Dispersants: The Lesser Of Two Evils Or A Cure Worse Than The Disease?

The April 20, 2010, BP oil spill is widely regarded as the nation’s worst environmental disaster. The explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig resulted in the death of eleven crewmen, and thousands of fish, sea turtles, birds, and marine mammals. The federal government estimates that 4.9 million barrels (or 205.8 million gallons) of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico from the rogue well. In addition to the direct effect on wildlife from the spilled oil, which includes reduced ability to regulate temperature, forage, and nest, the unprecedented application of dispersants also likely impacted wildlife. During the oil spill, BP released roughly 1.84 million gallons of dispersants into the Gulf, 1.07 million gallons to the surface and 771,000 subsea. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved these measures despite its admission that no one fully knew the environmental effects of the dispersants, particularly at such great depths or volumes. Lisa Jackson, EPA administrator, called her decision to approve BP’s subsea dispersant use the hardest decision she ever made. As days turned to weeks and the oil continued to spill, it became obvious that both BP and the government were woefully unprepared to respond to a spill of this magnitude. The horror and chaos of the oil spill put the government in the awkward position of leading the efforts to respond to the spill while relying on industry resources and expertise. This also resulted in a tug-of-war within the Obama Administration between its enforcement and regulation roles and its need to cooperate with BP in order to stop the flow of oil and recover from the spill. The use of subsea dispersants most clearly exemplified this conflict as the government’s lack of knowledge about the effects of dispersants made it almost impossible for it to fulfill its legal duty to protect the nation’s waters and wildlife from pollutants. Two U.S. federal laws, the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), contain provisions that specifically ensure that dispersant approval and use will not jeopardize imperiled wildlife and the resources on which they depend. In light of the general lack of knowledge regarding the effects of dispersants used in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and the harm they may have caused, it has become evident that these two environmental laws, their implementation, or both, were inadequate to safeguard the environment and wildlife from the disaster response. This Article examines the use of dispersants in response to the BP oil spill. The authors describe the ways in which the CWA and the ESA authorize the EPA to regulate the use of dispersants and suggest how the regulation of dispersants could be strengthened. Part II discusses the development of contingency plans for oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico and the pre-spill consultation process for dispersants’ effects on wildlife. Part III describes BP’s dispersant use in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and recent scientific research identifying potential effects on the ocean and marine wildlife. Part IV discusses lessons learned from the oil spill and concludes that future preparedness will require better agency implementation or even legislative action

The Effects Of Female Size On Fecundity In A Large Marine Gastropod Rapana Venosa (Muricidae)

The life history strategy of the veined rapa whelk Rapana venosa, a temperate marine gastropod, includes generation times of 1 y, individual longevity of \u3e 10 y, annual production of egg cases, and an adult size range of 40 to \u3e 160 mm shell length (SL). This life history combined with the animal\u27s generalist ecological preferences and broad physiological tolerances makes rapa whelks well suited for ecological success along a gradient of habitat and community types. Ballast water transport of veliger larvae across traditional zoogeographic boundaries has resulted in the establishment of invasive rapa whelk populations in Chesapeake Bay, USA, as well as European habitats. Although the need for a quantitative understanding of rapa whelk reproductive biology in terms of annual embryo production or fecundity is acknowledged as a necessary step in assessing the biological and ecological consequences of such an invasion, rapa whelk fecundity in relation to size for the entire adult size range (40-\u3e 160 mm SL) has not previously been quantified. The relationships between rapa whelk female size and egg case height, number of embryos egg case(-1), number of egg cases produced female whelk(-1) yr(-1) and fecundity, and the number of embryos female-(1) yr(-1), are described for a size range of individuals from Chesapeake Bay. In 2001 and 2003, egg laying began in mid to late May at water temperatures of approximately 18 degrees C and salinities 14-20 ppt and continued for 11-12 wk. The smallest rapa whelk observed (45 mm SL, 5.8 g wet tissue weight) laid egg cases with heights of approximately 7 mm. The largest whelk (163 mm SL, 220 g) laid egg cases with heights 30-33 mm. The number of embryos observed in egg cases produced by Chesapeake Bay rapa whelks ranged from 123 embryos in a 7.4 mm high egg case to 3,673 embryos in a 33.5 mm high egg case. Rapa whelk fecundity (number of embryos female(-1)yr(-1)) increased with female size. Egg case production was observed in rapa whelks that had hatched from egg cases and recruited within the previous year (\u3c 1 y old). Small (\u3c 80 mm SL, \u3c 28 g wet tissue weight) rapa whelks have relatively lower annual fecundities (1 x 10(5) embryos fernale(-1) yr(-1)) than large (\u3e 80 mm SL, \u3e 28 g wet tissue weight) rapa whelks that may produce between 1 x 10(6) and 4 x 10(6) embryos female(-1) yr(-1). Estimates of rapa whelk fecundity, even for small rapa whelks, are at least an order of magnitude greater than similar estimates for native United States Atlantic coast gastropods

