Immunohistochemical study of PrPSc distribution in neural and extraneural tissues of two cats with feline spongiform encephalopathy

<p>Abstract</p> <p>Background</p> <p>Two domestic shorthair cats presenting with progressive hind-limb ataxia and increased aggressiveness were necropsied and a post mortem diagnosis of Feline Spongiform Encephalopathy (FSE) was made. A wide spectrum of tissue samples was collected and evaluated histologically and immunohistologically for the presence of PrP^Sc.</p> <p>Results</p> <p>Histopathological examination revealed a diffuse vacuolation of the grey matter neuropil with the following areas being most severely affected: corpus geniculatum medialis, thalamus, gyrus dentatus of the hippocampus, corpus striatum, and deep layers of the cerebral and cerebellar cortex as well as in the brain stem. In addition, a diffuse glial reaction involving astrocytes and microglia and intraneuronal vacuolation in a few neurons in the brain stem was present.</p> <p>Heavy PrP^Scimmunostaining was detected in brain, retina, optic nerve, pars nervosa of the pituitary gland, trigeminal ganglia and small amounts in the myenteric plexus of the small intestine (duodenum, jejunum) and slightly in the medulla of the adrenal gland.</p> <p>Conclusion</p> <p>The PrP^Scdistribution within the brain was consistent with that described in other FSE-affected cats. The pattern of abnormal PrP in the retina corresponded to that found in a captive cheetah with FSE, in sheep with scrapie and was similar to nvCJD in humans.</p

If cooperation is likely punish mildly: Insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game

Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.Comment: 15 pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON

Formalization of Transform Methods using HOL Light

Transform methods, like Laplace and Fourier, are frequently used for analyzing the dynamical behaviour of engineering and physical systems, based on their transfer function, and frequency response or the solutions of their corresponding differential equations. In this paper, we present an ongoing project, which focuses on the higher-order logic formalization of transform methods using HOL Light theorem prover. In particular, we present the motivation of the formalization, which is followed by the related work. Next, we present the task completed so far while highlighting some of the challenges faced during the formalization. Finally, we present a roadmap to achieve our objectives, the current status and the future goals for this project.Comment: 15 Pages, CICM 201

Benevolent characteristics promote cooperative behaviour among humans

Cooperation is fundamental to the evolution of human society. We regularly observe cooperative behaviour in everyday life and in controlled experiments with anonymous people, even though standard economic models predict that they should deviate from the collective interest and act so as to maximise their own individual payoff. However, there is typically heterogeneity across subjects: some may cooperate, while others may not. Since individual factors promoting cooperation could be used by institutions to indirectly prime cooperation, this heterogeneity raises the important question of who these cooperators are. We have conducted a series of experiments to study whether benevolence, defined as a unilateral act of paying a cost to increase the welfare of someone else beyond one's own, is related to cooperation in a subsequent one-shot anonymous Prisoner's dilemma. Contrary to the predictions of the widely used inequity aversion models, we find that benevolence does exist and a large majority of people behave this way. We also find benevolence to be correlated with cooperative behaviour. Finally, we show a causal link between benevolence and cooperation: priming people to think positively about benevolent behaviour makes them significantly more cooperative than priming them to think malevolently. Thus benevolent people exist and cooperate more

Drugs Associated with More Suicidal Ideations Are also Associated with More Suicide Attempts

In randomized controlled trials (RCTs), some drugs, including CB1 antagonists for obesity treatment, have been shown to cause increased suicidal ideation. A key question is whether drugs that increase or are associated with increased suicidal ideations are also associated with suicidal behavior, or whether drug-induced suicidal ideations are unlinked epiphenomena that do not presage the more troubling and potentially irrevocable outcome of suicidal behavior. This is difficult to determine in RCTs because of the rarity of suicidal attempts and completions.To determine whether drugs associated with more suicidal ideations are also associated with more suicide attempts in large spontaneous adverse event (AE) report databases.Generalized linear models with negative binomial distribution were fitted to Food and Drug Administration (FDA) Adverse Event (AE) Reporting System (AERS) data from 2004 to 2008. A total of 1,404,470 AEs from 832 drugs were analyzed as a function of reports of suicidal ideations; other non-suicidal adverse reactions; drug class; proportion of reports from males; and average age of subject for which AE was filed. Drug was treated as the unit of analysis, thus the statistical models effectively had 832 observations.Reported suicide attempts and completed suicides per drug.832 drugs, ranging from abacavir to zopiclone, were evaluated. The 832 drugs, as primary suspect drugs in a given adverse event, accounted for over 99.9% of recorded AERS. Suicidal ideations had a significant positive association with suicide attempts (p<.0001) and had an approximately 131-fold stronger magnitude of association than non-suicidal AERs, after adjusting for drug class, gender, and age.In AE reports, drugs that are associated with increased suicidal ideations are also associated with increased suicidal attempts or completions. This association suggests that drug-induced suicidal ideations observed in RCTs plausibly represent harbingers that presage the more serious suicide attempts and completions and should be a cause for concern

