It's Not You, It's Me: A Review of Individual Differences in Visuospatial Perspective Taking.

Visuospatial perspective taking (VSPT) concerns the ability to understand something about the visual relationship between an agent or observation point on the one hand and a target or scene on the other. Despite its importance to a wide variety of other abilities, from communication to navigation, and decades of research, there is as yet no theory of VSPT. Indeed, the heterogeneity of results from different (and sometimes the same) VSPT tasks point to a complex picture suggestive of multiple VSPT strategies, individual differences in performance, and context-specific factors that together have a bearing on both the efficiency and accuracy of outcomes. In this article, we review the evidence in search of patterns in the data. We found a number of predictors of VSPT performance but also a number of gaps in understanding that suggest useful pathways for future research and, possibly, a theory (or theories) of VSPT. Overall, this review makes the case for understanding VSPT by better understanding the perspective taker rather than the target agents or their perception

'Seeing’ proximal representations: Testing attitudes to the relationship between vision and images

Corrections applied by the visual system, like size constancy, provide us with a coherent and stable perspective from ever-changing retinal images. In the present experiment we investigated how willing adults are to examine their own vision as if it were an uncorrected 2D image, much like a photograph. We showed adult participants two lines on a wall, both of which were the same length but one was closer to the participant and hence appeared visually longer. Despite the instruction to base their judgements on appearance specifically, approximately half of the participants judged the lines to appear the same. When they took a photo of the lines and were asked how long they appeared in the image their responses shifted; now the closer line appeared longer. However, when they were asked again about their own view they reverted to their original response. These results suggest that many adults are resistant to imagining their own vision as if it were a flat image. We also place these results within the context of recent views on visual perspective-taking

Perspective-Taking: In Search of a Theory.

Perspective-taking has been one of the central concerns of work on social attention and developmental psychology for the past 60 years. Despite its prominence, there is no formal description of what it means to represent another's viewpoint. The present article argues that such a description is now required in the form of theory-a theory that should address a number of issues that are central to the notion of assuming another's viewpoint. After suggesting that the mental imagery debate provides a good framework for understanding some of the issues and problems surrounding perspective-taking, we set out nine points that we believe any theory of perspective-taking should consider

Wild chacma baboons (Papio ursinus) remember single foraging episodes

This study was supported by grants from Zürcher Hochschulverein, Schweizerische Akademie für Naturwissenschaften, Stiftung Thyll-Dürr, and Stiftung Annemarie Schindler, to R.N.Understanding animal episodic-like memory is important for tracing the evolution of the human mind. However, our knowledge about the existence and nature of episodic-like memory in non-human primates is minimal. We observed the behaviour of a wild male chacma baboon faced with a trade-off between protecting his stationary group from aggressive extra-group males and foraging among five out-of-sight platforms. These contained high-priority food at a time of natural food shortage. In 10 morning and eight evening trials, the male spontaneously visited the platforms in five and four different sequences, respectively. In addition, he interrupted foraging sequences at virtually any point on eight occasions, returning to the group for up to 2 h. He then visited some or all of the remaining platforms and prevented revisits to already depleted ones, apparently based on his memory for the previous foraging episode about food value, location, and time. Efficient use of memory allowed him to keep minimal time absent from his group while keeping food intake high. These findings support the idea that episodic-like memory offers an all-purpose solution to a wide variety of problems that require flexible, quick, yet precise decisions in situations arising from competition for food and mates in wild primates.PostprintPeer reviewe

Hippocampal-Dependent Spatial Memory in the Water Maze is Preserved in an Experimental Model of Temporal Lobe Epilepsy in Rats

Cognitive impairment is a major concern in temporal lobe epilepsy (TLE). While different experimental models have been used to characterize TLE-related cognitive deficits, little is known on whether a particular deficit is more associated with the underlying brain injuries than with the epileptic condition per se. Here, we look at the relationship between the pattern of brain damage and spatial memory deficits in two chronic models of TLE (lithium-pilocarpine, LIP and kainic acid, KA) from two different rat strains (Wistar and Sprague-Dawley) using the Morris water maze and the elevated plus maze in combination with MRI imaging and post-morten neuronal immunostaining. We found fundamental differences between LIP- and KA-treated epileptic rats regarding spatial memory deficits and anxiety. LIP-treated animals from both strains showed significant impairment in the acquisition and retention of spatial memory, and were unable to learn a cued version of the task. In contrast, KA-treated rats were differently affected. Sprague-Dawley KA-treated rats learned less efficiently than Wistar KA-treated animals, which performed similar to control rats in the acquisition and in a probe trial testing for spatial memory. Different anxiety levels and the extension of brain lesions affecting the hippocampus and the amydgala concur with spatial memory deficits observed in epileptic rats. Hence, our results suggest that hippocampal-dependent spatial memory is not necessarily affected in TLE and that comorbidity between spatial deficits and anxiety is more related with the underlying brain lesions than with the epileptic condition per se

