It is Hobbes, not Rousseau:an experiment on voting and redistribution

We perform an experiment which provides a laboratory replica of some important features of the welfare state. In the experiment, all individuals in a group decide whether to make a costly effort, which produces a random (independent) outcome for each one of them. The group members then vote on whether to redistribute the resulting and commonly known total sum of earnings equally amongst themselves. This game has two equilibria, if played once. In one of them, all players make effort and there is little redistribution. In the other one, there is no effort and nothingWe thank Iris Bohnet, Tim Cason, David Cooper, John Duffy, Maia Guell, John Van Huyck and Robin Mason for helpful conversations and encouragement. The comments of the Editor and two referees helped improve the paper. We gratefully acknowledge the financial support from Spain’s Ministry of Science and Innovation under grants CONSOLIDER INGENIO 2010 CSD2006-0016 (all authors), ECO2009-10531 (Cabrales), ECO2008-01768 (Nagel) and the Comunidad de Madrid under grant Excelecon (Cabrales), the Generalitat de Catalunya and the CREA program (Nagel), and project SEJ2007-64340 of Spain’s Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (Rodríguez Mora).Publicad

Social preferences, accountability, and wage bargaining

We assess the extent of preferences for employment in a collective wage bargaining situation with heterogeneous workers. We vary the size of the union and introduce a treatment mechanism transforming the voting game into an individual allocation task. Our results show that highly productive workers do not take employment of low productive workers into account when making wage proposals, regardless of whether insiders determine the wage or all workers. The level of pro-social preferences is small in the voting game, while it increases as the game is transformed into an individual allocation task. We interpret this as an accountability effect

Search for the lepton-family-number nonconserving decay \mu -> e + \gamma

The MEGA experiment, which searched for the muon- and electron-number violating decay \mu -> e + \gamma, is described. The spectrometer system, the calibrations, the data taking procedures, the data analysis, and the sensitivity of the experiment are discussed. The most stringent upper limit on the branching ratio of \mu -> e + \gamma) < 1.2 x 10^{-11} was obtained

The Intentional Use of Service Recovery Strategies to Influence Consumer Emotion, Cognition and Behaviour

Service recovery strategies have been identified as a critical factor in the success of. service organizations. This study develops a conceptual frame work to investigate how specific service recovery strategies influence the emotional, cognitive and negative behavioural responses of . consumers., as well as how emotion and cognition influence negative behavior. Understanding the impact of specific service recovery strategies will allow service providers' to more deliberately and intentionally engage in strategies that result in positive organizational outcomes. This study was conducted using a 2 x 2 between-subjects quasi-experimental design. The results suggest that service recovery has a significant impact on emotion, cognition and negative behavior. Similarly, satisfaction, negative emotion and positive emotion all influence negative behavior but distributive justice has no effect

Clinical practice: The bleeding child. Part II: Disorders of secondary hemostasis and fibrinolysis

Bleeding complications in children may be caused by disorders of secondary hemostasis or fibrinolysis. Characteristic features in medical history and physical examination, especially of hemophilia, are palpable deep hematomas, bleeding in joints and muscles, and recurrent bleedings. A detailed medical and family history combined with a thorough physical examination is essential to distinguish abnormal from normal bleeding and to decide whether it is necessary to perform diagnostic laboratory evaluation. Initial laboratory tests include prothrombin time and activated partial thromboplastin time. Knowledge of the classical coagulation cascade with its intrinsic, extrinsic, and common pathways, is useful to identify potential defects in the coagulation in order to decide which additional coagulation tests should be performed

Action Being Character: A Promising Perspective on the Solution Concept of Game Theory

The inconsistency of predictions from solution concepts of conventional game theory with experimental observations is an enduring question. These solution concepts are based on the canonical rationality assumption that people are exclusively self-regarding utility maximizers. In this article, we think this assumption is problematic and, instead, assume that rational economic agents act as if they were maximizing their implicit utilities, which turns out to be a natural extension of the canonical rationality assumption. Implicit utility is defined by a player's character to reflect his personal weighting between cooperative, individualistic, and competitive social value orientations. The player who actually faces an implicit game chooses his strategy based on the common belief about the character distribution for a general player and the self-estimation of his own character, and he is not concerned about which strategies other players will choose and will never feel regret about his decision. It is shown by solving five paradigmatic games, the Dictator game, the Ultimatum game, the Prisoner's Dilemma game, the Public Goods game, and the Battle of the Sexes game, that the framework of implicit game and its corresponding solution concept, implicit equilibrium, based on this alternative assumption have potential for better explaining people's actual behaviors in social decision making situations

The central dark matter content of early-type galaxies: scaling relations and connections with star formation histories

We examine correlations between the masses, sizes, and star formation histories for a large sample of low-redshift early-type galaxies, using a simple suite of dynamical and stellar populations models. We confirm an anti-correlation between size and stellar age, and survey for trends with the central content of dark matter (DM). An average relation between central DM density and galaxy size of ~ Reff^-2 provides the first clear indication of cuspy DM haloes in these galaxies -- akin to standard LCDM haloes that have undergone adiabatic contraction. The DM density scales with galaxy mass as expected, deviating from suggestions of a universal halo profile for dwarf and late-type galaxies. We introduce a new fundamental constraint on galaxy formation by finding that the central DM fraction decreases with stellar age. This result is only partially explained by the size-age dependencies, and the residual trend is in the opposite direction to basic DM halo expectations. Therefore we suggest that there may be a connection between age and halo contraction, and that galaxies forming earlier had stronger baryonic feedback which expanded their haloes, or else lumpier baryonic accretion that avoided halo contraction. An alternative explanation is a lighter initial mass function for older stellar populations.Comment: 24 pages, 23 figures. MNRAS, submitted with minor modifications following referee report

Risk Tolerance, Self-Interest, and Social Preferences

We use an experimental method to investigate whether systematic relationships exist across distinct aspects of individual preferences: risk aversion in monetary outcomes, altruism in a twoperson context, and social preferences in a larger group context. Individual preferences across these three contexts are measured, and there is no possibility for risk sharing, wealth effects, or updating expectations of the population choices. We find that social preferences are related to demographic variables, including years of education, gender, and age. Perhaps most importantly, self allocation in a two-person dictator game is related to social preferences in a group context. Participants who are more generous in a dictator game are more likely to vote against their selfinterest in a group decision-making task which we interpret to be expressions of social preferences