Scepticism and the genealogy of knowledge: situating epistemology in time

My overarching purpose is to illustrate the philosophical fruitfulness of expanding epistemology not only laterally across the social space of other epistemic subjects, but at the same time vertically in the temporal dimension. I set about this by first presenting central strands of Michael Williams' diagnostic engagement with scepticism, in which he crucially employs a Default and Challenge model of justification. I then develop three key aspects of Edward Craig's ‘practical explication' of the concept of knowledge so that they may be seen to resonate positively with Williams's epistemological picture: the admixture of internalist and externalist features; the proto-contextualism; and, finally, the distinctively genealogical antisceptical impetus. In this way I aim to support and augment the socialized anti-sceptical case mounted by Williams, and so to show that expanding epistemology in the temporal dimension can be a productive move in central debates in epistemology

Forum on Miranda Fricker's "Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing"

This paper summarizes key themes from my Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (OUP, 2007); and it gives replies to commentators

Epistemic injustice: power and the ethics of knowing

Divulgação dos SUMÁRIOS das obras recentemente incorporadas ao acervo da Biblioteca Ministro Oscar Saraiva do STJ. Em respeito à Lei de Direitos Autorais, não disponibilizamos a obra na íntegra.Localização na estante: 340.12 F897

Injustiças Testemunhais Institucionalizadas

Embora as injustiças testemunhais tenham sido pensadas originalmente por Miranda Fricker apenas como redução de credibilidade, neste texto a autora assume a redefinição proposta por Jennifer Lackey para incluir, dentro das injustiças testemunhais, também a hipótese de excesso de credibilidade causada por uma injustiça agencial, isto é, quando a injustiça é cometida por se atribuir excesso de credibilidade a declarações precisamente quando a agência epistêmica do sujeito (as condições de agir como um sujeito de conhecimento) foi obstruída. A partir de sua preocupação com as instituições, Fricker tanto examina o contexto da justiça criminal que propicia as falsas confissões como propõe reflexões sobre as mudanças que são necessárias para a implementação de mais justiça epistêmica no interior dos sistemas de justiça criminal

The value of knowledge and the test of time

The current literature on the value of knowledge is marred by two unwarranted presumptions, which together distort the debate and conceal what is perhaps the most basic value of knowledge, as distinct from mere true belief. These presumptions are the Synchronic Presumption, which confines philosophical attention to the present snapshot in time; and the Analytical Presumption, which has people look for the value of knowledge in some kind of warrant. Together these presumptions conceal that the value of knowledge might inhere not in a necessary condition, but simply in a property that most knowledge possesses; and, in particular, that it might inhere, as I argue it does, in a certain property of 'resilience': the tendency to survive misleading counter-evidence over time owing to the subject's being in a position to weight it against evidence already possessed