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) Fail a What-Where-When Task but Find Rewards by Using a Location-Based Association Strategy

Recollecting the what-where-when of an episode, or episodic-like memory, has been established in corvids and rodents. In humans, a linkage between remembering the past and imagining the future has been recognised. While chimpanzees can plan for the future, their episodic-like memory has hardly been investigated. We tested chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) with an adapted food-caching paradigm. They observed the baiting of two locations amongst four and chose one after a given delay (15 min, 1 h or 5 h). We used two combinations of food types, a preferred and a less preferred food that disappeared at different rates. The subjects had to base their choices on the time elapsed since baiting, and on their memory of which food was where. They could recover either their preferred food or the one that remained present. All animals failed to obtain the preferred or present foods above chance levels. They were like-wise unsuccessful at choosing baited cups above chance levels. The subjects, thus, failed to use any feature of the baiting events to guide their choices. Nonetheless, their choices were not random, but the result of a developed location-based association strategy. Choices in the second half of the study correlated with the rewards obtained at each location in the first half of the study, independent from the choices made for each location in the first half of the study. This simple location-based strategy yielded a fair amount of food. The animals' failure to remember the what-where-when in the presented set-up may be due to the complexity of the task, rather than an inability to form episodic-like memories, as they even failed to remember what was where after 15 minutes

Temporal context and conditional associative learning

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>We investigated how temporal context affects the learning of arbitrary visuo-motor associations. Human observers viewed highly distinguishable, fractal objects and learned to choose for each object the one motor response (of four) that was rewarded. Some objects were consistently preceded by specific other objects, while other objects lacked this task-irrelevant but predictive context.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>The results of five experiments showed that predictive context consistently and significantly accelerated associative learning. A simple model of reinforcement learning, in which three successive objects informed response selection, reproduced our behavioral results.</p> <p>Conclusions</p> <p>Our results imply that not just the representation of a current event, but also the representations of past events, are reinforced during conditional associative learning. In addition, these findings are broadly consistent with the prediction of attractor network models of associative learning and their prophecy of a persistent representation of past objects.</p

Grammatical gender and linguistic relativity: A systematic review

Many languages assign nouns to a grammatical gender class, such that ‘bed’ might be assigned masculine gender in one language (e.g. Italian) but feminine gender in another (e.g. Spanish). In the context of research assessing the potential for language to influence thought (the linguistic relativity hypothesis), a number of scholars have investigated whether grammatical gender assignment ‘rubs off’ on concepts themselves, such that Italian speakers might conceptualise beds as more masculine than Spanish speakers. We systematically reviewed 43 pieces of empirical research examining grammatical gender and thought, which together tested 5,895 participants. We classified the findings in terms of their support for this hypothesis, and assessed the results against parameters previously identified as potentially influencing outcomes. Overall, we found that support was strongly task- and context-dependent, and rested heavily on outcomes that have clear and equally-viable alternative explanations. We also argue that it remains unclear whether grammatical gender is in fact a useful tool for investigating relativity

Dissociable effects of lesions to the perirhinal cortex and the postrhinal cortex on memory for context and objects in rats

Memory for the context in which an object appeared was investigated with a version of the spontaneous object recognition paradigm. Sham-operated rats explore familiar objects appearing in incongruent but familiar contexts more than those appearing in congruent contexts, revealing memory for the context in which an object previously appeared. At short delays, perirhinal cortex-lesioned rats were unimpaired on memory for object in context, whereas fornix-lesioned rats showed only a mild impairment. In contrast, postrhinal lesions resulted in severe deficits. However, in a comparable noncontextual object task, postrhinal and fornix lesions had no effect, whereas perirhinal-lesioned rats were severely impaired. Comparison of these tasks and other published data may shed light on the nature of the contextual processing involved

Evidence for a weak but reliable processing advantage for false beliefs over similar non-mental states in adults

The ability to attribute mental states to others has sometimes been attributed to a domain-specific mechanism which privileges the processing of these states over similar but non-mental representations. If correct, then others’ beliefs should be processed more efficiently than similar information contained within non-mental states. We tested this by examining whether adults would be faster to process others' false beliefs than equivalent 'false' photos. Additionally, we tested whether they would be faster to process others' true beliefs about something than their own (matched) personal knowledge about the same event. Across four experiments we found a small but reliable effect in favour of the first prediction, but no evidence for the second. Results are consistent with accounts positing specialised processes for (false) mental states. The size of the effect does however suggest that alternative explanations such as practice effects cannot be ruled out