13 research outputs found
MULTIPLE ADVERSE SELECTION
We study an adverse selection model, with a principal and several agents, wherecontracting is under asymmetric information. The number of agents is finite and types are "continuous" and independent. We analyze two settings. In the first one, the performance functions of mechanisms may depend on all the reported types. In the second one, each performance function depends only on the respective announced type.Under the standard hypotheses in the basic one-agent adverse selection model and theindependence assumption, there is not loss of generality if the principal considers onlymechanisms for which every agent reports his true type as a dominant strategy. We consider also the relaxation of the monotonicity hypothesis about the agents' welfare and we will prove that the former "equivalente" behveen the Bayesian implementation and the dominant strategy one stands firm in some cases. We examine the properties of the optimal mechanism, supposing that the principal's "virtual income" depends on the agents' performances only through the aggregate total performance (which is natural in the context of regulation of a good produced by an oligopoly), and also, assuming the frame of regulation of a monopolist with several independent divisions (or the one of a group of firms), each one producing a different good. Unlike the standard properties of the optimal mechmisiiis in the basic one-agent adverse selection model, in our model the optimal mechanism may ask very efficient agents for an individual performance higher than the one of complete information. We show also that if agents are symmetrical, the principal may prefer ex ante to hire more than one agent.Adverse Selection; Independent Types; Optimal Mechanisms.
- DELEGATION AND ENDOGENOUS MERGERS IN OLIGOPOLY
In this paper we consider the interactions between the use of strategic delegation and mergers in the context of a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and cost functions. It is assumed that, after the merging process is completed, the owner of every independent firm decides its managerial incentive for his manager. In the context of endogenous mergers through acquisitions, we show that the incentive to merge, under delegation, is considerably increased with respect to the setting without delegation. In fact, we prove that the level of welfare in the setting with delgation is, in some cases, lower than the corresponding under non delegation.Strategic delegation, endoqenous mergers, cournot oligopoly
ADVERSE SELECTION AND MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES
We analyze managerial contracts (i.e. incentive schemes based on a linear combination of profits and sales) under asymmetric information about costs. In the competitive setting with ex ante symmetric information, standard strategic effects appear. Under adverse selection in both, monopolistic and competitive settings, we show that, in order to decrease the manager's expected informational rents, the owner will optimally pay the manager to keep sales low or, on the contrary, keep them high. Moreover, the interactions between the strategic and the informational rent effects have a non-additive nature, implying non-standard results. Unlike the monopolistic framework, we show that, in the competitive framework, the manager may become aggressive under ex ante symmetric information than under adverse selection. Unlike the setting with ex ante symmetric information, we show that, under adverse selection, the manager may become more aggressive in the monopolistic framework than in the competitive one.Managerial incentives, Adverse selection, Quantity competition.
Anti-piracy policy and quality differential in markets for information goods
In this paper we analyze the strategic decisions of the government, the incumbent and the pirate in a market where the good is piratable. We show that deterred or accommodated piracy can occur in equilibrium, but pure monopoly cannot occur for any anti-piracy policy. We also show that the initial quality differential between the original and the pirated product is essential to explain the effects of an increase in the quality of pirated product on both the level of piracy and the optimal monitoring rate. Assuming a one-stage entry process and a sufficiently high quality differential, we prove that the incumbent always prefers to move first and make a credible commitment to a price. However, this is not true with a two-stage entry process.for-profit piracy, quality, monitoring, price competition.
Adverse selection under complete ignorance
We examine an adverse selection relationship in which the principal is unaware of the ex ante distribution of the agent's types. We show that the minimax regret mechanism, which is an incentive compatible and individually rational mechanism that minimizes the maximal principal's regret, requires the efficient agent to realize the corresponding first-best action and demands an action lower than the first-best one from the inefficient type. We prove also that the value of the minimal informational rent affects both, the optimal regrets and the distortion induced by the minimax regret mechanism.Principal-agent problem, adverse selection, minimax Regret Criterion
- DELEGATION AND MERGERS IN OLIGOPOLY
In this paper we analyze the effect strategic delegation on the profitability of mergers in the context of a Cournot oligopoly with linear demand and cost functions. It is assumed that, after the merging process is completed, the owner of every independent firm decides its managerial incentive for his manager. We show that the required fraction of merging firms for a merger to be profitable, in our model with delegation, is substantially smaller that without delegation.Strategic Delegation, Mergers, Cournot Oligopoly
First-best, second-best and principal-agent problems
In some pure moral hazard situations the principal can implement a first-best allocation using an incentive contract constructed on the basis of a first-best payment scheme. Such a contract relies on the possibility of discriminate actions according to the outcome by imposing a penalty whenever the observed outcome is lower than the admissible ones. The elimination of inefficient behavior depends basically on the outcome function, and we find that the fine is finite in the more interesting cases. The implementation of the first-best solution does not depend on the principal's risk neutrality. Nevertheless, when the principal is risk neutral, the ef f icient contract is dichotomous. Moreover, we prove that the efficient allocation can be reached through such a dichotomous payment scheme if and only if the principal is risk neutral for a certain range of returns.
El asentamiento neolĂtico de Limoneros (Elche, Alicante).
En este trabajo se presentan los resultados de las intervenciones de urgencia llevadas a cabo en el yacimiento de Limoneros, asentamiento al aire libre ocupado durante la primera mitad del V milenio cal BC localizado al sur de la ciudad de Elche (Alicante), en la llanura aluvial del rĂo VinalopĂł. Durante los trabajos de excavaciĂłn se reconocieron distintas estructuras negativas entre las que destacan dos tramos de foso, silos y cubetas, estructuras que quedaron amortizadas en Ăşltima instancia como zonas de desecho. El análisis global de las evidencias recuperadas permite caracterizar las actividades desarrolladas por una comunidad campesina en un espacio geográfico articulado por el VinalopĂł, ámbito en el cual se ha documentado un buen nĂşmero de asentamientos asociados a este momento, convirtiĂ©ndose en un marco referente para explicar la expansiĂłn y consolidaciĂłn de las sociedades neolĂticas en el sur del Levante peninsular.
Adverse selection and managerial incentives
We analyze managerial contracts (i.e. incentive schemes based on a linear combination of profits and sales) under asymmetric information about costs. In the competitive setting with ex ante symmetric information, standard strategic effects appear. Under adverse selection in both, monopolistic and competitive settings, we show that, in order to decrease the manager's expected informational rents, the owner will optimally pay the manager to keep sales low or, on the contrary, keep them high. Moreover, the interactions between the strategic and the informational rent effects have a non-additive nature, implying non-standard results. Unlike the monopolistic framework, we show that, in the competitive framework, the manager may become aggressive under ex ante symmetric information than under adverse selection. Unlike the setting with ex ante symmetric information, we show that, under adverse selection, the manager may become more aggressive in the monopolistic framework than in the competitive one