Ants mediate the structure of phytotelm communities in an ant-garden bromeliad

The main theories explaining the biological diversity of rain forests often confer a limited understanding of the contribution of interspecific interactions to the observed patterns. We show how two-species mutualisms can affect much larger segments of the invertebrate community in tropical rain forests. Aechmea mertensii (Bromeliaceae) is both a phytotelm (plant-held water) and an ant-garden epiphyte. We studied the influence of its associated ant species (Pachycondyla goeldii and Camponotus femoratus) on the physical characteristics of the plants, and, subsequently, on the diversity of the invertebrate communities that inhabit their tanks. As dispersal agents for the bromeliads, P. goeldii and C. femoratus influence the shape and size of the bromeliad by determining the location of the seedling, from exposed to partially shaded areas. By coexisting on a local scale, the two ant species generate a gradient of habitat conditions in terms of available resources (space and food) for aquatic invertebrates, the diversity of the invertebrate communities increasing with greater volumes of water and fine detritus. Two-species mutualisms are widespread in nature, but their influence on the diversity of entire communities remains largely unexplored. Because macroinvertebrates constitute an important part of animal production in all ecosystem types, further investigations should address the functional implications of such indirect effects

PERISSOMYRMEX SNYDERI (HYMENOPTERA: FORMICIDAE) IS NATIVE TO CENTRAL AMERICA AND EXHIBITS WORKER POLYMORPHISM

ABSTRACT The rediscovery of Perissomyrmex snyderi, previously known from the two worker types, is reported. New collections were observed from two different cloud forest sites in the state of Chiapas, Mexico. Based on the collection localities and cloud forest habitats, the species is clearly native to Central America. A sample of 205 workers revealed diphasic allometry, with distinct minor and major worker castes, and the queen was observed for the first time

Models and estimators linking individual-based and sample-based rarefaction, extrapolation and comparison of assemblages

Aims: In ecology and conservation biology, the number of species counted in a biodiversity study is a key metric but is usually a biased underestimate of total species richness because many rare species are not detected. Moreover, comparing species richness among sites or samples is a statistical challenge because the observed number of species is sensitive to the number of individuals counted or the area sampled. For individual-based data, we treat a single, empirical sample of species abundances from an investigator-defined species assemblage or community as a reference point for two estimation objectives under two sampling models: estimating the expected number of species (and its unconditional variance) in a random sample of (i) a smaller number of individuals (multinomial model) or a smaller area sampled (Poisson model) and (ii) a larger number of individuals or a larger area sampled. For sample-based incidence (presence-absence) data, under a Bernoulli product model, we treat a single set of species incidence frequencies as the reference point to estimate richness for smaller and larger numbers of sampling units. Methods: The first objective is a problem in interpolation that we address with classical rarefaction (multinomial model) and Coleman rarefaction (Poisson model) for individual-based data and with sample-based rarefaction (Bernoulli product model) for incidence frequencies. The second is a problem in extrapolation that we address with sampling-theoretic predictors for the number of species in a larger sample (multinomial model), a larger area (Poisson model) or a larger number of sampling units (Bernoulli product model), based on an estimate of asymptotic species richness. Although published methods exist for many of these objectives, we bring them together here with some new estimators under a unified statistical and notational framework. This novel integration of mathematically distinct approaches allowed us to link interpolated (rarefaction) curves and extrapolated curves to plot a unified species accumulation curve for empirical examples. We provide new, unconditional variance estimators for classical, individual-based rarefaction and for Coleman rarefaction, long missing from the toolkit of biodiversity measurement. We illustrate these methods with datasets for tropical beetles, tropical trees and tropical ants. Important Findings: Surprisingly, for all datasets we examined, the interpolation (rarefaction) curve and the extrapolation curve meet smoothly at the reference sample, yielding a single curve. Moreover, curves representing 95% confidence intervals for interpolated and extrapolated richness estimates also meet smoothly, allowing rigorous statistical comparison of samples not only for rarefaction but also for extrapolated richness values. The confidence intervals widen as the extrapolation moves further beyond the reference sample, but the method gives reasonable results for extrapolations up to about double or triple the original abundance or area of the reference sample. We found that the multinomial and Poisson models produced indistinguishable results, in units of estimated species, for all estimators and datasets. For sample-based abundance data, which allows the comparison of all three models, the Bernoulli product model generally yields lower richness estimates for rarefied data than either the multinomial or the Poisson models because of the ubiquity of non-random spatial distributions in nature. © 2012 The Author. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Institute of Botany, Chinese Academy of Sciences and the Botanical Society of China. All rights reserved

