The resurrection of group selection as a theory of human cooperation

Two books edited by members of the MacArthur Norms and Preferences Network (an interdisciplinary group, mainly anthropologists and economists) are reviewed here. These books in large part reflect a renewed interest in group selection that has occurred among these researchers: they promote the theory that human cooperative behavior evolved via selective processes which favored biological and/or cultural group-level adaptations as opposed to individual-level adaptations. In support of this theory, an impressive collection of cross-cultural data are presented which suggest that participants in experimental economic games often do not behave as self-interested income maximizers; this lack of self-interest is regarded as evidence of group selection. In this review, problems with these data and with the theory are discussed. On the data side, it is argued that even if a behavior seems individually-maladaptive in a game context, there is no reason to believe that it would have been that way in ancestral contexts, since the environments of experimental games do not at all resemble those in which ancestral humans would have interacted cooperatively. And on the theory side, it is argued that it is premature to invoke group selection in order to explain human cooperation, because more parsimonious individual-level theories have not yet been exhausted. In summary, these books represent ambitious interdisciplinary contributions on an important topic, and they include unique and useful data; however, they do not make a convincing case that the evolution of human cooperation required group selection

Linkage mapping reveals sex-dimorphic map distances in a passerine bird

Linkage maps are lacking for many highly influential model organisms in evolutionary research, including all passerine birds. Consequently, their full potential as research models is severely hampered. Here, we provide a partial linkage map and give novel estimates of sex-specific recombination rates in a passerine bird, the great reed warbler (Acrocephalus arundinaceus). Linkage analysis of genotypic data at 51 autosomal microsatellites and seven markers on the Z-chromosome (one of the sex chromosomes) from an extended pedigree resulted in 12 linkage groups with 2–8 loci. A striking feature of the map was the pronounced sex-dimorphism: males had a substantially lower recombination rate than females, which resulted in a suppressed autosomal map in males (sum of linkage groups: 110.2cM) compared to females (237.2cM; female/male map ratio: 2.15). The sex-specific recombination rates will facilitate the building of a denser linkage map and cast light on hypotheses about sex-specific recombination rates

A demographic model for sex ratio evolution and the effects of sex-biased offspring costs

© The Author(s), 2016. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License. The definitive version was published in Ecology and Evolution 6 (2016): 1470–1492, doi:10.1002/ece3.1902.The evolution of the primary sex ratio, the proportion of male births in an individual's offspring production strategy, is a frequency-dependent process that selects against the more common sex. Because reproduction is shaped by the entire life cycle, sex ratio theory would benefit from explicitly two-sex models that include some form of life cycle structure. We present a demographic approach to sex ratio evolution that combines adaptive dynamics with nonlinear matrix population models. We also determine the evolutionary and convergence stability of singular strategies using matrix calculus. These methods allow the incorporation of any population structure, including multiple sexes and stages, into evolutionary projections. Using this framework, we compare how four different interpretations of sex-biased offspring costs affect sex ratio evolution. We find that demographic differences affect evolutionary outcomes and that, contrary to prior belief, sex-biased mortality after parental investment can bias the primary sex ratio (but not the corresponding reproductive value ratio). These results differ qualitatively from the widely held conclusions of previous models that neglect demographic structure.National Science Foundation Graduate Research Grant Number: 1122374; NSF Grant Numbers: DEB1145017, DEB1257545; European Research Council Grant Number: 322989; Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution Academic Programs Offic

Evolutionary Roots of Property Rights; The Natural and Cultural Nature of Human Cooperation

