The Simple Ree groups 2F4(q2){}^2F_4(q^2) are determined by the set of their character degrees

Let $G$ be a finite group. Let ${\rm{cd}}(G)$ be the set of all complex irreducible character degrees of $G.$ In this paper, we will show that if ${\rm{cd}}(G)={\rm{cd}}(H),$ where $H$ is the simple Ree group ${}^2F_4(q^2),q^2\geq 8,$ then $G\cong H\times A,$ where $A$ is an abelian group. This verifies Huppert's Conjecture for the simple Ree groups ${}^2F_4(q^2)$ when $q^2\geq 8.$Comment: 14 pages, to appear in Journal of Algebr

Symmetric groups are determined by their character degrees

Let $G$ be a finite group. Let $X_1(G)$ be the first column of the ordinary character table of $G.$ In this paper, we will show that if $X_1(G)=X_1(S_n),$ then $G\cong S_n.$ As a consequence, we show that $S_n$ is uniquely determined by the structure of the complex group algebra \C S_n.Comment: 12 pages, to appear in Journal of Algebr

On a generalization of M-group

In this paper, we will show that if for every nonlinear complex irreducible character of a finite group G, some multiple of it is induced from an irreducible character of some proper subgroup of G, then G is solvable. This is a generalization of Taketa's Theorem on the solvability of M-group.Comment: 17 pages, to appear in J. Algebr

The Ontology of Intentional Agency in Light of Neurobiological Determinism: Philosophy Meets Folk Psychology

The moot point of the Western philosophical rhetoric about free will consists in examining whether the claim of authorship to intentional, deliberative actions fits into or is undermined by a one-way causal framework of determinism. Philosophers who think that reconciliation between the two is possible are known as metaphysical compatibilists. However, there are philosophers populating the other end of the spectrum, known as the metaphysical libertarians, who maintain that claim to intentional agency cannot be sustained unless it is assumed that indeterministic causal processes pervade the action-implementation apparatus employed by the agent. The metaphysical libertarians differ among themselves on the question of whether the indeterministic causal relation exists between the series of intentional states and processes, both conscious and unconscious, and the action, making claim for what has come to be known as the event-causal view, or between the agent and the action, arguing that a sort of agent causation is at work. In this paper, I have tried to propose that certain features of both event-causal and agent-causal libertarian views need to be combined in order to provide a more defendable compatibilist account accommodating deliberative actions with deterministic causation. The ‘‘agent-executed-eventcausal libertarianism’’, the account of agency I have tried to develop here, integrates certain plausible features of the two competing accounts of libertarianism turning them into a consistent whole. I hope to show in the process that the integration of these two variants of libertarianism does not challenge what some accounts of metaphysical compatibilism propose—that there exists a broader deterministic relation between the web of mental and extra-mental components constituting the agent’s dispositional system—the agent’s beliefs, desires, short-term and long-term goals based on them, the acquired social, cultural and religious beliefs, the general and immediate and situational environment in which the agent is placed, etc. on the one hand and the decisions she makes over her lifetime on the basis of these factors. While in the ‘‘Introduction’’ the philosophically assumed anomaly between deterministic causation and the intentional act of deciding has been briefly surveyed, the second section is devoted to the task of bridging the gap between compatibilism and libertarianism. The next section of the paper turns to an analysis of folk-psychological concepts and intuitions about the effects of neurochemical processes and prior mental events on the freedom of making choices. How philosophical insights can be beneficially informed by taking into consideration folk-psychological intuitions has also been discussed, thus setting up the background for such analysis. It has been suggested in the end that support for the proposed theory of intentional agency can be found in the folk-psychological intuitions, when they are taken in the right perspective

Simple classical groups of Lie type are determined by their character degrees

In this paper, we will show that nonabelian simple classical groups of Lie type are uniquely determined by the structure of their complex group algebras.Comment: 10 pages, to appear in Journal of Algebr

Alternating groups and moduli space lifting Invariants

Main Theorem: Spaces of r-branch point 3-cycle covers, degree n or Galois of degree n!/2 have one (resp. two) component(s) if r=n-1 (resp. r\ge n). Improves Fried-Serre on deciding when sphere covers with odd-order branching lift to unramified Spin covers. We produce Hurwitz-Torelli automorphic functions on Hurwitz spaces, and draw Inverse Galois conclusions. Example: Absolute spaces of 3-cycle covers with +1 (resp. -1) lift invariant carry canonical even (resp. odd) theta functions when r is even (resp. odd). For inner spaces the result is independent of r. Another use appears in, http://www.math.uci.edu/~mfried/paplist-mt/twoorbit.html, "Connectedness of families of sphere covers of A_n-Type." This shows the M(odular) T(ower)s for the prime p=2 lying over Hurwitz spaces first studied by, http://www.math.uci.edu/~mfried/othlist-cov/hurwitzLiu-Oss.pdf, Liu and Osserman have 2-cusps. That is sufficient to establish the Main Conjecture: (*) High tower levels are general-type varieties and have no rational points.For infinitely many of those MTs, the tree of cusps contains a subtree -- a spire -- isomorphic to the tree of cusps on a modular curve tower. This makes plausible a version of Serre's O(pen) I(mage) T(heorem) on such MTs. Establishing these modular curve-like properties opens, to MTs, modular curve-like thinking where modular curves have never gone before. A fuller html description of this paper is at http://www.math.uci.edu/~mfried/paplist-cov/hf-can0611591.html .Comment: To appear in the Israel Journal as of 1/5/09; v4 is corrected from proof sheets, but does include some proof simplification in \S

Additive Polynomials for Finite Groups of Lie Type

This paper provides a realization of all classical and most exceptional finite groups of Lie type as Galois groups over function fields over F_q and derives explicit additive polynomials for the extensions. Our unified approach is based on results of Matzat which give bounds for Galois groups of Frobenius modules and uses the structure and representation theory of the corresponding connected linear algebraic groups.Comment: 59 pages; v2: added reference, slightly restructured section 6.1, few small rewordings; v3: completed realization of Steinberg's triality groups (thanks to P. Mueller for solving the remaining open question); clarified argument how to use Thm. 3.

The apology mismatch: asymmetries between victim's need for apologies and perpetrator's willingness to apologize

Although previous research on apologies has shown that apologies can have many beneficial effects on victims’ responses, the dyadic nature of the apology process has largely been ignored. As a consequence, very little is known about the congruence between perpetrators’ willingness to apologize and victims’ willingness to receive an apology. In three experimental studies we showed that victims mainly want to receive an apology after an intentional transgression, whereas perpetrators want to offer an apology particularly after an unintentional transgression. As expected, these divergent apologetic needs among victims and perpetrators were mediated by unique emotions: guilt among perpetrators and anger among victims. These results suggest that an apology serves very different goals among victims and perpetrators, thus pointing at an apology mismatch