Fair representation on International courts: geography, gender and beyond

RESUMEN La conferencia plantea una cuestión acerca de los tribunales internacionales de justicia (ICs): ¿por qué debería importarnos que su composición sea suficientemente diversa, entendiendo por tal no sólo que atienda a diferentes tradiciones y especialidades judiciales, sino también a criterios de género, geográficos y otros? Para responder a la pregunta, la exposición planteará en primer lugar cuáles son las funciones que cumplen los tribunales internacionales de justicia, a la luz de las cuales examinará cuatro razones, epistémicas y morales, por las que la composición plural de tales tribunales importa. Abordará después la cuestión de cuáles serían los grupos o los criterios de diversidad a los que habría que atender. Y, por último, cerrará la exposición discutiendo diferentes medidas que pueden adoptarse en los procesos de nominación y selección de los jueces de los tribunales internacionales a fin de lograr que la composición sea más diversa y equilibrada

How many women judges are enough on international courts?

The African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) made history on August 27, 2018. The majority of its judges were female—six of 11, and the first among international courts and tribunals (ICs) to secure sex parity—that is, numerical equality.1 This achievement is even more remarkable given that only 23% of the judges and arbitrators of the ICs are women.2 The milestone also prompts us to consider more closely what considerations of legitimacy entail about the proportion of women international judges. The present composition of ICs is clearly under legal, social, and political control, and ICs have profound effects. The persistent underrepresentation of women is especially striking since not only civil society groups, but also the states who nominate and establish election procedures have agreed several treaties that require or urge a balance of gender representation.3 So it would seem that the parity achieved by the ACtHPR should be applauded. However, that IC may now be even more gender equal than we may have reason to require of a legitimate IC—or so this article argues. A less egalitarian composition within a “parity zone” of approximately 40% of either of the main sexes seems to suffice. The present reflections considers various possible arguments offered concerning the impact of gender inequality on the international bench, drawing in part on studies of domestic judiciaries, as well as on available research and reflections by practitioners and women international judges.4 Several arguments support calls to increase the proportion of female international judges—but how far? Section 2 addresses some background issues: first concerning the terms “feminism,” “sex,” and “gender,” then, the tasks of ICs that should lead us to question the present sex inequality on the international bench

Stability and trust in federations with ethnic territories and a secession clause - Challenges and opportunities for Ethiopia

How might Ethiopia maintain its federal structure and its territory? ‘Constitutional contestation’ in Ethiopia is fuelled by two factors: regions and political parties follow ethnic line; and the Ethiopian Constitution has a secession clause. A central challenge is to secure sufficient political trust. The public must be assured that authorities and individuals across regional borders generally comply with the law. This requires authoritative, independent ways to settle disagreements and monitor compliance, including carefully designed multi-level checks and balances, representatives of regions in central decision making bodies, and a ‘competence police’. So we should welcome the prohibition of the 2019 Election Law against ethnically based political parties. Strong and credible human rights constraints together with free media and functioning opposition parties may also foster trusts,. This is one further reason why Ethiopia should grant the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACtHPR) jurisdiction to hear cases from ngo s and individuals

Why the Realist-Instrumentalist Debate about Rational Choice Rests on a Mistake

Within the social sciences, much controversy exists about which status should be ascribed to the rationality assumption that forms the core of rational choice theories. Whilst realists argue that the rationality assumption is an empirical claim which describes real processes that cause individual action, instrumentalists maintain that it amounts to nothing more than an analytically set axiom or ‘as if’ hypothesis which helps in the generation of accurate predictions. In this paper, I argue that this realist-instrumentalist debate about rational choice theory can be overcome once it is realised that the rationality assumption is neither an empirical description nor an ‘as if’ hypothesis, but a normative claim

Psalms for Organ, Volume 12: Ramoth

Pages, 21-24 in Psalms for Organ, Volume 12

Mental States Are Like Diseases

While Quine’s linguistic behaviorism is well-known, his Kant Lectures contain one of his most detailed discussions of behaviorism in psychology and the philosophy of mind. Quine clarifies the nature of his psychological commitments by arguing for a modest view that is against ‘excessively restrictive’ variants of behaviorism while maintaining ‘a good measure of behaviorist discipline…to keep [our mental] terms under control’. In this paper, I use Quine’s Kant Lectures to reconstruct his position. I distinguish three types of behaviorism in psychology and the philosophy of mind: ontological behaviorism, logical behaviorism, and epistemological behaviorism. I then consider Quine’s perspective on each of these views and argue that he does not fully accept any of them. By combining these perspectives we arrive at Quine’s surprisingly subtle view about behaviorism in psychology