Herpes simplex virus 1 amplicon vector-mediated siRNA targeting epidermal growth factor receptor inhibits growth of human glioma cells in vivo

In primary glioblastomas and other tumor types, the epidermal growth factor receptor (EGFR) is frequently observed with alterations, such as amplification, structural rearrangements, or overexpression of the gene, suggesting an important role in glial tumorigenesis and progression. In this study, we investigated whether posttranscriptional gene silencing by vector-mediated RNAi to inhibit EGFR expression can reduce the growth of cultured human gli36 glioma cells. To "knock down" EGFR expression, we have created HSV-1-based amplicons that contain the RNA polymerase III-dependent H1 promoter to express double-stranded hairpin RNA directed against EGFR at two different locations (pHSVsiEGFR I and pHSVsiEGFR II). We demonstrate that both pHSVsiEGFR I and pHSVsiEGFR II mediated knock-down of transiently transfected full-length EGFR or endogenous EGFR in a dose-dependent manner. The knock-down of EGFR resulted in the growth inhibition of human glioblastoma (gli36-luc) cells both in culture and in athymic mice in vivo. Cell cycle analysis and annexin V staining revealed that siRNA-mediated suppression of EGFR induced apoptosis. Overall HSV-1 amplicons can mediate efficient and specific posttranscriptional gene silencing. Copyright © The American Society of Gene Therapy

Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders

Although empirical and theoretical studies affirm that punishment can elevate collaborative efforts, its emergence and stability remain elusive. By peer-punishment the sanctioning is something an individual elects to do depending on the strategies in its neighborhood. The consequences of unsustainable efforts are therefore local. By pool-punishment, on the other hand, where resources for sanctioning are committed in advance and at large, the notion of sustainability has greater significance. In a population with free-riders, punishers must be strong in numbers to keep the "punishment pool" from emptying. Failure to do so renders the concept of institutionalized sanctioning futile. We show that pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree that they cannot prevail. A discontinuous phase transition leads to an outbreak of sustainability when punishers subvert second-order free-riders in the competition against defectors.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 3 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific Report

Experimental Study of Informal Rewards in Peer Production

We test the effects of informal rewards in online peer production. Using a randomized, experimental design, we assigned editing awards or “barnstars” to a subset of the 1% most productive Wikipedia contributors. Comparison with the control group shows that receiving a barnstar increases productivity by 60% and makes contributors six times more likely to receive additional barnstars from other community members, revealing that informal rewards significantly impact individual effort

Reward and punishment in climate change dilemmas

Mitigating climate change effects involves strategic decisions by individuals that may choose to limit their emissions at a cost. Everyone shares the ensuing benefits and thereby individuals can free ride on the effort of others, which may lead to the tragedy of the commons. For this reason, climate action can be conveniently formulated in terms of Public Goods Dilemmas often assuming that a minimum collective effort is required to ensure any benefit, and that decision-making may be contingent on the risk associated with future losses. Here we investigate the impact of reward and punishment in this type of collective endeavors - coined as collective-risk dilemmas - by means of a dynamic, evolutionary approach. We show that rewards (positive incentives) are essential to initiate cooperation, mostly when the perception of risk is low. On the other hand, we find that sanctions (negative incentives) are instrumental to maintain cooperation. Altogether, our results are gratifying, given the a-priori limitations of effectively implementing sanctions in international agreements. Finally, we show that whenever collective action is most challenging to succeed, the best results are obtained when both rewards and sanctions are synergistically combined into a single policy.This research was supported by Fundacao para a Ciencia e Tecnologia (FCT) through grants PTDC/EEISII/5081/2014 and PTDC/MAT/STA/3358/2014 and by multiannual funding of INESC-ID and CBMA (under the projects UID/CEC/50021/2019 and UID/BIA/04050/2013). F.P.S. acknowledges support from the James S. McDonnell Foundation 21st Century Science Initiative in Understanding Dynamic and Multi-scale Systems Postdoctoral Fellowship Award. All authors declare no competing financial or non-financial interests in relation to the work described

Social Closure and the Evolution of Cooperation via Indirect Reciprocity

Direct and indirect reciprocity are good candidates to explain the fundamental problem of evolution of cooperation. We explore the conditions under which different types of reciprocity gain dominance and their performances in sustaining cooperation in the PD played on simple networks. We confirm that direct reciprocity gains dominance over indirect reciprocity strategies also in larger populations, as long as it has no memory constraints. In the absence of direct reciprocity, or when its memory is flawed, different forms of indirect reciprocity strategies are able to dominate and to support cooperation. We show that indirect reciprocity relying on social capital inherent in closed triads is the best competitor among them, outperforming indirect reciprocity that uses information from any source. Results hold in a wide range of conditions with different evolutionary update rules, extent of evolutionary pressure, initial conditions, population size, and density