30 research outputs found
Reasoning as a social competence : an experimental comparison with the intellectualist theories
La majorité des recherches en sciences cognitives suppose que la fonction du raisonnement humain est d'aider l'individu à avoir de meilleures croyances et à prendre de meilleures décisions, en particulier grâce à des mécanismes mentaux d'inférences logiques. En 2011, Dan Sperber et Hugo Mercier ont proposé une vision alternative du raisonnement humain. La fonction du raisonnement serait argumentative : le raisonnement serait ce qui permet aux individus de produire et d'évaluer des arguments en contextes dialogiques. Cette thèse a d'une part pour objectif de proposer une comparaison théorique entre les théories standards du raisonnement et la théorie argumentative du raisonnement. D'autre part, elle apporte un soutien empirique a la théorie argumentative à travers différents paradigmes expérimentaux (i.e., résolution de problème individuelle, production et évaluation d'arguments individuelles, résolution de problème et échange d'arguments en groupe). Cette thèse défend non seulement la valeur explicative de la théorie argumentative du raisonnement, mais caractérise également les mécanismes cognitifs du raisonnement humain, de part leurs fonctions, leurs biais, et les contextes qui les déclenchentMost research in cognitive science assumes that the function of human reasoning is to help individual to improve their beliefs and make better decisions, in particular through mental mechanisms of logical inference. In 2011, Dan Sperber and Hugo Mercier put forward an alternative view of human reasoning. The function of reasoning would be argumentative: reasoning would be what enables individuals to produce and evaluate arguments in dialogical contexts. This PhD thesis aims at proposing a theoretical comparison between standard theories of reasoning and the argumentative theory of reasoning. Furthermore, it provides empirical support for the latter by using different experimental paradigms (i.e., individual problem solving, production and evaluation of arguments in solitary contexts, problem solving and arguments exchange in group). This thesis not only defends the explanatory value of the argumentative theory but also characterizes the cognitive mechanisms of human reasoning by their functions, their biases, and their triggering context
Le raisonnement comme compétence sociale : une comparaison expérimentale avec les théories intellectualistes
Most research in cognitive science assumes that the function of human reasoning is to help individual to improve their beliefs and make better decisions, in particular through mental mechanisms of logical inference. In 2011, Dan Sperber and Hugo Mercier put forward an alternative view of human reasoning. The function of reasoning would be argumentative: reasoning would be what enables individuals to produce and evaluate arguments in dialogical contexts. This PhD thesis aims at proposing a theoretical comparison between standard theories of reasoning and the argumentative theory of reasoning. Furthermore, it provides empirical support for the latter by using different experimental paradigms (i.e., individual problem solving, production and evaluation of arguments in solitary contexts, problem solving and arguments exchange in group). This thesis not only defends the explanatory value of the argumentative theory but also characterizes the cognitive mechanisms of human reasoning by their functions, their biases, and their triggering contextsLa majorité des recherches en sciences cognitives suppose que la fonction du raisonnement humain est d'aider l'individu à avoir de meilleures croyances et à prendre de meilleures décisions, en particulier grâce à des mécanismes mentaux d'inférences logiques. En 2011, Dan Sperber et Hugo Mercier ont proposé une vision alternative du raisonnement humain. La fonction du raisonnement serait argumentative : le raisonnement serait ce qui permet aux individus de produire et d'évaluer des arguments en contextes dialogiques. Cette thèse a d'une part pour objectif de proposer une comparaison théorique entre les théories standards du raisonnement et la théorie argumentative du raisonnement. D'autre part, elle apporte un soutien empirique a la théorie argumentative à travers différents paradigmes expérimentaux (i.e., résolution de problème individuelle, production et évaluation d'arguments individuelles, résolution de problème et échange d'arguments en groupe). Cette thèse défend non seulement la valeur explicative de la théorie argumentative du raisonnement, mais caractérise également les mécanismes cognitifs du raisonnement humain, de part leurs fonctions, leurs biais, et les contextes qui les déclenchen
Arguments, More Than Confidence, Explain the Good Performance of Reasoning Groups
International audienceIn many intellective tasks groups consistently outperform individuals. One factor is that the individual(s) with the best answer is able to convince the other group members using sound argumentation. Another factor is that the most confident group member imposes her answer whether it is right or wrong. In Experiments 1 and 2, individual participants were given arguments against their answer in intellective tasks. Demonstrating sound argumentative competence, many participants changed their minds to adopt the correct answer, even though the arguments had no confidence markers, and barely any participants changed their minds to adopt an incorrect answer. Confidence could not explain who changed their mind, as the least confident participants were as likely to change their minds as the most confident. In Experiments 3 (adults) and 4 (10-year-olds), participants solved intellective tasks individually and then in groups, before solving transfer problems individually. Demonstrating again sound argumentative competence, participants adopted the correct answer when it was present in the group, and many succeeded in transferring this understanding to novel problems. Moreover, the group member with the right answer nearly always managed to convince the group even when she was not the most confident. These results show that argument quality can overcome confidence among the factors influencing the discussion of intellective tasks. Explanations for apparent exceptions are discussed
Objective Evaluation of Demonstrative Arguments
International audienceMany experiments suggest that participants are more critical of arguments that challenge their views or that come from untrustworthy sources. However, other results suggest that this might not be true of demonstrative arguments. A series of four experiments tested whether people are influenced by two factors when they evaluate demonstrative arguments: how confident they are in the answer being challenged by the argument, and how much they trust the source of the argument. Participants were not affected by their confidence in the answer challenged by the argument. By contrast, they were sometimes affected by their trust in the argument’s source. Analyses of reaction times and transfer problems suggest that source trustworthiness did not directly affect argument evaluation, but affected instead the number of times the participants considered the arguments. Our results thus suggest that people can evaluate demonstrative arguments objectively. In conclusion, we defend the hypothesis that people might also be able to evaluate non-demonstrative arguments objectively. These results support the predictions of the argumentative theory of reasoning
Argumentation and the diffusion of counter-intuitive beliefs.
