107 research outputs found

    Freedom of Association, Social Cohesion and Welfare

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    How does freedom of association shape social cohesion, individual behavior and welfare, in heterogeneous populations? To answer this question, we develop a theoretical model and conduct experiments with human subjects. We study a network formation and action choice game in which individuals benefit from selecting the same action as their neighbours. However, one group of individuals prefers to coordinate on one action, while the rest prefers to coordinate on the other action.Universidad de Málaga. Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech

    PSEUDORANDOM PROCESSES: ENTROPY AND AUTOMATA

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    This paper studies implementation of cooperative payoffs in finitely repeated games when players implement their strategies by finite automata of big sizes. Specifically, we analyze how much we have to depart from fully rational behavior to achieve the Folk Theorem payoffs, i.e., which are the maximum bounds on automata complexity which yield cooperative behavior in long but not infinite interactions. To this end we present a new approach to the implementation of the mixed strategy equilibrium paths leading to cooperation. The novelty is to offer a new construction of the set of the pure strategies which belong to the mixed strategy equilibrium. Thus, we consider the subset of strategies which is characterized by both the complexity of the finite automata and the entropy associated to the underlying coordination process. The equilibrium play consists of both a communication phase and the play of a cycle which depends on the chosen message. The communication set is designed by tools of Information Theory. Moreover, the characterization of this set is given by the complexity of the weaker player that implements the equilibrium play. We offer a domain of definition of the smallest automaton which includes previous domains in the literature.Complexity; Cooperation; Entropy; Automata; Repeated Games.

    COORDINATION THROUGH DE BRUIJN SEQUENCES

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    Let µ be a rational distribution over a finite alphabet, and ( ) be a n-periodic sequences which first n elements are drawn i.i.d. according to µ. We consider automata of bounded size that input and output at stage t. We prove the existence of a constant C such that, whenever , with probability close to 1 there exists an automaton of size m such that the empirical frequency of stages such that is close to 1. In particular, one can take , where and .Coordination, complexity, De Bruijn sequences, automata

    MODELLING SEGREGATION THROUGH CELLULAR AUTOMATA: A THEORETICAL ANSWER

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    This paper is a note in which we prove that Cellular Automata are suitable tools to model multi-agent interactive procedures. In particular, we apply the argument to validate results from simulation tools obtained for the classical model of segregation of Thomas Schelling (1971a).Cellular Automata, segregation, local information

    OPTIMAL USE OF COMMUNICATION RESOURCES

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    We study a repeated game with asymmetric information about a dynamic state of nature. In the course of the game, the better informed player can communicate some or all of his information with the other. Our model covers costly and/or bounded communication. We characterize the set of equilibrium payoffs, and contrast these with the communication equilibrium payoffs, which by definition entail no communication costs.Repeated games, communication, entropy

    Coordination Concerns: Concealing the Free Rider Problem

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    In our daily routine, we face many situations where we need to coordinate in cooperating, such as maintaining friendships or team working. If we all put all our efforts in doing so, we will efficiently get the best possible outcome for everybody. However, we are occasionally tempted to look the other way and let the rest solve the problem. These situations are called social dilemmas and this passive attitude of not exerting any effort in the common goal and benefitting of others doing so is denominated the free rider problem. The purpose of this chapter is to present this issue by means of a public goods game and propose the different mechanisms experimental literature has demonstrated to conceal the free rider problem. Examples of this nature are maintaining relationships over prolonged periods of time, determining a minimum threshold for the common project rewards to be enjoyed by everybody or enabling transparent communication. Additionally, sanctioning opportunities promote cooperation even further. Besides economic penalizations, punishment can occur at a social domain through hostility, ostracism or bond breaking. Moreover, it can be implemented either from an individual approach or through the use of centralized institutions endowed with sanctioning power

    Bounded computational capacity equilibrium

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    A celebrated result of Abreu and Rubinstein states that in repeated games, when the players are restricted to playing strategies that can be implemented by finite automata and they have lexicographic preferences, the set of equilibrium payoffs is a strict subset of the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs. In this paper we explore the limitations of this result. We prove that if memory size is costly and players can use mixed automata, then a folk theorem obtains and the set of equilibrium payoff is once again the set of feasible and individually rational payoffs. Our result emphasizes the role of memory cost and of mixing when players have bounded computational power

    Bounded rationality

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    The observation of the actual behavior by economic decision makers in the lab and in the field justifies that bounded rationality has been a generally accepted assumption in many socio-economic models. The goal of this paper is to illustrate the difficulties involved in providing a correct definition of what a rational (or irrational) agent is. In this paper we describe two frameworks that employ different approaches for analyzing bounded rationality. The first is a spatial segregation set-up that encompasses two optimization methodologies: backward induction and forward induction. The main result is that, even under the same state of knowledge, rational and non-rational agents may match their actions. The second framework elaborates on the relationship between irrationality and informational restrictions. We use the beauty contest (Nagel, 1995) as a device to explain this relationship

    Ida Gramcko y Elizabeth Schön: discursos poéticos en la escena venezolana

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    This essay aims to help understand the importance of the theatrical discourse of two Venezuelan poets: Elizabeth Schön (1921- 2007) and Ida Gramcko (1924-1994). From a hermeneutic vision, it reveals aspects of expressive uniqueness of each of the artists who are a reference in Venezuelan female drama. El presente ensayo tiene como objetivo comprender la importancia del discurso teatral de dos poetas venezolanas: Elizabeth Schön (1921-2007) e Ida Gramcko (1924-1994). Desde una visión hermenéutica se develan aspectos de la singularidad expresiva de cada una de las artistas, las cuales constituyen un referente en la dramaturgia femenina venezolana

    The complexity of interacting automata

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    This paper studies the interaction of automata of size m. We characterise statistical properties satisfied by random plays generated by a correlated pair of automata with m states each. We show that in some respect the pair of automata can be identified with a more complex automaton of size comparable to mlogm . We investigate implications of these results on the correlated min–max value of repeated games played by automata
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