Market Power and the FTC

Although the DOJ/FTC Merger Guidelines provide a firm foundation for analyzing changes in prospective market power resulting from a proposed merger, the analysis does not focus on detecting or measuring market power that may already exist in the market. Further, antitrust enforcement is focused on anti-competitive mergers and unfair forms of competition. From an antitrust perspective, a firm that lawfully acquired market power does not commit an antitrust offense merely by exercising that power, unless it engages in unfair methods of competition to protect that power

Geographic Market Definition in an International Context

Market definition is generally regarded as a key step in antitrust analysis. Market definition has two components. Product market definition seeks to include all products that are meaningful substitutes. Geographic market definition seeks to incorporate all relevant sources of the product in question. This paper is concerned with geographic market definition and, in particular, how geographic markets are defined in situations where competition may, at least to some extent, transcend national boundaries. The subject of the paper may be of some current interest for two reasons. First, the perception is widespread that, over the past twenty or so years, competition in many products and services has become increasingly international in scope and that this trend will continue. Second, the way in which foreign competition is taken into account in performing the antitrust analysis can have a dramatic impact on the legal or policy conclusions that are reached in a particular instance. The legality of a proposed merger, for example, may turn entirely on how competition from foreign sellers is treated. For antitrust purposes, when we say that competition has become more international in scope, we mean primarily that the range of possible suppliers for many goods and services to U.S. consumers increasingly includes sellers who do not produce or are not primarily headquartered in the United States or that an increasing portion of sales by American-based firms are to customers abroad. Many aspects of antitrust are potentially affected by these changes. Some of the more complex issues involve jurisdictional considerations and these will not be discussed here. As we will see, however, the subject of market definition exposes almost all of the substantive (as opposed to jurisdictional) considerations that come into play when we take account of the international aspect of certain markets. The paper has three main parts. The first focuses on the role market definition plays in antitrust analysis and, in particular, the link between market definition and market power. The second explores the particular issues that are raised with respect to market definition when there is an international aspect to competition. The final section addresses some of the empirical questions raised by the largely theoretical analysis of the first two parts of the paper

Geographic Market Definition in an International Context

Market definition is generally regarded as a key step in antitrust analysis. Market definition has two components. Product market definition seeks to include all products that are meaningful substitutes. Geographic market definition seeks to incorporate all relevant sources of the product in question. This paper is concerned with geographic market definition and, in particular, how geographic markets are defined in situations where competition may, at least to some extent, transcend national boundaries. The subject of the paper may be of some current interest for two reasons. First, the perception is widespread that, over the past twenty or so years, competition in many products and services has become increasingly international in scope and that this trend will continue. Second, the way in which foreign competition is taken into account in performing the antitrust analysis can have a dramatic impact on the legal or policy conclusions that are reached in a particular instance. The legality of a proposed merger, for example, may turn entirely on how competition from foreign sellers is treated. For antitrust purposes, when we say that competition has become more international in scope, we mean primarily that the range of possible suppliers for many goods and services to U.S. consumers increasingly includes sellers who do not produce or are not primarily headquartered in the United States or that an increasing portion of sales by American-based firms are to customers abroad. Many aspects of antitrust are potentially affected by these changes. Some of the more complex issues involve jurisdictional considerations and these will not be discussed here. As we will see, however, the subject of market definition exposes almost all of the substantive (as opposed to jurisdictional) considerations that come into play when we take account of the international aspect of certain markets. The paper has three main parts. The first focuses on the role market definition plays in antitrust analysis and, in particular, the link between market definition and market power. The second explores the particular issues that are raised with respect to market definition when there is an international aspect to competition. The final section addresses some of the empirical questions raised by the largely theoretical analysis of the first two parts of the paper

Raising rivals’ fixed costs

This article demonstrates that raising fixed costs can serve as a credible mechanism for a well placed firm to exclude its rivals. We identify a number of credible avenues, such as increased regulation, vexatious litigation and increased prices for essential inputs, through which such a firm can raise fixed costs. We show that for a wide range of oligopoly models this may be a profitable strategy, even if the firm’s own fixed costs are affected as much (or even more) than its rivals and even if it is less efficient. The resulting reduction in the number of firms in the market is detrimental to consumer welfare and hence worthy of scrutiny by competition and regulatory authorities

First observation of Bs -> D_{s2}^{*+} X mu nu decays

Using data collected with the LHCb detector in proton-proton collisions at a centre-of-mass energy of 7 TeV, the semileptonic decays Bs -> Ds+ X mu nu and Bs -> D0 K+ X mu nu are detected. Two structures are observed in the D0 K+ mass spectrum at masses consistent with the known D^+_{s1}(2536) and $D^{*+}_{s2}(2573) mesons. The measured branching fractions relative to the total Bs semileptonic rate are B(Bs -> D_{s2}^{*+} X mu nu)/B(Bs -> X mu nu)= (3.3\pm 1.0\pm 0.4)%, and B(Bs -> D_{s1}^+ X munu)/B(Bs -> X mu nu)= (5.4\pm 1.2\pm 0.5)%, where the first uncertainty is statistical and the second is systematic. This is the first observation of the D_{s2}^{*+} state in Bs decays; we also measure its mass and width.Comment: 8 pages 2 figures. Published in Physics Letters

Corrigendum to "Overview: oxidant and particle photochemical processes above a south-east Asian tropical rainforest (the OP3 project): introduction, rationale, location characteristics and tools" published in Atmos. Chem. Phys., 10, 169–199, 2010

Author(s): Hewitt, CN; Lee, JD; MacKenzie, AR; Barkley, MP; Carslaw, N; Carver, GD; Chappell, NA; Coe, H; Collier, C; Commane, R; Davies, F; Davison, B; DiCarlo, P; Di Marco, CF; Dorsey, JR; Edwards, PM; Evans, MJ; Fowler, D; Furneaux, KL; Gallagher, M; Guenther, A; Heard, DE; Helfter, C; Hopkins, J; Ingham, T; Irwin, M; Jones, C; Karunaharan, A; Langford, B; Lewis, AC; Lim, SF; MacDonald, SM; Mahajan, AS; Malpass, S; McFiggans, G; Mills, G; Misztal, P; Moller, S; Monks, PS; Nemitz, E; Nicolas-Perea, V; Oetjen, H; Oram, DE; Palmer, PI; Phillips, GJ; Pike, R; Plane, JMC; Pugh, T; Pyle, JA; Reeves, CE; Robinson, NH; Stewart, D; Stone, D; Whalley, LK; Yang,