International audienceResearch in cultural evolution has focused on the spread of intuitive or minimally counterintuitive beliefs. However, some very counterintuitive beliefs can also spread successfully, at least in some communities-scientific theories being the most prominent example. We suggest that argumentation could be an important factor in the spread of some very counterintuitive beliefs. A first experiment demonstrates that argumentation enables the spread of the counterintuitive answer to a reasoning problem in large discussion groups, whereas this spread is limited or absent when participants can show their answers to each other but cannot discuss. A series of experiments using the technique of repeated transmission show that, in the case of the counterintuitive belief studied: (a) arguments can help spread this belief without loss; (b) conformist bias does not help spread this belief; and (c) authority or prestige bias play a minimal role in helping spread this belief. Thus, argumentation seems to be necessary and sufficient for the spread of some counterintuitive beliefs. (PsycINFO Database Recor
Believing What You're Told: Politeness and Scalar Inferences
The experimental pragmatics literature has extensively investigated the ways in which distinct contextual factors affect the computation of scalar inferences, whose most studied example is the one that allows “Some X-ed” to mean Not all X-ed. Recent studies from Bonnefon et al. (2009, 2011) investigate the effect of politeness on the interpretation of scalar utterances. They argue that when the scalar utterance is face-threatening (“Some people hated your speech”) (i) the scalar inference is less likely to be derived, and (ii) the semantic interpretation of “some” (at least some) is arrived at slowly and effortfully. This paper re-evaluates the role of politeness in the computation of scalar inferences by drawing on the distinction between “comprehension” and “epistemic assessment” of communicated information. In two experiments, we test the hypothesis that, in these face-threatening contexts, scalar inferences are largely derived but are less likely to be accepted as true. In line with our predictions, we find that slowdowns in the face-threatening condition are attributable to longer reaction times at the (latter) epistemic assessment stage, but not at the comprehension stage
Vigilant conservatism in evaluating communicated information
In the absence of other information, people put more weight on their own opinion than on the opinion of others: they are conservative. Several proximal mechanisms have been suggested to account for this finding. One of these mechanisms is that people cannot access reasons for other people's opinions, but they can access the reasons for their own opinions-whether they are the actual reasons that led them to hold the opinions (rational access to reasons), or post-hoc constructions (biased access to reasons). In four experiments, participants were asked to provide an opinion, and then faced with another participant's opinion and asked if they wanted to revise their initial opinion. Some questions were manipulated so that the advice participants were receiving was in fact their own opinion, while what they thought was their own opinion was in fact not. In all experiments, the participants were consistently biased towards what they thought was their own opinion, showing that conservativeness cannot be explained by rational access to reasons, which should have favored the advice. One experiment revealed that conservativeness was not decreased under time pressure, suggesting that biased access to reasons is an unlikely explanation for conservativeness. The experiments also suggest that repetition plays a role in advice taking, with repeated opinions being granted more weight than non-fluent opinions. Our results are not consistent with any of the established proximal explanations for conservatism. Instead, we suggest an ultimate explanation-vigilant conservatism-that sees conservatism as adaptive since receivers should be wary of senders' interests, as they rarely perfectly converge with theirs
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Why Teach How Things Work?Tracking the Evolution of Children’s Intuitions about Complexity
Mechanistic information can be characterized as theinteracting causal components underlying a phenomenon - inshort, how something works. Children and adults arenotoriously poor at learning, remembering, and applyingmechanistic information, so it comes as no surprise that thewisdom of teaching mechanism has come under increasingscrutiny in science education. However, while a rich memoryfor mechanistic details may be out of the average student’sgrasp, we argue that exposure to mechanism does not leavestudents empty-handed. Instead, it refines their intuitionsabout science and the world in significant ways. For thecurrent study, we focused on one kind of intuition inparticular: beliefs about causal complexity. Children ages 6-11 rated the complexity of a heart and a lock and were thengiven either mechanistic or non-mechanistic informationabout them. Afterwards, they were asked if their intuitionsabout complexity had changed and if so by how much. Threeweeks later, children were asked again about their intuitionsabout complexity. Crucially, children who were givenmechanistic information demonstrated a significantly greatershift in their assessments of complexity for both the heart anddoor lock compared to their counterparts who were givennon-mechanistic information. This contradicts the notion thatmechanism provides learners with few benefits while alsodemonstrating how mechanism can be a powerful force inshaping children’s intuitions
Experts and laymen grossly underestimate the benefits of argumentation for reasoning
Many fields of study have shown that group discussion generally improves reasoning performance for a wide range of tasks. This article shows that most
of the population, including specialists, does not expect group discussion to be as beneficial as it is. Six studies asked participants to solve a standard reasoning problem—the Wason selection task—and to estimate the performance of individuals working alone and in groups. We tested samples of
U.S., Indian, and Japanese participants, European managers, and
psychologists of reasoning. Every sample underestimated the improvement yielded by group discussion. They did so even after they had been explained
the correct answer, or after they had had to solve the problem in groups. These mistaken intuitions could prevent individuals from making the best of
institutions that rely on group discussion, from collaborative learning and work teams to deliberative assemblies