No. 51: Migrant Remittances and Household Survival in Zimbabwe

Migrant remittances are now recognised as an important source of global development finance and there is increasing evidence that international remittances have considerable developmental impacts. The contribution of remittances to GDP in many developing countries is significant and has shown a steady increase over the past decade. However, while there is a consensus that remittance flows to Africa are increasing, little attention has been paid to the impact of these transfers on poverty alleviation, primarily because of data deficiencies at the household level. Despite their obvious magnitude, accurate data on remittance flows to Zimbabwe is unavailable or inaccessible. In an attempt to address such data deficiencies, SAMP devised the household-level Migration and Remittances Survey (MARS) which was administered in several SADC countries, including Zimbabwe. The MARS study was implemented in Zimbabwe in 2005 and surveyed 723 urban and rural households. The data generated by MARS is critical in at least three ways: (a) it quantifies the largely hidden economic value of labour migration from Zimbabwe; (b) it provides information on the significance of remittances to economic survival in a state undergoing massive formal sector decline; and (c) it provides information on the relationship between remittances and poverty alleviation at the household level. MARS allows us to do two things: first, to construct a profile of Zimbabwe’s migrant population and, second, to answer basic questions about remittance origins, volumes, channels and use. With regard to the migrant profile MARS found the following: Nearly three quarters of the migrants (72%) identified in the survey had worked outside the country for 5 years or less. Only 7% had been working outside the country for over 10 years. The number of migrants per household varied between one and five. The majority (73%) were reliant on a single migrant, and another 21% had two. Nearly 60% of migrants were in neighbouring countries, primarily South Africa (32%), Botswana (16%) and Mozambique (5%). The other 40% were outside Southern Africa in a wide range of countries. The United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and Canada are primary destinations. Half of the migrants were sons and daughters or other relatives of household heads. However, the crisis in Zimbabwe is of such magnitude that household heads and spouses are migrating in significant numbers. Some 28% of the migrants were household heads and 13% were spouses/partners. More migrants were married (58%) than unmarried (31%). All of this suggests a broadening and deepening of participation in labour migration. In most countries in SADC, migration still tends to be heavily male-dominated. Zimbabwe has become an exception to this rule. In this study 56% of migrants were male and 44% female. The majority of migrants (72%) are under the age of 40. They are also relatively well-educated compared to migrants from other SADC countries. Less than 1% have no schooling and over 50% have a post-secondary diploma, undergraduate degree or postgraduate degree. Migrants are employed in a wide variety of jobs outside Zimbabwe, many not in the profession for which they have training or skills. In other words, this is a generalized out-movement of people, not confined to one or two professions or sectors. Nineteen percent of migrants were in the informal sector, followed by professional work (15%), health (12%), services (9%), teaching (7%), manual work (6%) and office work (5%). Comparing in-country with out-of-country employment by sector, the survey showed that 70% of Zimbabwean health workers were migrants; as were over 40% of professional workers, service workers, managerial office workers and mineworkers. Between 30- 40% of office workers and farm workers were also migrants. With teachers, the proportion was 28% and domestic workers 25%. Most migrants maintain close connections with Zimbabwe. Nearly half visit their families at least once every three months. However, almost 20% of the migrants (mostly living overseas) return home only once a year. Absences from home are highly variable: 18% are away for less than a month at a time, 19% between one and six months and 30% between six months and a year. Twenty percent are away for a year or longer. The survey also provided unprecedented insights into the remittance behaviour of Zimbabwe’s migrants, as well as invaluable information on the crucial importance of remittances to household survival. Although most migrant-sending households were struggling and poverty was increasing, very few could be considered destitute, at least on the evidence of this survey. However, without the constant and regular infusion of remittances from outside the country, the answers to this question would probably have been very different. Amongst the survey’s key findings on remittances were the following: The vast majority of migrants regularly send back remittances in cash and/or kind. In the year prior to the study, three-quarters of migrant-sending households received