Coherent motion of stereocilia assures the concerted gating of hair-cell transduction channels

The hair cell's mechanoreceptive organelle, the hair bundle, is highly sensitive because its transduction channels open over a very narrow range of displacements. The synchronous gating of transduction channels also underlies the active hair-bundle motility that amplifies and tunes responsiveness. The extent to which the gating of independent transduction channels is coordinated depends on how tightly individual stereocilia are constrained to move as a unit. Using dual-beam interferometry in the bullfrog's sacculus, we found that thermal movements of stereocilia located as far apart as a bundle's opposite edges display high coherence and negligible phase lag. Because the mechanical degrees of freedom of stereocilia are strongly constrained, a force applied anywhere in the hair bundle deflects the structure as a unit. This feature assures the concerted gating of transduction channels that maximizes the sensitivity of mechanoelectrical transduction and enhances the hair bundle's capacity to amplify its inputs.Comment: 24 pages, including 6 figures, published in 200

The Effects of Serotonin Receptor Antagonists on Contraction and Relaxation Responses Induced by Electrical Stimulation in the Rat Small Intestine

Background: The main source of 5-HT in body is in enterchromafin cells of intestine, different studies mentioned different roles for endogenous 5-HT and receptors involved and it is not clearified the mechanism of action of endogenous 5-HT. Objectives: To study the role of endogenous 5-HT on modulation of contraction and relaxation responses induced by electrical field stimulation (EFS) in different regions of the rat intestine. Materials and Methods: Segments taken from the rat duodenum, jejunum, mid and terminal ileum were vertically mounted, connected to a transducer and exposed to EFS with different frequencies in the absence and presence of various inhibitors of enteric mediators i. e. specific 5-HT receptor antagonists. Results: EFS-induced responses were sensitive to TTX and partly to atropine, indicating a major neuronal involvement and a cholinergic system. Pre-treatment with WAY100635 (a 5-HT1A receptor antagonist) and granisetron up to 10.0 µM, GR113808 (a 5-HT4 receptor antagonist), methysergide and ritanserin up to 1.0 µM, failed to modify responses to EFS inall examined tissues. In the presence of SB258585 1.0 µM (a 5-HT6 receptor antagonist) there was a trend to enhance contraction in the proximal part of the intestine and reduce contraction in the distal part. Pre-treatment with SB269970A 1.0 µM (5-HT7 receptor antagonist) induced a greater contractile response to EFS at 0.4 Hz only in the duodenum. Conclusions: The application of 5-HT1A, 5-HT2, 5-HT3, 5-HT4, 5-HT6 and 5-HT7 receptor antagonists, applied at concentrations lower than 1.0 µM did not modify the EFS-induced contraction and relaxation responses, whichsuggests the unlikely involvement of endogenous 5-HT in mediating responses to EFS in the described test conditions. Keywords: Electric Stimulation Therapy; Serotonin 5-HT1 Receptor Antagonists; Intestine, Smal

Mathematically Gifted Adolescents Have Deficiencies in Social Valuation and Mentalization

Many mathematically gifted adolescents are characterized as being indolent, underachieving and unsuccessful despite their high cognitive ability. This is often due to difficulties with social and emotional development. However, research on social and emotional interactions in gifted adolescents has been limited. The purpose of this study was to observe differences in complex social strategic behaviors between gifted and average adolescents of the same age using the repeated Ultimatum Game. Twenty-two gifted adolescents and 24 average adolescents participated in the Ultimatum Game. Two adolescents participate in the game, one as a proposer and the other as a responder. Because of its simplicity, the Ultimatum Game is an apt tool for investigating complex human emotional and cognitive decision-making in an empirical setting. We observed strategic but socially impaired offers from gifted proposers and lower acceptance rates from gifted responders, resulting in lower total earnings in the Ultimatum Game. Thus, our results indicate that mathematically gifted adolescents have deficiencies in social valuation and mentalization

Optimal interdependence between networks for the evolution of cooperation

Recent research has identified interactions between networks as crucial for the outcome of evolutionary games taking place on them. While the consensus is that interdependence does promote cooperation by means of organizational complexity and enhanced reciprocity that is out of reach on isolated networks, we here address the question just how much interdependence there should be. Intuitively, one might assume the more the better. However, we show that in fact only an intermediate density of sufficiently strong interactions between networks warrants an optimal resolution of social dilemmas. This is due to an intricate interplay between the heterogeneity that causes an asymmetric strategy flow because of the additional links between the networks, and the independent formation of cooperative patterns on each individual network. Presented results are robust to variations of the strategy updating rule, the topology of interdependent networks, and the governing social dilemma, thus suggesting a high degree of universality

Heterogeneous Aspirations Promote Cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game