Effects of glycerol and creatine hyperhydration on doping-relevant blood parameters

Glycerol is prohibited as an ergogenic aid by the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) due to the potential for its plasma expansion properties to have masking effects. However, the scientific basis of the inclusion of Gly as a “masking agent” remains inconclusive. The purpose of this study was to determine the effects of a hyperhydrating supplement containing Gly on doping-relevant blood parameters. Nine trained males ingested a hyperhydrating mixture twice per day for 7 days containing 1.0 g•kg<sup>−1</sup> body mass (BM) of Gly, 10.0 g of creatine and 75.0 g of glucose. Blood samples were collected and total hemoglobin (Hb) mass determined using the optimized carbon monoxide (CO) rebreathing method pre- and post-supplementation. BM and total body water (TBW) increased significantly following supplementation by 1.1 ± 1.2 and 1.0 ± 1.2 L (BM, P < 0.01; TBW, P < 0.01), respectively. This hyperhydration did not significantly alter plasma volume or any of the doping-relevant blood parameters (e.g., hematocrit, Hb, reticulocytes and total Hb-mass) even when Gly was clearly detectable in urine samples. In conclusion, this study shows that supplementation with hyperhydrating solution containing Gly for 7 days does not significantly alter doping-relevant blood parameters

Navigating a river by its bends. A study on transnational social networks as resources for the transformation of Cambodia

This article explores in what ways first generation Cambodian French and Cambodian American returnees create and employ the social capital available in their transnational social networks upon their return to Cambodia. The triangular interdependence between the returnees, their overseas immigrant communities and homeland society is taken as a starting point. The central argument is that Cambodian French and Cambodian American returnees build different relationships to Cambodia due to: (1) the influence of their immigrant communities in the countries of resettlement; and (2) the contexts of their exit from Cambodia. Regarding debates on the contribution of returnees to an emergent nation, findings in this multisited casestudy bring forward that ideas of return held by the three parties involved may force remigrants into transnationalism in both host and home countries. Findings also demonstrate that social capital may be seen as a resource or a restraint in the lives of returnees

Dispersants: The Lesser Of Two Evils Or A Cure Worse Than The Disease?

The April 20, 2010, BP oil spill is widely regarded as the nation’s worst environmental disaster. The explosion of the Deepwater Horizon oil rig resulted in the death of eleven crewmen, and thousands of fish, sea turtles, birds, and marine mammals. The federal government estimates that 4.9 million barrels (or 205.8 million gallons) of oil spilled into the Gulf of Mexico from the rogue well. In addition to the direct effect on wildlife from the spilled oil, which includes reduced ability to regulate temperature, forage, and nest, the unprecedented application of dispersants also likely impacted wildlife. During the oil spill, BP released roughly 1.84 million gallons of dispersants into the Gulf, 1.07 million gallons to the surface and 771,000 subsea. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) approved these measures despite its admission that no one fully knew the environmental effects of the dispersants, particularly at such great depths or volumes. Lisa Jackson, EPA administrator, called her decision to approve BP’s subsea dispersant use the hardest decision she ever made. As days turned to weeks and the oil continued to spill, it became obvious that both BP and the government were woefully unprepared to respond to a spill of this magnitude. The horror and chaos of the oil spill put the government in the awkward position of leading the efforts to respond to the spill while relying on industry resources and expertise. This also resulted in a tug-of-war within the Obama Administration between its enforcement and regulation roles and its need to cooperate with BP in order to stop the flow of oil and recover from the spill. The use of subsea dispersants most clearly exemplified this conflict as the government’s lack of knowledge about the effects of dispersants made it almost impossible for it to fulfill its legal duty to protect the nation’s waters and wildlife from pollutants. Two U.S. federal laws, the Clean Water Act (CWA) and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), contain provisions that specifically ensure that dispersant approval and use will not jeopardize imperiled wildlife and the resources on which they depend. In light of the general lack of knowledge regarding the effects of dispersants used in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, and the harm they may have caused, it has become evident that these two environmental laws, their implementation, or both, were inadequate to safeguard the environment and wildlife from the disaster response. This Article examines the use of dispersants in response to the BP oil spill. The authors describe the ways in which the CWA and the ESA authorize the EPA to regulate the use of dispersants and suggest how the regulation of dispersants could be strengthened. Part II discusses the development of contingency plans for oil spills in the Gulf of Mexico and the pre-spill consultation process for dispersants’ effects on wildlife. Part III describes BP’s dispersant use in response to the Deepwater Horizon oil spill and recent scientific research identifying potential effects on the ocean and marine wildlife. Part IV discusses lessons learned from the oil spill and concludes that future preparedness will require better agency implementation or even legislative action