Explicating ways of consensus-making in science and society: distinguishing the academic, the interface and the meta-consensus

In this chapter, we shed new light on the epistemic struggle between establishing consensus and acknowledging plurality, by explicating different ways of consensus-making in science and society and examining the impact hereof on their field of intersection, i.e. consensus conferences (in particular those organized by the National Institute of Health). We draw a distinction between, what we call, academic and interface consensus, to capture the wide appeal to consensus in existing literature. We investigate such accounts - i.e. from Miriam Solomon, John Beatty and Alfred Moore, and Boaz Miller - as to put forth a new understanding of consensus-making, focusing on the meta-consensus. We further defend how (NIH) consensus conferences enable epistemic work, through demands of epistemic adequacy and contestability, contrary to the claim that consensus conferences miss a window for epistemic opportunity (Solomon M, The social epistemology of NIH consensus conferences. In: Kincaid H, McKitrick J (ed) Establishing medical reality: methodological and metaphysical issues in philosophy of medicine. Springer, Dordrecht, 2007). Paying attention to the dynamics surrounding consensus, moreover, allows us to illustrate how the public understanding of science and the public use of the ideal of consensus could be well modified

Caterpillars and fungal pathogens: two co-occurring parasites of an ant-plant mutualism

In mutualisms, each interacting species obtains resources from its partner that it would obtain less efficiently if alone, and so derives a net fitness benefit. In exchange for shelter (domatia) and food, mutualistic plant-ants protect their host myrmecophytes from herbivores, encroaching vines and fungal pathogens. Although selective filters enable myrmecophytes to host those ant species most favorable to their fitness, some insects can by-pass these filters, exploiting the rewards supplied whilst providing nothing in return. This is the case in French Guiana for Cecropia obtusa (Cecropiaceae) as Pseudocabima guianalis caterpillars (Lepidoptera, Pyralidae) can colonize saplings before the installation of their mutualistic Azteca ants. The caterpillars shelter in the domatia and feed on food bodies (FBs) whose production increases as a result. They delay colonization by ants by weaving a silk shield above the youngest trichilium, where the FBs are produced, blocking access to them. This probable temporal priority effect also allows female moths to lay new eggs on trees that already shelter caterpillars, and so to occupy the niche longer and exploit Cecropia resources before colonization by ants. However, once incipient ant colonies are able to develop, they prevent further colonization by the caterpillars. Although no higher herbivory rates were noted, these caterpillars are ineffective in protecting their host trees from a pathogenic fungus, Fusarium moniliforme (Deuteromycetes), that develops on the trichilium in the absence of mutualistic ants. Therefore, the Cecropia treelets can be parasitized by two often overlooked species: the caterpillars that shelter in the domatia and feed on FBs, delaying colonization by mutualistic ants, and the fungal pathogen that develops on old trichilia. The cost of greater FB production plus the presence of the pathogenic fungus likely affect tree growth

The art of being human : a project for general philosophy of science

Throughout the medieval and modern periods, in various sacred and secular guises, the unification of all forms of knowledge under the rubric of ‘science’ has been taken as the prerogative of humanity as a species. However, as our sense of species privilege has been called increasingly into question, so too has the very salience of ‘humanity’ and ‘science’ as general categories, let alone ones that might bear some essential relationship to each other. After showing how the ascendant Stanford School in the philosophy of science has contributed to this joint demystification of ‘humanity’ and ‘science’, I proceed on a more positive note to a conceptual framework for making sense of science as the art of being human. My understanding of ‘science’ is indebted to the red thread that runs from Christian theology through the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment to the Humboldtian revival of the university as the site for the synthesis of knowledge as the culmination of self-development. Especially salient to this idea is science‘s epistemic capacity to manage modality (i.e. to determine the conditions under which possibilities can be actualised) and its political capacity to organize humanity into projects of universal concern. However, the challenge facing such an ideal in the twentyfirst century is that the predicate ‘human’ may be projected in three quite distinct ways, governed by what I call ‘ecological’, ‘biomedical’ and ‘cybernetic’ interests. Which one of these future humanities would claim today’s humans as proper ancestors and could these futures co-habit the same world thus become two important questions that general philosophy of science will need to address in the coming years

