The Problem of Low and Unequal Voter Turnout - and What We Can Do About It. IHS Political Science Series No. 54, February 1998

Low voter turnout has become a serious problem in most democracies, not only in the United States but also in many West European countries – and even in a traditionally high-turnout country like Austria where turnout has also been declining in recent years. There are five reasons why we should be concerned about this problem: 1. Low turnout means low participation by less privileged citizens, who are already at a disadvantage in terms of other forms of political participation. 2. Unequal participation means unequal influence. 3. Actual turnout tends to be lower than the official turnout figures suggest. 4. Turnout in elections other than those at the national level tends to be particularly low. 5. Turnout is declining in most countries. The problem of low and unequal turnout can be solved by a number of institutional mechanisms such as proportional representation, concurrent and infrequent elections, weekend instead of weekday voting, and compulsory voting. The last of these – mandatory voting – is especially strong and effective, and also morally justified

Democratic Quality in Stable Democracies

The major predecessor to Ringen’s and my own efforts to measure democratic quality in terms of the purpose of democracy is Robert Dahl’s seminal book Polyarchy (1971). Measuring the quality of democracy requires two prior judgments: (1) making sure that, in terms of institutional characteristics, a country is sufficiently democratic, and that, as a minimum, it has universal suffrage, and (2) that its democracy has been uninterrupted for a minimum number of years. To an important extent, higher democratic quality can be attributed to institutional characteristics of consensus democracy, especially proportional representation

The problem of low and unequal voter turnout - and what we can do about it

Eine geringe Wahlbeteiligung ist inzwischen in den meisten Demokratien zu einem ernsten Problem geworden, und dies nicht nur in den USA und vielen westeuropäischen Ländern. Auch in Ländern mit traditionell hoher Wahlbeteiligung wie Österreich ist die Grundform demokratischer Partizipation beständig zurückgegangen. Die vorliegende Studie diskutiert einige Gründe für diesen Trend: (1) Eine geringe Wahlbeteiligung der sozial schwächeren und benachteiligten Bürgern bedeutet auch eine geringere politische Partizipation dieser Wähler in anderen Bereichen. (2) Ungleiche Partizipation bedeutet ungleiche Einflussmöglichkeiten auf das politische und gesellschaftliche Geschehen. (3) Die Wahlbeteiligung bei anderen Wahlen (Länder, Kommunen) ist stärker als bei gesamtnationalen Wahlen. (4) Der Trend ist durchgängig in allen Ländern festzustellen. Der Autor beschreibt einige der institutionellen Möglichkeiten, wie dieser Entwicklung begegnet werden kann: neue Repräsentationsformen, unregelmäßige Wahlen, Wochenends- statt Wochentagswahlen, Wahlpflicht. Die letzte Möglichkeit ist für den Autor die effektivste und auch am besten moralisch legitimierbar. (ICA)'Low voter turnout has become a serious problem in most democracies, not only in the United States but also in many West European countries - and even in a traditionally high-turnout country like Austria where turnout has also been declining in recent years. There are five reasons why we should be concerned about this problem: 1. low turnout means low participation by less privileged citizens, who are already at a disadvantage in terms of other forms of political participation; 2. unequal participation means unequal influence; 3. actual turnout tends to be lower than the official turnout figures suggest; 4. turnout in elections other than those at the national level tends to be particularly low; 5. turnout is declining in most countries. The problem of low and unequal turnout can be solved by a number of institutional mechanisms such as proportional representation, concurrent and infrequent elections, weekend instead of weekday voting, and compulsory voting. The last of these - mandatory voting - is especially strong and effective, and also morally justified.' (author's abstract)

Deliberation and Consociation: Joint Pathways to Peace in Divided Societies

In this short commentary, Arend Lijphart continues the conversation on the role of deliberation in promoting the “spirit of accommodation” in deeply divided societies. Jürg Steiner and Maria Clara Jaramillo started this discussion in their article “How to Arrive at Peace in Deeply Divided Societies? Using Deliberation to Refine Consociational Theory” published in this same issue

Power-sharing: Institutions, Behavior, and Peace

This is the author accepted manuscript. The final version is available from Wiley via the DOI in this record.Replication Materials: The data, code, and any additional materials required to replicate all analyses in this article are available on the American Journal of Political Science Dataverse within the Harvard Dataverse Network, at: https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/3DK6JAGrievances that derive from the unequal treatment of ethnic groups are a key motivation for civil war. Ethnic power-sharing should therefore reduce the risk of internal conflict. Yet conflict researchers disagree on whether formal power-sharing institutions effectively prevent large-scale violence.We can improve our understanding of the effect of power-sharing institutions by analyzing the mechanisms under which they operate. To this effect, we compare the direct effect of formal power-sharing institutions on peace with their indirect effect through power-sharing behavior. Combining data on inclusive and territorially dispersive institutions with information on power-sharing behavior, we empirically assess this relationship on a global scale. Our causal mediation analysis reveals that formal power-sharing institutions affect the probability of ethnic conflict onset mostly through power-sharing behavior that these institutions induce.Funding: Swiss National Science Foundation (Grant No. 105511- 143213; PI: Cederman, Hug, and Wucherpfennig), the National Science Foundation (Grant No. Q2 SES-081950766b; PI: Strøom), and the Norwegian Research Council (196850/F10; PI: Gates)