remittances. Migrants sent home R2,759 p.a. on average. Various factors influenced the amounts remitted by individual migrants. For instance, heads of households remitted more than their children. Men remitted slightly more than women, an indication of greater labour market access in destination countries. Those in the 40-59 age group remitted more than migrants in any other age category. Furthermore, those who were married remitted more on average than those who were still single. Remittances come from a diverse range of countries and wide range of sectors. Migrants overseas remit more on average than those within Southern Africa. Within the region, the largest remitters are in Botswana followed by Zambia and South Africa. Professional workers, on average, send the most money back to Zimbabwe, followed by self-employed entrepreneurs, office workers and managers. Surprisingly, unskilled manual workers remit more, on average, than health workers, teachers, domestic workers and workers in the service sector. Most migrants remit on a regular basis. Some 61% of households receive money from migrants at least once a month. Another 25% receive money at least once or twice every three months and 7% once or twice a year. There was a positive correlation between the amount remitted and the frequency of remitting: migrants who send money home more frequently remit more on average than those who remit less often. Migrants use many different channels to send remittances home. In Zimbabwe, there is a clear preference for trusted informal channels over banks and formal money transfer operators such as Western Union and Moneygram. Social networks influence the channels through which informal remittances are sent. Active social ties between migrants and family members and friends provide the personal links and local information necessary for informal remittance sending. Decisions about how much will be remitted, how often and through what channels are not the sole preserve of the migrant. Households are in regular contact with their migrant members by phone and regularly send requests for emergency assistance. Eighty percent of households reported that migrants can be relied on to send emergency remittances most or all of the time. As many as 61% of the surveyed households had received goods in the year prior to the survey. Non-cash remittances included foodstuffs (for example, maize-meal, sugar, salt, and cooking oil) as well as consumer goods such as bicycles, radios, sofas, agricultural inputs and building materials. Most non-cash remitting is based on the specific and immediate needs of the recipients. When the country faces shortages of basic commodities, non-cash remittances in the form of food tend to increase. How important are remittances to household survival and sustainability in Zimbabwe? A broad distinction is often drawn between productive and consumptive uses of remittances. Since most remittances to Zimbabwe are aimed at easing the livelihood constraints of the households back home, consumption tends to dominate remittance usage. The survey’s findings about remittance usage include: The vast majority of households receive cash and in-kind remittances. No other source of income came close in terms of the proportion of households that benefited. For example, despite the overall significance of informal sector trade only 15% of households generated income this way. A mere 6 % received income from the sale of farm products. Cash remittances were the major source of total household income, followed by wage work in Zimbabwe and remittance goods. The relative importance of remittances compared to other classes of income can be assessed via their importance to various basic household expenditure categories. Total expenses largely covered by remittances included gifts (93%), entertainment (92%), building (90%), clothes (88%), transportation (88%), education (88%), housing (85%), medical expenses (83%) and food and groceries (80%). The most common use of remittances is to buy food (by 67% of households), buy clothing (49%) and pay for school fees (48%). Domestic building materials are another common expense (by 49% of households) as are transportation costs (fuel and fares). The use of remittances to generate further income is not common although 27% of households used remittances to support food production and 12% purchased goods for re-sale. About 16% saved a portion of their remittances and 5% bought insurance policies. Nine percent spent remittances on funeral and burial policies and 8% on funerals – a clear indicator of the impact of HIV/AIDS. The MARS study clearly shows that without remittance flows, the situation of many Zimbabwean households would be even more dire than it is already. Remittances have reduced vulnerability to hunger, ill-health and poverty in both rural and urban households. Households with migrants go without basic necessities less often. Remittances have also allowed families to keep children in school and to put roofs over the heads of household members. Remittances, as a major source of household income, clearly have an important impact on livelihoods in Zimbabwe

