Praxisänderung zu Depressionen und anderen psychischen Leiden. Bedeutung, Einordnung, Folgen – Bemerkungen zu den Leitentscheiden 8C_841/2016 und 8C_130/2017 vom 30. November 2017

Das Bundesgericht hat sich in zwei wichtigen Leitentscheiden zur Beurteilung der invalidisierenden Wirkung psychischer Leiden geäussert. Es distanziert sich von der (kurzen Episode der) Sonderrechtsprechung für Depressionen, weitet die Indikatorenprüfung der neuen «Schmerzrechtsprechung» (BGE 141 V 281) auf sämtliche psychischen Leiden aus und präzisiert einige der Indikatoren. Der Beitrag stellt die Praxisänderungen vor, ordnet sie in den weiteren Kontext ein und leuchtet die möglichen Konsequenzen aus

Grundprobleme der Invaliditätsbemessung in der Invalidenversicherung

Der faire Zugang zu Invalidenleistungen war in den vergangenen Jahren Gegenstand grösserer Kontroversen. Insbesondere die Thematik der medizinischen Einschränkungen und deren Begutachtung standen im Vordergrund. Die vorliegende Studie richtet den Fokus auf die Invaliditätsbemessung in der Invalidenversicherung, insbesondere auf die allgemeine Methode des Einkommensvergleichs bei unselbstständig erwerbenden Personen. Es zeigt sich, dass der für die Bestimmung des Invaliditätsgrades vergleichsweise herangezogene ausgeglichene Arbeitsmarkt immer mehr in Richtung einer abstrakten Fiktion gerückt wird und sich vom real existierenden Arbeitsmarkt zunehmend entfernt, zumal auch die lohnstatistischen Grundlagen nicht sachgerecht herangezogen werden. Zudem führt die restriktive Handhabung von Korrekturinstrumenten (Einkommensparallelisierung, Tabellenlohnabzüge) zu erheblichen Verzerrungen. Die Studie zeigt die Entwicklungen sowie die Praxis detailliert auf, analysiert Schwachstellen und zeigt Perspektiven für eine künftige, näher an der wirtschaftlichen Realität liegende Bemessung auf

If cooperation is likely punish mildly: Insights from economic experiments based on the snowdrift game

Punishment may deter antisocial behavior. Yet to punish is costly, and the costs often do not offset the gains that are due to elevated levels of cooperation. However, the effectiveness of punishment depends not only on how costly it is, but also on the circumstances defining the social dilemma. Using the snowdrift game as the basis, we have conducted a series of economic experiments to determine whether severe punishment is more effective than mild punishment. We have observed that severe punishment is not necessarily more effective, even if the cost of punishment is identical in both cases. The benefits of severe punishment become evident only under extremely adverse conditions, when to cooperate is highly improbable in the absence of sanctions. If cooperation is likely, mild punishment is not less effective and leads to higher average payoffs, and is thus the much preferred alternative. Presented results suggest that the positive effects of punishment stem not only from imposed fines, but may also have a psychological background. Small fines can do wonders in motivating us to chose cooperation over defection, but without the paralyzing effect that may be brought about by large fines. The later should be utilized only when absolutely necessary.Comment: 15 pages, 6 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON

Visible inequality breeds more inequality

Experiments suggest that when people can see wealth inequality in their social network, this propels further inequality through reduced cooperation and reduced social connectivity. News & Views comment on Nishi et al, Nature 526, 2015, p. 426-429

Analysing and controlling the tax evasion dynamics via majority-vote model

Within the context of agent-based Monte-Carlo simulations, we study the well-known majority-vote model (MVM) with noise applied to tax evasion on simple square lattices, Voronoi-Delaunay random lattices, Barabasi-Albert networks, and Erd\"os-R\'enyi random graphs. In the order to analyse and to control the fluctuations for tax evasion in the economics model proposed by Zaklan, MVM is applied in the neighborhod of the noise critical $q_{c}$. The Zaklan model had been studied recently using the equilibrium Ising model. Here we show that the Zaklan model is robust and can be reproduced also through the nonequilibrium MVM on various topologies.Comment: 18 pages, 7 figures, LAWNP'09, 200

Combining ‘‘real effort’’ with induced effort costs: the ball-catching task

We introduce the “ball-catching task”, a novel computerized task, which combines a tangible action (“catching balls”) with induced material cost of effort. The central feature of the ball-catching task is that it allows researchers to manipulate the cost of effort function as well as the production function, which permits quantitative predictions on effort provision. In an experiment with piece-rate incentives we find that the comparative static and the point predictions on effort provision are remarkably accurate. We also present experimental findings from three classic experiments, namely, team production, gift exchange and tournament, using the task. All of the results are closely in line with the stylized facts from experiments using purely induced values. We conclude that the ball-catching task combines the advantages of real effort tasks with the use of induced values, which is useful for theory-testing purposes as well as for applications

Conducting interactive experiments online

Online labor markets provide new opportunities for behavioral research, but conducting economic experiments online raises important methodological challenges. This particularly holds for interactive designs. In this paper, we provide a methodological discussion of the similarities and differences between interactive experiments conducted in the laboratory and online. To this end, we conduct a repeated public goods experiment with and without punishment using samples from the laboratory and the online platform Amazon Mechanical Turk. We chose to replicate this experiment because it is long and logistically complex. It therefore provides a good case study for discussing the methodological and practical challenges of online interactive experimentation. We find that basic behavioral patterns of cooperation and punishment in the laboratory are replicable online. The most important challenge of online interactive experiments is participant dropout. We discuss measures for reducing dropout and show that, for our case study, dropouts are exogenous to the experiment. We conclude that data quality for interactive experiments via the Internet is adequate and reliable, making online interactive experimentation a potentially valuable complement to laboratory studies

Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders

Although empirical and theoretical studies affirm that punishment can elevate collaborative efforts, its emergence and stability remain elusive. By peer-punishment the sanctioning is something an individual elects to do depending on the strategies in its neighborhood. The consequences of unsustainable efforts are therefore local. By pool-punishment, on the other hand, where resources for sanctioning are committed in advance and at large, the notion of sustainability has greater significance. In a population with free-riders, punishers must be strong in numbers to keep the "punishment pool" from emptying. Failure to do so renders the concept of institutionalized sanctioning futile. We show that pool-punishment in structured populations is sustainable, but only if second-order free-riders are sanctioned as well, and to a such degree that they cannot prevail. A discontinuous phase transition leads to an outbreak of sustainability when punishers subvert second-order free-riders in the competition against defectors.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 3 figures; accepted for publication in Scientific Report