Public goods and decay in networks

We propose a simple behavioral model to analyze situations where (1) a group of agents repeatedly plays a public goods game within a network structure and (2) each agent only observes the past behavior of her neighbors, but is affected by the decisions of the whole group. The model assumes that agents are imperfect conditional cooperators, that they infer unobserved contributions assuming imperfect conditional cooperation by others, and that they have some degree of bounded rationality. We show that our model approximates quite accurately regularities derived from public goods game experiments

Analisis Tingkat Kepuasan Pasien Rawat Inap Terhadap Mutu Pelayanan di Rumah Sakit Hidayah Boyolali

Hidayah Boyolali hospital is one private hospital in Central Java province. From the data obtained in February 2014 the number of visits for inpatients at the hospital had decreased and continued to decline until May 2014. The decline in the number of patient visits can occur either because the patients were less satisfied or dissatisfied with the services which provided at the hospital. This study aims to analyzed inpatient satisfaction for the quality of services at the Hospital Hidayah Boyolali and identify which attributes should be main priority and maintained. This research method is descriptive qualitative using Servqual. The population in the study were all inpatients, whereas the number of samples in this study were 50 people. Gap between customers’ service expectations and their perceptions analized by using Cartesius cart. The results of the analysis with the Cartesius cart shows two attributes are included in quadrant A, the first is the doctors and nurses are fast in providing the needed services, the second is the doctors and nurses are listened patiently to the patient's complaints. Two of these attributes should be a priority by Hidayah hospital in an effort to improve their service quality, because these two attributes are considered very important by patients, but instead it’s not yet in line with patients expectations. Keywords : Service Quality, Satisfaction, Cartesius Car

Explaining Africa’s public consumption procyclicality : revisiting old evidence

This paper compiles a novel dataset of time-varying measures of government consumption cyclicality for a panel of 46 African economies between 1960 and 2014. Government consumption has, generally, been highly procyclical over time in this group of countries. However, sample averages hide serious heterogeneity across countries with the majority of them showing procyclical behavior despite some positive signs of graduation from the “procyclicality trap” in a few cases. By means of weighted least squares regressions, we find that more developed African economies tend to have a smaller degree of government consumption procyclicality. Countries with higher social fragmentation and those are more reliant on foreign aid inflows tend to have a more procyclical government consumption policy. Better governance promotes counter- cyclical fiscal policy whileincreased democracy dampens it. Finally, some fiscal rules are important in curbing the procyclical behavior of government consumption.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

Electrochemical study of hydrogen absorption in polycrystalline palladium

The hydrogen reactions on polycrystalline Pd in 0.1 M NaOH at 25°C have been studied by using transients at constant potential, and by impedance spectroscopy and X-ray diffraction techniques. At potentials, Es, more positive than the reversible potential, Er, for the H2 evolution reaction, the current-time response and the impedance data indicate H atom diffusion into the bulk Pd. The X-ray diffraction pattern of electrodes cathodized during 20 min at these potentials are similar to those obtained for Pd. At Es s moves in the negative direction. The Nyquist plot for the rising part of the transients indicates the H atom diffusion into the bulk metal and H2 evolution on the Pd surface at high frequencies. The X-ray diffraction pattern of the electrodes cathodized at Es r, shows the presence of the βPdH phase and Pd. The experimental results indicate that different reactions take place simultaneously in this potential range: (i) Hs evolution, (ii) H diffusion into the bulk Pd, (iii) nucleation and diffusion-controlled growth of the βPdH phase. Taking into account the contribution of these reactions, a model, which is able to reproduce the experimental current transients, is presented.Instituto de Investigaciones Fisicoquímicas Teóricas y Aplicada

Incomplete Punishment Networks in Public Goods Games: Experimental Evidence

Abundant evidence suggests that high levels of contributions to public goods can be sustained through self-governed monitoring and sanctioning. This experimental study investigates the effectiveness of decentralized sanctioning institutions in alternative punishment networks. Our results show that the structure of punishment network significantly affects allocations to the public good. In addition, we observe that network configurations are more important than punishment capacities for the levels of public good provision, imposed sanctions and economic efficiency. Lastly, we show that targeted revenge is a major driver of anti-social punishment

The impact of relative position and returns on sacrifice and reciprocity: an experimental study using individual decisions

We present a comprehensive experimental design that makes it possible to characterize other-regarding preferences and their relationship to the decision maker’s relative position. Participants are faced with a large number of decisions involving variations in the trade-offs between own and other’s payoffs, as well as in other potentially important factors like the decision maker’s relative position. We find that: (1) choices are responsive to the cost of helping and hurting others; (2) The weight a decision maker places on others’ monetary payoffs depends on whether the decision maker is in an advantageous or disadvantageous relative position; and (3) We find no evidence of reciprocity of the type linked to menu-dependence. The results of a mixture-model estimation show considerable heterogeneity in subjects’ motivations and confirm the absence of reciprocal motives. Pure selfish behavior is the most frequently observed behavior. Among the subjects exhibiting social preferences, social-welfare maximization is the most frequent, followed by inequality-aversion and by competitiveness

The UN in the lab

We consider two alternatives to inaction for governments combating terrorism, which we term Defense and Prevention. Defense consists of investing in resources that reduce the impact of an attack, and generates a negative externality to other governments, making their countries a more attractive objective for terrorists. In contrast, Prevention, which consists of investing in resources that reduce the ability of the terrorist organization to mount an attack, creates a positive externality by reducing the overall threat of terrorism for all. This interaction is captured using a simple 3×3 “Nested Prisoner’s Dilemma” game, with a single Nash equilibrium where both countries choose Defense. Due to the structure of this interaction, countries can benefit from coordination of policy choices, and international institutions (such as the UN) can be utilized to facilitate coordination by implementing agreements to share the burden of Prevention. We introduce an institution that implements a burden-sharing policy for Prevention, and investigate experimentally whether subjects coordinate on a cooperative strategy more frequently under different levels of cost sharing. In all treatments, burden sharing leaves the Prisoner’s Dilemma structure and Nash equilibrium of the game unchanged. We compare three levels of burden sharing to a baseline in a between-subjects design, and find that burden sharing generates a non-linear effect on the choice of the efficient Prevention strategy and overall performance. Only an institution supporting a high level of mandatory burden sharing generates a significant improvement in the use of the Prevention strategy

Group-level selection increases cooperation in the public goods game

When groups compete for resources, some groups will be more successful than others, forcing out less successful groups. Group-level selection is the most extreme form of group competition, where the weaker group ceases to exist, becoming extinct. We implement group-level selection in a controlled laboratory experiment in order to study its impact on human cooperation. The experiment uses variations on the standard linear public goods game. Group-level selection operates through competition for survival: the least successful, lowest-earning groups become extinct, in the sense that they no longer are able to play the game. Additional control treatments include group comparison without extinction, and extinction of the least successful individuals across groups. We find that group-level extinction produces very high contributions to the provision of the public good, while group comparison alone or individual extinction fail to cause higher contributions. Our results provide stark evidence that group-level selection enhances within-group cooperation