Debates about the role of natural and cultural selection in the development of prosocial, antisocial and socially neutral mechanisms and behavior raise questions that touch property rights, cooperation, and conflict. For example, some researchers suggest that cooperation and prosociality evolved by natural selection (Hamilton 1964, Trivers 1971, Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, De Waal 2013, 2014), while others claim that natural selection is insufficient for the evolution of cooperation, which required in addition cultural selection (Sterelny 2013, Bowles and Gintis 2003, Seabright 2013, Norenzayan 2013). Some scholars focus on the complexity and hierarchical nature of the evolution of cooperation as involving different tools associated with lower and the higher levels of competition (Nowak 2006, Okasha 2006); others suggest that humans genetically inherited heuristics that favor prosocial behavior such as generosity, forgiveness or altruistic punishment (Ridley 1996, Bowles and Gintis 2004, Rolls 2005). We argue these mechanisms are not genetically inherited; rather, they are features inherited through cultural selection. To support this view we invoke inclusive fitness theory, which states that individuals tend to maximize their inclusive fitness, rather than maximizing group fitness. We further reject the older notion of natural group selection - as well as more recent versions (West, Mouden, Gardner 2011) – which hold that natural selection favors cooperators within a group (Wynne-Edwards 1962). For Wynne-Edwards, group selection leads to group adaptations; the survival of individuals therefore depends on the survival of the group and a sharing of resources. Individuals who do not cooperate, who are selfish, face extinction due to rapid and over-exploitation of resources

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma games with optional participation

Competition among cooperators, defectors, and loners is studied in an evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game with optional participation. Loners are risk averse i.e. unwilling to participate and rather rely on small but fixed earnings. This results in a rock-scissors-paper type cyclic dominance of the three strategies. The players are located either on square lattices or random regular graphs with the same connectivity. Occasionally, every player reassesses its strategy by sampling the payoffs in its neighborhood. The loner strategy efficiently prevents successful spreading of selfish, defective behavior and avoids deadlocks in states of mutual defection. On square lattices, Monte Carlo simulations reveal self-organizing patterns driven by the cyclic dominance, whereas on random regular graphs different types of oscillatory behavior are observed: the temptation to defect determines whether damped, periodic or increasing oscillations occur. These results are compared to predictions by pair approximation. Although pair approximation is incapable of distinguishing the two scenarios because of the equal connectivity, the average frequencies as well as the oscillations on random regular graphs are well reproduced.Comment: 6 pages, 7 figure

Grandparental Child Care in Europe : Evidence for Preferential Investment in More Certain Kin

Peer reviewe

Lightweight Interactions for Reciprocal Cooperation in a Social Network Game

The construction of reciprocal relationships requires cooperative interactions during the initial meetings. However, cooperative behavior with strangers is risky because the strangers may be exploiters. In this study, we show that people increase the likelihood of cooperativeness of strangers by using lightweight non-risky interactions in risky situations based on the analysis of a social network game (SNG). They can construct reciprocal relationships in this manner. The interactions involve low-cost signaling because they are not generated at any cost to the senders and recipients. Theoretical studies show that low-cost signals are not guaranteed to be reliable because the low-cost signals from senders can lie at any time. However, people used low-cost signals to construct reciprocal relationships in an SNG, which suggests the existence of mechanisms for generating reliable, low-cost signals in human evolution.Comment: 13 pages, 2 figure

Parents just don't understand: Parent-offspring conflict over mate choice

Previous research reveals that children and parents are not in complete agreement over which traits are most important for the mate of the child. Children tend to prefer traits that suggest genetic quality, whereas parents prefer characteristics that suggest high parental investment and cooperation with the ingroup. Using a sample of parents, mothers (n = 234) and fathers (n =240) the hypothesis was supported; parents perceived characteristics indicating a lack of genetic quality as being more unacceptable to the child, while characteristics indicating a lack of parental investment and cooperation with the ingroup were more unacceptable to themselves. Sex differences between mothers and fathers and sons and daughters were explored

Altruism can proliferate through group/kin selection despite high random gene flow

The ways in which natural selection can allow the proliferation of cooperative behavior have long been seen as a central problem in evolutionary biology. Most of the literature has focused on interactions between pairs of individuals and on linear public goods games. This emphasis led to the conclusion that even modest levels of migration would pose a serious problem to the spread of altruism in group structured populations. Here we challenge this conclusion, by analyzing evolution in a framework which allows for complex group interactions and random migration among groups. We conclude that contingent forms of strong altruism can spread when rare under realistic group sizes and levels of migration. Our analysis combines group-centric and gene-centric perspectives, allows for arbitrary strength of selection, and leads to extensions of Hamilton's rule for the spread of altruistic alleles, applicable under broad conditions.Comment: 5 pages, 2 figures. Supplementary material with 50 pages and 26 figure