Divided but united:explaining nested public support for European integration

<p>Academic and general interest in public support for European Integration is on the rise. Theoretically, the utilitarian, identity, reference, cue-taking and signalling models have been developed to explain this perplexing phenomenon. While these models have been tested, there is no comprehensive up-to-date account of how well they perform separately, relative to each other and across levels. Empirically, this study utilises a data set with 110,873 respondents from the European Social Survey. Methodologically, a multilevel model is used to address causal heterogeneity between levels. The study shows that ‘attitudes towards multiculturalism’ at the individual level and ‘corruption’ at the country level are the strongest predictors. When interacting levels within models, it is demonstrated that individual trust in the national political establishment is being moderated by the level of corruption in a country in influencing support for European integration. On this basis, two models are proposed, named the ‘saviour model’ and the ‘anti-establishment model’.</p

Political Contest and Oppositional Voices in Postconflict Democracy:The Impact of Institutional Design on Government–Media Relations

The media are considered to play a crucial democratic role in the public sphere through representing political issues to the public (Gelders et al. 2007); facilitating deliberation, public opinion formation and political participation (Habermas 1989); acting as the 'watchdog' of powerful societal institutions (Norris 2000); and in assisting in the development of civil society in politically fragile and divided contexts (Taylor 2000). Journalists are expected to perform their news reporting within the framework of public interest values, such as objectivity, impartiality, public service, autonomy, and a critical questioning of power (Street 2001). Yet, it is acknowledged that political, cultural, organisational, economic, and relational factors affect this journalistic ideal (Davis 2010). In deeply divided, post-conflict societies, ethno-political antagonisms are fundamental to almost all aspects of civic life, yet there is limited research into how government-media relations operate in such contexts. Most media-politics studies focus on Western majoritarian parliamentary or presidential systems - that is, any system that has clear ‘winners’ and ‘losers’ after elections - and where institutional factors are considered, the focus is largely on how party systems impact on journalism (e.g. Çarkoğlu et al. 2014; Hallin and Mancini 2004; Sheafer and Wolfsfeld 2009). This focus however, neglects important institutional variables, such as mandatory coalition, proportionality and special cross-community voting arrangements, which pertain in more constitutionally complex democracies and which may have a significant impact on media-politics relations

Government‒business relations in multilevel systems: the effect of conflict perception on venue choice

In multilevel systems, organised interests, including business firms, can pursue their political goals at different levels. At the same time, national systems of interest representation provide important incentive structures for corporate political behaviour. In this context, corporate political strategy is guided by firms’ perceptions of their relationship with policy-makers. If this relationship is under strain in one venue, firms shift their lobbying effort to alternative venues, subject to constraints reflecting national institutional legacies. Using survey data on 56 large German and British firms, the article investigates empirically how perceptions of government‒business relations and national systems of interest representation interact to shape the political behaviour of large firms in multilevel systems. The analysis shows that perceived conflict with public authorities at the national level leads to increased business lobbying at the EU level. Furthermore, national types of interest representation shape relative business engagement at the EU level as well as the readiness of firms to shift venue

Government‒business relations in multilevel systems: the effect of conflict perception on venue choice

In multilevel systems, organised interests, including business firms, can pursue their political goals at different levels. At the same time, national systems of interest representation provide important incentive structures for corporate political behaviour. In this context, corporate political strategy is guided by firms’ perceptions of their relationship with policy-makers. If this relationship is under strain in one venue, firms shift their lobbying effort to alternative venues, subject to constraints reflecting national institutional legacies. Using survey data on 56 large German and British firms, the article investigates empirically how perceptions of government‒business relations and national systems of interest representation interact to shape the political behaviour of large firms in multilevel systems. The analysis shows that perceived conflict with public authorities at the national level leads to increased business lobbying at the EU level. Furthermore, national types of interest representation shape relative business engagement at the EU level as well as the readiness of firms to shift venue

Institutions, Path Dependence, and Democratic Consolidation.&quot;

ABSTRACT Formal political institutions have been assigned two roles in democratization theorizing: as contingent effects of strategic interaction and as predictable bases for democratic consolidation. These roles might be reconciled if we assume that institutions become persistent once in place. But patterns of behavior surrounding these institutions do not appear to conform to the expectations of path dependency or comparable frameworks: while unchallenged in some cases, these institutions are repeatedly contested and often enough revised in others. This is true even of &apos;low stakes&apos; institutional designs. Consequently, groups often perceive institutional designs not as &apos;locked in&apos; and instead as malleable over even a few years. Codified political institutions therefore appear unable to generate the reduced risks -in effect, the credible commitments -which Adam Przeworski&apos;s argument about democratic consolidation requires. This conclusion suggests that consolidation may result from reductions in political risks caused by non-institutional factors. It also has implications for diverse arguments which assume stability or predictability in formal institutions. KEY WORDS • credible commitments • democratic consolidation • institutions • path dependence The Two Roles Institutions Play in Democratization Theorizing This article&apos;s main claim is that formal political institutions cannot and do not play the decisive role in democratic consolidation which several theorists suggest. This is the case because these institutions -&apos;electoral systems, constitutional provisions governing relations between the legislative and executive branches, and degrees of decentralization &apos; (Colomer, 1995: 74) are more contingent and susceptible to revision than has often been assumed, including by many democratization theorists. An emphasis on institutional contingency may seem more plausible today than in earlier decades, given substantial constitutional changes in numerous countries in the past few years. But the cases discussed here suggest that contingency Journal of Theoretical Politics 13(3): 249-7