The fine structure of the comparative

The paper provides evidence for a more articulated structure of the comparative as compared with the one in Bobaljik (2012). We propose to split up Bobaljik's cmpr head into two distinct heads, C1 and C2. Looking at Czech, Old Church Slavonic and English, we show that this proposal explains a range of facts about suppletion and allomorphy. A crucial ingredient of our analysis is the claim that adjectival roots are not a-categorial, but spell out adjectival functional structure. Specifically, we argue that adjectival roots come in various types, differing in the amount of functional structure they spell out. In order to correctly model the competition between roots, we further introduce a Faithfulness Restriction on Cyclic Override, which allows us to dispense with the Elsewhere Principle

The effect of fight cost structure on fighting behaviour

A common feature of animal populations is the stealing by animals of resources such as food from other animals. This has previously been the subject of a range of modelling approaches, one of which is the so called "producer-scrounger" model. In this model a producer finds a resource that takes some time to be consumed, and some time later a (generally) conspecific scrounger discovers the producer with its resource and potentially attempts to steal it. In this paper we consider a variant of this scenario where each individual can choose to invest an amount of energy into this contest, and the level of investment of each individual determines the probability of it winning the contest, but also the additional cost it has to bear. We analyse the model for a specific set of cost functions and maximum investment levels and show how the evolutionarily stable behaviour depends upon them. In particular we see that for high levels of maximum investment, the producer keeps the resource without a fight for concave cost functions, but for convex functions the scrounger obtains the resource (albeit at some cost)

Does Sex-Selective Predation Stabilize or Destabilize Predator-Prey Dynamics?

Background: Little is known about the impact of prey sexual dimorphism on predator-prey dynamics and the impact of sexselective harvesting and trophy hunting on long-term stability of exploited populations. Methodology and Principal Findings: We review the quantitative evidence for sex-selective predation and study its longterm consequences using several simple predator-prey models. These models can be also interpreted in terms of feedback between harvesting effort and population size of the harvested species under open-access exploitation. Among the 81 predator-prey pairs found in the literature, male bias in predation is 2.3 times as common as female bias. We show that long-term effects of sex-selective predation depend on the interplay of predation bias and prey mating system. Predation on the ‘less limiting’ prey sex can yield a stable predator-prey equilibrium, while predation on the other sex usually destabilizes the dynamics and promotes population collapses. For prey mating systems that we consider, males are less limiting except for polyandry and polyandrogyny, and male-biased predation alone on such prey can stabilize otherwise unstable dynamics. On the contrary, our results suggest that female-biased predation on polygynous, polygynandrous or monogamous prey requires other stabilizing mechanisms to persist. Conclusions and Significance: Our modelling results suggest that the observed skew towards male-biased predation might reflect, in addition to sexual selection, the evolutionary history of predator-prey interactions. More focus on these phenomena can yield additional and interesting insights as to which mechanisms maintain the persistence of predator-prey pairs over ecological and evolutionary timescales. Our results can also have implications for long-term sustainability of harvesting and trophy hunting of sexually dimorphic species

Nonlinear and Multiplayer Evolutionary Games

Classical evolutionary game theory has typically considered populations within which randomly selected pairs of individuals play games against each other, and the resulting payoff functions are linear. These simple functions have led to a number of pleasing results for the dynamic theory, the static theory of evolutionarily stable strategies, and the relationship between them. We discuss such games, together with a basic introduction to evolutionary game theory, in Sect. 5.1. Realistic populations, however, will generally not have these nice properties, and the payoffs will be nonlinear. In Sect. 5.2 we discuss various ways in which nonlinearity can appear in evolutionary games, including pairwise games with strategy-dependent interaction rates, and playing the field games, where payoffs depend upon the entire population composition, and not on individual games. In Sect. 5.3 we consider multiplayer games, where payoffs are the result of interactions between groups of size greater than two, which again leads to nonlinearity, and a breakdown of some of the classical results of Sect. 5.1. Finally in Sect. 5.4 we summarise and discuss the previous sections

id for each site and plant, aphid and parasitoid species

Include the id for each site and plant, aphid and parasitoid specie

Geographic pairwise Euclidean distance for the 302 sampled sites

Include the geographic pairwise Euclidean distance for the 302 sampled site