, two subtypes of human influenza A viruses, A(H1N1)pdm09 and A(H3N2), and two lineages of influenza B, B/Victoria and B/Yamagata, have been responsible for the vast majority of cases each year. Within each subtype and lineage, different clades and genetic groups were described to reflect the continuous viral evolution, driven by antigenic drift. The WHO Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) studies human influenza viruses from >110 countries, to monitor circulating strains, understand epidemiology and evolution, and contribute to verify the vaccine effectiveness and update its formulation each year.4, 5 A growing number of laboratories and research centers is contributing to this initiative by sequencing the whole viral genome or the hemagglutinin (HA) gene from local strains.Instituto de BiotecnologĂaFil: Cacciabue, Marco Polo Domingo. Instituto Nacional de TecnologĂa Agropecuaria (INTA). Instituto de AgrobiotecnologĂa y BiologĂa Molecular; ArgentinaFil: Cacciabue, Marco Polo Domingo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones CientĂficas y TĂ©cnicas; ArgentinaFil: Cacciabue, Marco Polo Domingo. Universidad Nacional de Luján. Departamento de Ciencias Básicas; ArgentinaFil: Marcone, DĂ©bora Natalia. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Farmacia y BioquĂmica. Departamento de MicrobiologĂa, InmunologĂa, BiotecnologĂa y GenĂ©tica. Cátedra de VirologĂa; ArgentinaFil: Marcone, DĂ©bora Natalia. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones CientĂficas y TĂ©cnicas; ArgentinaFil: Marcone, DĂ©bora Natalia. Pontificia Universidad CatĂłlica Argentina. Facultad de Ciencias MĂ©dicas. Cátedra de MicrobiologĂa, ParasitologĂa y VirologĂa; Argentin
Correlates of protection from tuberculosis
Multiple immunological mechanisms interact to protect against Mycobacterium tuberculosis (M.tb) infection and/or tuberculosis (TB) disease. However, development of a much-needed new and effective TB vaccine is hindered by the lack of validated correlates of protection. The identification of correlates of protection would facilitate the rational design, optimisation and evaluation of TB vaccine candidates. In this chapter, we discuss what is currently known about protective immunity against M.tb and potential correlates of protection that have been proposed to date, both including and also looking beyond the central role of IFN-Îł producing CD4+ T cells to consider innate and humoral immune parameters. Approaches to identifying and validating correlates of protection will also be reviewed
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