268 research outputs found
Task constraints distinguish perspective inferences from perspective use during discourse interpretation in a false belief task
Interpreting other peoplesâ actions relies on an understanding of their current mental states (e.g. beliefs, desires and intentions). In this paper, we distinguish between listenersâ ability to infer othersâ perspectives and their explicit use of this knowledge to predict subsequent actions. In a visual-world study, two groups of participants (passive observers vs. active participants) watched short videos, depicting transfer events, where one character (âJaneâ) either held a true or false belief about an objectâs location. We tracked participantsâ eye-movements around the final visual scene, time-locked to related auditory descriptions (e.g. âJane will look for the chocolates in the container on the leftâ.). Results showed that active participants had already inferred the characterâs belief in the 1 s preview period prior to auditory onset, before it was possible to use this information to predict an outcome. Moreover, they used this inference to correctly anticipate reference to the objectâs initial location on false belief trials at the earliest possible point (i.e. from âJaneâ onwards). In contrast, passive observers only showed evidence of a belief inference from the onset of âJaneâ, and did not show reliable use of this inference to predict Janeâs behaviour on false belief trials until much later, when the location (âleft/rightâ) was auditorily available. These results show that active engagement in a task activates earlier inferences about othersâ perspectives, and drives immediate use of this information to anticipate othersâ actions, compared to passive observers, who are susceptible to influences from egocentric or reality biases. Finally, we review evidence that using other peoplesâ perspectives to predict their behaviour is more cognitively effortful than simply using oneâs own
Why are listeners sometimes (but not always) egocentric?:Making inferences about using others' perspective in referential communication
Theory of Mind (ToM) is the ability to understand others' mental states, and that these mental states can differ from our own. Although healthy adults have little trouble passing conceptual tests of ToM (e.g., the false belief task [1]), they do not always succeed in using ToM [2,3]. In order to be successful in referential communication, listeners need to correctly infer the way in which a speaker's perspective constrains reference and inhibit their own perspective accordingly. However, listeners may require prompts to take these effortful inferential steps. The current study investigated the possibility of embedding prompts in the instructions for listeners to make inference about using a speaker's perspective. Experiment 1 showed that provision of a clear introductory example of the full chain of inferences resulted in large improvement in performance. Residual egocentric errors suggested that the improvement was not simply due to superior comprehension of the instructions. Experiment 2 further dissociated the effect by placing selective emphasis on making inference about inhibiting listeners' own perspective versus using the speaker's perspective. Results showed that only the latter had a significant effect on successful performance. The current findings clearly demonstrated that listeners do not readily make inferences about using speakers' perspectives, but can do so when prompted.</p
Mentalizing under Uncertainty: Dissociated Neural Responses to Ambiguous and Unambiguous Mental State Inferences
The ability to read the minds of others (i.e., to mentalize) requires that perceivers understand a wide range of different kinds of mental states, including not only othersâ beliefs and knowledge but also their feelings, desires, and preferences. Moreover, although such inferences may occasionally rely on observable features of a situation, perceivers more typically mentalize under conditions of âuncertainty,â in which they must generate plausible hypotheses about a target's mental state from ambiguous or otherwise underspecified information. Here, we use functional neuroimaging to dissociate the neural bases of these 2 distinct socialâcognitive challenges: 1) mentalizing about different types of mental states (beliefs vs. preferences) and 2) mentalizing under conditions of varying ambiguity. Although these 2 aspects of mentalizing have typically been confounded in earlier research, we observed a double dissociation between the brain regions sensitive to type of mental state and ambiguity. Whereas ventral and dorsal aspects of medial prefrontal cortex responded more during ambiguous than unambiguous inferences regardless of the type of mental state, the right temporoparietal junction was sensitive to the distinction between beliefs and preferences irrespective of certainty. These results underscore the emerging consensus that, rather than comprising a single mental operation, social cognition makes flexible use of different processes as a function of the particular demands of the social context
Autism and psychosis: Clinical implications for depression and suicide
