Rawls y la cláusula del valor equitativo de las libertades políticas

Una de las críticas frecuentes a la justicia como equidad de Rawls es que ésta resulta insuficientemente democrática, puesto que subordina las libertades políticas a un conjunto de derechos y libertades civiles que sirven de restricciones laterales al proceso mayoritario. Sin embargo, en sus últimos trabajos, Rawls insistió en que las libertades políticas tienen idéntico peso que las civiles y que, además, las primeras gozan de un privilegio del que carecen las segundas: estar protegidas por una cláusula que garantiza su valor equitativo. La incorporación de la cláusula del valor equitativo de las libertades políticas en su primer principio de justicia permitiría a Rawls responder a una segunda crítica, la que acusa al liberalismo de defender un esquema de libertades meramente formales. E incidentalmente, a una tercera, aquella que afirma que el principio de diferencia no sólo permite grandes desigualdades económicas sino que incluso las incentiva. En este artículo pretendo mostrar que la cláusula del valor equitativo permite a Rawls (1) escapar las dos primeras críticas, (2) amortiguar la tercera y (3) ofrecer un criterio de distribución de la riqueza alternativo al principio de diferencia (i) léxicamente superior a éste, (ii) más igualitaritarista y (iii) más prometedor en términos de alcanzar un equilibrio reflexivo. Para ello, defino el papel de las libertades políticas en la justicia como equidad y reconstruyo la definición, justificación e implicaciones de la cláusula que protege su valor equitativo.It has been frequently argued that Rawls's Justice as Fairness denigrates democratic decision-making, as it subordinates political liberties to a set of civil rights and liberties that limit the majority rule. However, at least in his latest works, Rawls claimed that political liberties have the same weight as the civil ones. Even more, he claimed that the former are further protected by a especial proviso -explicitly included in his first principle of justice- that guarantees their fair value. If correct, this proviso would serve as a response to two further criticisms. First, the one that attributes to liberalism the defence of a merely formal set of political liberties and, second, to the argument that attacks Rawls's Difference Principle not only for allowing large inequalities but also for swelling them. Little work has been done to study the nature, justification and implications of this proviso. And, when done, it has been said to be not satisfactorily founded. In this paper I shall reconstruct the lost arguments for the proviso and argue that its implications are quite revolutionary for Rawls's theory of justice. First, because it provides an alternative, lexically prior and more demanding distributive principle to that of the difference principle. Second, because it prevents some of the normative problems attributed to the difference principle. And third, because it enables a path to reach a wider reflective equilibrium

Cadáveres privados y cadáveres públicos. Epistemología y ética de las imágenes censuradas