Grounding knowledge and normative valuation in agent-based action and scientific commitment

Philosophical investigation in synthetic biology has focused on the knowledge-seeking questions pursued, the kind of engineering techniques used, and on the ethical impact of the products produced. However, little work has been done to investigate the processes by which these epistemological, metaphysical, and ethical forms of inquiry arise in the course of synthetic biology research. An attempt at this work relying on a particular area of synthetic biology will be the aim of this chapter. I focus on the reengineering of metabolic pathways through the manipulation and construction of small DNA-based devices and systems synthetic biology. Rather than focusing on the engineered products or ethical principles that result, I will investigate the processes by which these arise. As such, the attention will be directed to the activities of practitioners, their manipulation of tools, and the use they make of techniques to construct new metabolic devices. Using a science-in-practice approach, I investigate problems at the intersection of science, philosophy of science, and sociology of science. I consider how practitioners within this area of synthetic biology reconfigure biological understanding and ethical categories through active modelling and manipulation of known functional parts, biological pathways for use in the design of microbial machines to solve problems in medicine, technology, and the environment. We might describe this kind of problem-solving as relying on what Helen Longino referred to as “social cognition” or the type of scientific work done within what Hasok Chang calls “systems of practice”. My aim in this chapter will be to investigate the relationship that holds between systems of practice within metabolic engineering research and social cognition. I will attempt to show how knowledge and normative valuation are generated from this particular network of practitioners. In doing so, I suggest that the social nature of scientific inquiry is ineliminable to both knowledge acquisition and ethical evaluations

Deweyan tools for inquiry and the epistemological context of critical pedagogy

This article develops the notion of resistance as articulated in the literature of critical pedagogy as being both culturally sponsored and cognitively manifested. To do so, the authors draw upon John Dewey\u27s conception of tools for inquiry. Dewey provides a way to conceptualize student resistance not as a form of willful disputation, but instead as a function of socialization into cultural models of thought that actively truncate inquiry. In other words, resistance can be construed as the cognitive and emotive dimensions of the ongoing failure of institutions to provide ideas that help individuals both recognize social problems and imagine possible solutions. Focusing on Dewey\u27s epistemological framework, specifically tools for inquiry, provides a way to grasp this problem. It also affords some innovative solutions; for instance, it helps conceive of possible links between the regular curriculum and the study of specific social justice issues, a relationship that is often under-examined. The aims of critical pedagogy depend upon students developing dexterity with the conceptual tools they use to make meaning of the evidence they confront; these are background skills that the regular curriculum can be made to serve even outside social justice-focused curricula. Furthermore, the article concludes that because such inquiry involves the exploration and potential revision of students\u27 world-ordering beliefs, developing flexibility in how one thinks may be better achieved within academic subjects and topics that are not so intimately connected to students\u27 current social lives, especially where students may be directly implicated

JOINT COMMITMENT, COERCION AND FREEDOM IN SCIENCE Conceptual Analysis and Case Studies

International audienceThis paper deals with the Ethics of group life in the sciences, if not directly with the policy of science that might evolve from it, and more precisely with the issue of democracy within scientific life

Arguments for the cognitive social sciences

This article analyses the arguments for the integration between the cognitive and social sciences. We understand interdisciplinary integration as an umbrella term that includes different ways of bringing scientific disciplines together. Our focus is on four arguments based on different ideas about how the cognitive sciences should be integrated with the social sciences: explanatory grounding, theoretical unification, constraint and complementarity. These arguments not only provide different reasons why the cognitive social sciences—i.e. disciplines and research programs that aim to integrate the social sciences with the cognitive sciences—are needed but also subscribe to different visions as to how these sciences might look like. We discuss each argument in three stages: First, we provide a concrete example of the argument. Second, we reconstruct the argument by specifying its premises, inferential structure and conclusion. Third, we evaluate the argument by analyzing its presuppositions, the plausibility of its premises, the soundness of its inferences and potential conceptual ambiguities. In the final discussion, we compare these arguments and identify the most compelling reasons why the cognitive social sciences are needed.Peer reviewe