To be the fittest is central to proliferation in evolutionary games. Individuals thus adopt the strategies of better performing players in the hope of successful reproduction. In structured populations the array of those that are eligible to act as strategy sources is bounded to the immediate neighbors of each individual. But which one of these strategy sources should potentially be copied? Previous research dealt with this question either by selecting the fittest or by selecting one player uniformly at random. Here we introduce a parameter that interpolates between these two extreme options. Setting equal to zero returns the random selection of the opponent, while positive favor the fitter players. In addition, we divide the population into two groups. Players from group select their opponents as dictated by the parameter , while players from group do so randomly irrespective of . We denote the fraction of players contained in groups and by and , respectively. The two parameters and allow us to analyze in detail how aspirations in the context of the prisoner's dilemma game influence the evolution of cooperation. We find that for sufficiently positive values of there exist a robust intermediate for which cooperation thrives best. The robustness of this observation is tested against different levels of uncertainty in the strategy adoption process and for different interaction networks. We also provide complete phase diagrams depicting the dependence of the impact of and for different values of , and contrast the validity of our conclusions by means of an alternative model where individual aspiration levels are subject to evolution as well. Our study indicates that heterogeneity in aspirations may be key for the sustainability of cooperation in structured populations

Pay-off scarcity causes evolution of risk-aversion and extreme altruism

All organisms descend from populations with limited resources, so it is clear why evolution should select strategies that win resources at the expense of competitors. Less obvious is how altruistic behaviours evolve, whereby an individual helps others despite expense to itself. Modelling simple agents using evolutionary game theory, it is shown that steady states of extreme altruism can evolve when pay-offs are very rare compared with death. In these states, agents give away most of their wealth. A new theorem for general evolutionary models shows that, when pay-offs are rare, evolution no longer selects strategies to maximize income (average pay-off), but to minimize the risk of missing-out entirely on a rare resource. Principles revealed by the model are widely applicable, where the game represents rare life-changing events: disasters or gluts

Cooperation, Norms, and Revolutions: A Unified Game-Theoretical Approach

Cooperation is of utmost importance to society as a whole, but is often challenged by individual self-interests. While game theory has studied this problem extensively, there is little work on interactions within and across groups with different preferences or beliefs. Yet, people from different social or cultural backgrounds often meet and interact. This can yield conflict, since behavior that is considered cooperative by one population might be perceived as non-cooperative from the viewpoint of another. To understand the dynamics and outcome of the competitive interactions within and between groups, we study game-dynamical replicator equations for multiple populations with incompatible interests and different power (be this due to different population sizes, material resources, social capital, or other factors). These equations allow us to address various important questions: For example, can cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma be promoted, when two interacting groups have different preferences? Under what conditions can costly punishment, or other mechanisms, foster the evolution of norms? When does cooperation fail, leading to antagonistic behavior, conflict, or even revolutions? And what incentives are needed to reach peaceful agreements between groups with conflicting interests? Our detailed quantitative analysis reveals a large variety of interesting results, which are relevant for society, law and economics, and have implications for the evolution of language and culture as well

Influence of opinion dynamics on the evolution of games

Under certain circumstances such as lack of information or bounded rationality, human players can take decisions on which strategy to choose in a game on the basis of simple opinions. These opinions can be modified after each round by observing own or others payoff results but can be also modified after interchanging impressions with other players. In this way, the update of the strategies can become a question that goes beyond simple evolutionary rules based on fitness and become a social issue. In this work, we explore this scenario by coupling a game with an opinion dynamics model. The opinion is represented by a continuous variable that corresponds to the certainty of the agents respect to which strategy is best. The opinions transform into actions by making the selection of an strategy a stochastic event with a probability regulated by the opinion. A certain regard for the previous round payoff is included but the main update rules of the opinion are given by a model inspired in social interchanges. We find that the dynamics fixed points of the coupled model is different from those of the evolutionary game or the opinion models alone. Furthermore, new features emerge such as the resilience of the fraction of cooperators to the topology of the social interaction network or to the presence of a small fraction of extremist players.Comment: 7 pages, 5 figure

Deep-Inelastic Inclusive ep Scattering at Low x and a Determination of alpha_s

A precise measurement of the inclusive deep-inelastic e^+p scattering cross section is reported in the kinematic range 1.5<= Q^2 <=150 GeV^2 and 3*10^(-5)<= x <=0.2. The data were recorded with the H1 detector at HERA in 1996 and 1997, and correspond to an integrated luminosity of 20 pb^(-1). The double differential cross section, from which the proton structure function F_2(x,Q^2) and the longitudinal structure function F_L(x,Q^2) are extracted, is measured with typically 1% statistical and 3% systematic uncertainties. The measured partial derivative (dF_2(x,Q^2)/dln Q^2)_x is observed to rise continuously towards small x for fixed Q^2. The cross section data are combined with published H1 measurements at high Q^2 for a next-to-leading order DGLAP QCD analysis.The H1 data determine the gluon momentum distribution in the range 3*10^(-4)<= x <=0.1 to within an experimental accuracy of about 3% for Q^2 =20 GeV^2. A fit of the H1 measurements and the mu p data of the BCDMS collaboration allows the strong coupling constant alpha_s and the gluon distribution to be simultaneously determined. A value of alpha _s(M_Z^2)=0.1150+-0.0017 (exp) +0.0009-0.0005 (model) is obtained in NLO, with an additional theoretical uncertainty of about +-0.005, mainly due to the uncertainty of the renormalisation scale.Comment: 68 pages, 24 figures and 18 table