Al 2002, Daniel Pearl, periodista del Wall Street Journal, era segrestat i degollat davant d’una càmera. La gravació del degollament, amb oberta internacionalitat pública, fou finalment censurada per la immensa majoria dels mitjans de comunicació occidentals i no va transcendir l’àmbit privat en el que es realitzà. Les vexacions i tortures fotografiades a Abu Ghraib, en canvi, transcendiren el 2004 la seva inicial privacitat en ésser publicades pel The New Yorker i la CBS, envaint així l’espai d’allò públic. Què distingeix ambdues imatges, determinant la seva “publicabilitat”? El present article pretén analitzar la censura d’imatges especialment cruentes en els espais informatius –i.e., al marge dels publicitaris o dels d’entreteniment. Per a això, provaré de respondre, en relació a aquest tipus d’imatges, les següents preguntes: Què poden mostrar? S’han de poder mostrar? I, com s’han de mostrar? La primera pregunta es dirigeix a una qüestió estrictament epistemològica. Donada la seva excessiva amplitud, em limitaré a establir, per una banda, que és necessari defnsar una certa idea de la veritat com a correspondència per a poder distingir entre imatges vertaderes i imatges falses. I, per una altra banda, precisaré en què podria consistir la falsedat d’una imatge. Les dos segones, en canvi, són de tipus ètic i apunten a la problemàtica formulació d’una llibertat d’expressió relativa a les imatges violentes. Provaré de posar de relleu la funció decisiva d’aquest tipus d’imatges com a revulsiu i desenvoluparé de forma crítica alguns dels arguments habitualment esgrimits per a impedir la seva difusió. Pretenc defensar que, inclús si acceptem que prima facie s’ha de poder veure tot, el centre del debat està en les condicions de publicació i, principalment, en la possible espectacularització mediàtica de les imatges.In 2002, Daniel Pearl, journalist for The Wall Street Journal, was kidnapped and beheaded in front of a camera. The registration of the beheading, deliberately publicly-addressed, was finally censured by the vast majority of the Western mass-media and did not go beyond the circumscribed private sphere where it happened. In contrast, the tortures and vexations photographed by Abu Ghraib jumped to the public arena in 2004 when they were published by The New Yorker and by the CBS, invading thus the public scene. What’s the difference between both images that determines their publicability? This text addresses this issue and aims at analysing the appropriateness of censuring journalistic images, especially if bloody, in informative programmes –besides advertising and entertaining programmes. I will try to provide an answer to questions such as: What are those images entitled to show? Should they be showed? If so, how should they be showed? The first question addresses an epistemological matter. Since it is a matter too wide to tackle here, I will simply sustain that it is necessary to define a certain idea of truth as a correspondence to distinguish between true and false images, and I will also precise what can be defined as the falsehood of an image. The other two questions pertain to the ethical domain and point at the problematic formulation of the freedom of speech related to violent images. I will try to pinpoint the determining function of this short of images as revulsives and will critically develop some of the most common arguments to ban their publicity. I try to sustain the idea that, even if in principle we are entitled to see everything, the key issue is publication conditions, and mainly the mass-media spectacularisation of imagesEn 2002, Daniel Pearl, periodista del Wall Street Journal, era secuestrado y degollado ante una cámara. La grabación del degüello, con abierta intencionalidad pública, fue finalmente censurada por la inmensa mayoría de medios de comunicación occidentales y no trascendió el ámbito privado en el que se realizó. Las vejaciones y torturas fotografiadas en Abu Ghraib, en cambio, trascendieron en 2004 su inicial privacidad al ser publicadas por The New Yorker y la CBS, invadiendo así el espacio de lo público. ¿Qué distingue ambas imágenes, determinando su «publicabilidad»? El presente artículo pretende analizar la censura de imágenes especialmente cruentas en los espacios informativos –i.e., al margen de los publicitarios o los de entretenimiento. Para ello, trataré de responder, en relación a este tipo de imágenes, a las siguientes preguntas: ¿Qué pueden mostrar? ¿Se deben mostrar? Y ¿cómo se deben mostrar? La primera pregunta se dirige a una cuestión estrictamente epistemológica. Dada su excesiva amplitud, me limitaré a establecer, por una parte, que es necesario defender una cierta idea de la verdad como correspondencia para poder distinguir entre imágenes verdaderas e imágenes falsas. Y, por otra parte, precisaré en qué podría consistir la falsedad de una imagen. Las dos segundas, en cambio, son de tipo ético y apuntan a la problemática formulación de una libertad de expresión relativa a las imágenes violentas. Trataré de poner de relieve la función decisiva de este tipo de imágenes como revulsivo y desarrollaré críticamente algunos de los argumentos habitualmente esgrimidos para impedir su difusión. Pretendo defender que, incluso si aceptamos que prima facie se debe poder ver todo, el centro del debate se halla en las condiciones de publicación y, principalmente, en la posible espectacularización mediática de las imágenes

Firms, States, and Democracy: A Qualified Defense of the Parallel Case Argument

The paper discusses the structure, applications, and plausibility of the muchusedparallel-case argument for workplace democracy. The argument restson an analogy between firms and states according to which the justificationof democracy in the state implies its justification in the workplace. Thecontribution of the paper is threefold. First, the argument is illustrated byapplying it to two usual objections to workplace democracy, namely, thatemployees lack the expertise required to run a firm and that only capitalsuppliers should have a say over the governance of the firm. Second,the structure of the argument is unfolded. Third, two salient similaritiesbetween firms and states regarding their internal and external effects andthe standing of their members are addressed in order to asses the potentialand limits of the argument, as well as three relevant differences regardingthe voluntariness of their membership, the narrowness of their goals, andthe stiffness of the competition they face. After considering these similaritiesand differences, the paper contends that the the parallel-case argumentprovides a sound reason in favor of democracy in the workplace —a reason,however, that needs to be importantly qualified and that is only pro tanto

Legitimate Intergenerational Constitutionalism

This paper examines the legitimacy conditions of constitutionalism by examining one particular type of constitutional provision: provisions aimed at advancing future generations’ interests. After covering the main forms that such provisions can adopt, it first considers three legitimacy gains of constitutionalising them. It then explores two legitimacy concerns that so doing raises. Given that constitutions are difficult to amend, constitutionalisation may threaten future generations’ sovereignty. And it may also make the constitution’s content impossible to adapt to changing circumstances and interests. Finally, the paper examines the ways in which such concerns may be addressed at the adoption, formulation, and amendment stages. In particular, it discusses if the use of sunset clauses and regular constitutional conventions may, and under what conditions, successfully address such concerns