On the chemical composition of Titan's dry lakebed evaporites

Titan, the main satellite of Saturn, has an active cycle of methane in its troposphere. Among other evidence for a mechanism of evaporation at work on the ground, dry lakebeds have been discovered. Recent Cassini infrared observations of these empty lakes have revealed a surface composition poor in water ice compared to that of the surrounding terrains --- suggesting the existence of organic evaporites deposits. The chemical composition of these possible evaporites is unknown. In this paper, we study evaporite composition using a model that treats both organic solids dissolution and solvent evaporation. Our results suggest the possibility of large abundances of butane and acetylene in the lake evaporites. However, due to uncertainties of the employed theory, these determinations have to be confirmed by laboratory experiments.Comment: Icarus, in pres

No. 77: Living with Xenophobia: Zimbabwean Informal Enterprise in South Africa

South Africa’s crisis of xenophobia is defined by the discrimination and intolerance to which migrants are exposed on a daily basis. A major target of the country’s extreme xenophobia – defined as a heightened form of xenophobia in which hostility and opposition to those perceived as outsiders and foreigners is expressed through violent acts – is the businesses run by migrants and refugees in the informal sector. Attitudinal surveys clearly show that South Africans differentiate migrants by national origin and that Zimbabweans are amongst the most disliked. Zimbabweans are certainly not the only small-business owners to have become victims of extreme xenophobia. However, few studies to date have specifically examined the impact of xenophobic violence on Zimbabweans who are trying to make a living in the South African informal sector. This report is based on two sources of data: (a) in 2015, SAMP’s Growing Informal Cities (GIC) Project surveyed over 1,000 randomly selected migrant-owned informal sector enterprises in Cape Town and Johannesburg. The data on 304 Zimbabwean-owned enterprises included in the survey sample has been extracted for analysis; and (b) in 2016, 50 in-depth interviews were conducted with Zimbabwean informal business owners in Cape Town, Johannesburg and Polokwane who had been affected by xenophobic violence. The demographic profile of the Zimbabwean migrant entrepreneurs in the GIC survey included the following: As many as 60% of Zimbabwean entrepreneurs in Cape Town and 65% in Johannesburg are male. This was a marked contrast to informal cross-border trade between Zimbabwe and South Africa, which is dominated by female Zimbabweans. The number of migrant entrepreneurs who arrived in South Africa peaked between 2005 and 2010 at the height of the economic crisis in Zimbabwe and has since fallen. As many as 88% of the migrants in Cape Town arrived in the city after 2005 (compared to 52% of those in Johannesburg). Only 5% of the survey respondents had experience working in the Zimbabwean informal economy before migrating to South Africa. Those with prior experience had generally been involved in informal cross-border trading and were therefore familiar with South Africa. Relatively few of the Zimbabwean entrepreneurs did not have documents permitting them to be in the country and/or to work legally. Just over one-third of the migrants in the survey had asylum-seeker (Section 22) permits but only 5% had refugee status (Section 24 permits). Around one-quarter had work permits and 10% had visitor’s permits. Only 15% did not have permits to reside and/or work in South Africa. The majority of the surveyed Zimbabwean enterprises were in the retail, trade and wholesale sector, followed by services and manufacturing. Most migrants did not start an informal business immediately on arrival in South Africa but first raised start-up capital through regular and casual employment. Against this backdrop, the report focuses on the findings from the in-depth interviews with Zimbabwean entrepreneurs. First, we review their experience of xenophobia and xenophobic violence. Most of the respondents recounted incidents of violence that had personally affected them. These accounts revealed a number of common features: To migrants, much of the violence occurs without warning and appears spontaneous. However, this is rarely the case as many attacks are preceded by community meetings from which migrants are excluded. They, therefore, have little ability or time to take evasive action. The perpetrators of xenophobic violence are often from the same community and are even personally known to their victims. The fact that migrant entrepreneurs provide goods, including food, at competitive prices and offer credit to consumers is clearly insufficient to protect them when violence erupts. In many areas, community leaders are ineffective in dealing with the violence and, in some cases, they actively foment hostility and instigate