There is increasing recognition of the co-occurrence of autism and schizophrenia spectrum disorders. However, the clinical significance of this on outcomes such as depression and suicidal thinking has not been explored. This study examines the association of autism spectrum traits, depressive symptoms and suicidal behaviour in individuals with psychotic experiences. In two cross sectional studies, individuals from a non-help seeking university student sample and patients with first episode psychosis (FEP) service completed standardized measures of autism spectrum traits, psychotic experiences, depressive symptoms and suicidal thinking. In healthy non-help seeking students, increased autism traits and increased subclinical psychotic experiences were significantly associated with depressive symptoms; a significant interaction effect suggests their combined presence has a greater impact on depression. In FEP, high autism traits and positive symptoms were associated with increased depression, hopelessness and suicidality, however there was no significant interaction effect. In FEP a multiple mediation model revealed that the relationship between autism traits and risk for suicidality was mediated through hopelessness. Young people with subclinical psychotic experiences and all patients with FEP should be screened for autism spectrum traits, which may have significant impact on clinical outcomes. Tailored interventions for patients with high levels of autistic spectrum co-morbidities in FEP should be a priority for future research
Interacting mindreaders
Could interacting mindreaders be in a position to know things which they would be unable to know if they were manifestly passive observers? This paper argues that they could. Mindreading is sometimes reciprocal: the mindreader's target reciprocates by taking the mindreader as a target for mindreading. The paper explains how such reciprocity can significantly narrow the range of possible interpretations of behaviour where mindreaders are, or appear to be, in a position to interact. A consequence is that revisions and extensions are needed to standard theories of the evidential basis of mindreading. The view also has consequences for understanding how abilities to interact combined with comparatively simple forms of mindreading may explain the emergence, in evolution or development, of sophisticated forms of social cognition
Perspective-taking abilities in the balance between autism tendencies and psychosis proneness
Difficulties with the ability to appreciate the perspective of others (mentalizing) is central to both autism and schizophrenia spectrum disorders. While the disorders are diagnostically independent, they can co-occur in the same individual. The effect of such co-morbidity is hypothesized to worsen mentalizing abilities. The recent influential âdiametric brain theoryâ, however, suggests that the disorders are etiologically and phenotypically diametrical, predicting opposing effects on one's mentalizing abilities. To test these contrasting hypotheses, we evaluated the effect of psychosis and autism tendencies on the perspective-taking (PT) abilities of 201 neurotypical adults, on the assumption that autism tendencies and psychosis proneness are heritable dimensions of normal variation. We show that while both autism tendencies and psychosis proneness induce PT errors, their interaction reduced these errors. Our study is, to our knowledge, the first to observe that co-occurring autistic and psychotic traits can exert opposing influences on performance, producing a normalizing effect possibly by way of their diametrical effects on socio-cognitive abilities. This advances the notion that some individuals may, to some extent, be buffered against developing either illness or present fewer symptoms owing to a balanced expression of autistic and psychosis liability
Diametric effects of autism tendencies and psychosis proneness on attention control irrespective of task demands
Our capacity to attend a target while ignoring irrelevant distraction impacts our ability to successfully interact with our environment. Previous reports have sometimes identified excessive distractor interference in both autism and schizophrenia spectrum disorders and in neurotypical individuals with high subclinical expressions of these conditions. Independent of task, we show that the direction of the effect of autism or psychosis traits on the suppression or rejection of a non-target item is diametrical. In Study 1, in which the presence of a salient non-target item hindered performance, higher autism traits were associated with better performance, while higher psychosis traits were associated with worse performance. In Study 2, in which the presence of a salient non-target item facilitated performance, a complete reversal of effects was observed. Future clinical interventions may be informed by the context-specific advantages we observed for the autism and psychosis spectra, and by the need to consider the diametric effects they yield
Interacting with Fictions:The Role of Pretend Play in Theory of Mind Acquisition
Pretend play is generally considered to be a developmental landmark in Theory of Mind acquisition. The aim of the present paper is to offer a new account of the role of pretend play in Theory of Mind development. To this end I combine Hutto and Gallagherâs account of social cognition development with Matraversâ recent argument that the cognitive processes involved in engagement with narratives are neutral regarding fictionality. The key contribution of my account is an analysis of pretend play as interaction with fictions. I argue that my account offers a better explanation of existing empirical data on the development of childrenâs pretend play and Theory of Mind than the competing theories from Leslie, Perner and Harris
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