The ballot and the wallet: Self-respect and the fair value of political liberties

Economic disparities often translate into disparities in political influence, rendering political liberties less worthy to poor citizens than to wealthier ones. Concerned with this, Rawls advocated that a guarantee of the fair value of political liberties be included in the first principle of justice as fairness, with significant regulatory and distributive implications. He nonetheless supplied little examination of the content and grounding of such guarantee, which we here offer. After examining three uncompelling arguments in its favor, we complete a more promising yet less explored argument that builds on the value of self-respect. We first inspect the conditions and duties that securing self-respect entails. We then look into how uneven allocations of the value of political liberties bear, expressively and due to the power imbalances they yield, on such conditions and duties

Little Republics: Authority and the Political Nature of the Firm

Political theorists have recently sought to replace the liberal, contractual theory of the firm with a political view that models the authority relation of employee to firm, and its appropriate regulation, on that of subject to state. This view is liable to serious difficulties, however, given the extant discontinuities between corporate and civil authority as to their coerciveness, entry and exit conditions, scope, legal standing, and efficiency constraints. I here inspect these, and argue that, albeit in some cases significant, such discontinuities fail to undermine the firm/state analogy, either because they are not significant enough to do so or because the particular trait on which they hinge is not decisive for how authority, in the state and in the firm, should be regulated to be legitimate. A pro tanto requirement exists, I thus argue, that corporate authority be held to regulatory norms comparable to those legitimate states abide by, including civil liberties, rule-of-law constraints, and accountability to subjects

La justificación epistémica de la delegación política. Una nota crítica

El objetivo de esta nota es analizar críticamente la justificación epistémica de la delegación política. Según este argumento, dada la ignorancia política de los ciudadanos, es deseable que éstos deleguen la toma de decisiones en manos de un conjunto de políticos profesionales elegidos y revocables en elecciones regulares. La tesis que se defiende es que dicho argumento conduce a un dilema que permite rechazar la justificación epistémica de la delegación política. Es éste: si la ignorancia política de los ciudadanos les impide participar en la toma directa de decisiones, entonces también les impedirá controlar eficazmente a los políticos en el poder; y si, por el contrario, los ciudadanos sí disponen de conocimientos políticos suficientes como para controlar a los políticos de manera eficaz, entonces no hay razón para que deban ser excluidos de la toma directa de decisiones

Dos principios retrospectivos de justicia climática

The paper examines two backwardlooking principles about how the costs of mitigating and adapting to climate change should be distributed. According to the polluter pays principle, such costs should be borne by those who caused climate change. According to the beneficiary pays principle, they should be borne by those who have benefited from the activities causing climate change, regardless of whether they took part in such activities or not. The paper unpacks both principles, considers their main problems and contends that, when properly combined, they can address such problems.El artículo analiza dos principios retrospectivos sobre cómo deberían distribuirse los costes de mitigación y adaptación al cambio climático. Según el principio de responsabilidad histórica, dichos costes deberían ser asumidos por quienes han causado el cambio climático. Según el principio del beneficio, deberían ser asumidos por los beneficiarios de las actividades causantes del cambio climático, con independencia de que hayan contribuido a ellas o no. El artículo presenta los principios y sus implicaciones, analiza sus principales problemas y argumenta que una combinación de ambos resuelve dichos problemas y proporciona una respuesta adecuada sobre cómo distribuir los costes de mitigación y adaptación

The Republican Case for Workplace Democracy

The republican case for workplace democracy is presented and defended from two alternative means of ensuring freedom from arbitrary interference in the firm—namely, the right to freely exit the firm and workplace regulation. This paper shows, respectively, that costless exit is neither possible nor desirable in either perfect or imperfect labor markets, and that managerial discretion is both desirable and inevitable due to the incompleteness of employment contracts and labor legislation. The paper then shows that WD is necessary, from a republican standpoint, if workers’ interests are to be adequately tracked in the exercise of managerial authority. Three important objections are finally addressed— that WD is redundant, that it is unnecessary provided that litigation and unionism can produce similar outcomes, and that it falls short of ensuring republican freedom compared to self-employment