attacks. The looting of stock on the premises is a constant feature of the attacks. However, robbery per se is not the prime motive for the attacks. Virtually all agreed that the purpose of the attacks was not simply to steal certain desirable goods but to destroy their business premises and operations so that they could not continue to operate and would go back to Zimbabwe. South African business owners in the same vicinity are left alone during crowd violence. Attacks often involved vicious physical assaults against the person, accompanied by insulting xenophobic language. Many accounts describe how anti-government service delivery protests quickly disintegrate into mob violence and looting of shops owned by migrants. The looting is never indiscriminate and targets only migrants. Migrants feel that they are scapegoats for government failure to deliver services. There was some evidence of “violent entrepreneurship” involving attacks orchestrated by South African competitors. Xenophobic violence is gender-indiscrimate with male and female migrants recounting equally harrowing stories. The respondents differed on whether Zimbabweans were particular targets. Most said that all foreign-owned businesses were targeted. A number commented that the type of business made a difference, with food and grocery shops being especially vulnerable. The pervasive view amongst South African politicians is that xenophobia does not exist in the country. However, the term “xenophobia:” was used by all the rewspondents to describe the harassment and physical abuse that they experience and some even referred to the widespread violence in 2008 and 2015 as “the xenophobia.” The language and practices of xenophobia cow the victims into silence and a sense of helplessness. The interviews provide important insights into how migrant entrepreneurs respond to the threat and reality of xenophobic violence. Trying to “fit in “ and integrate by learning local languages, dress codes and cultural practices is one way to try to pre-empt attacks. However, these strategies are no guarantee of protection when mob violence breaks out. Some suggested that there was safety in numbers and that conducting business in areas where there were many other migrant businesses reduced the risks of being attacked. The downside of operating in safer spaces is that business competition is extremely fierce. Most are aware that a great deal of the xenophobic violence is confined to low-income areas, particularly informal settlements. While it is possible for some to avoid doing business in these areas, and to operate in areas of the city where attacks are less frequent, this is not feasible for all. Many Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa do not have the financial means to afford accommodation outside informal settlements and do not have the resources to run a business elsewhere. Several respondents noted that the unpredictability of the attacks made it difficult to plan in advance. Some said that they made sure that they did not keep all of their stock at the place of business, storing some at home or in rented containers. All tried to minimize the amount of cash they kept on the premises. Various reactive strategies were mentioned, including temporarily ceasing business operations, staying indoors at home, and moving in with friends or relatives in other parts of the city. None of the respondents said that xenophobic attacks would put them permanently out of business. On the contrary, most said that they would simply raise the capital and start again. The logical implication of this is that xenophobic violence fails in its two main aims: to drive migrant entrepreneurs out of business and to drive them out of the country. Many respondents made reference to the fact that the crisis in Zimbabwe meant that there was nothing for them to return to, even if they wanted to return

South Africa Case Study: The Double Crisis – Mass Migration From Zimbabwe And Xenophobic Violence in South Africa

The protracted economic and political crisis in Zimbabwe led directly to a major increase in mixed migration flows to South Africa. Migrants were drawn from every sector of society, all education and skill levels, equal numbers of both sexes, and all ages (including unaccompanied child migration). Many migrants claimed asylum in South Africa which gave them the right to work while they waited for a refugee hearing. Many others were arrested and deported back to Zimbabwe. Migrants who were unable to find employment in the formal economy turned to employment and self-employment in the informal economy. These migrant entrepreneurs used personal savings to establish small and micro enterprises in many urban areas. The businesses focused on retail trading, manufacturing and services and contributed to the South African economy in various ways, including providing employment for South Africans. Nationwide xenophobic violence in 2008 targeted all migrants, irrespective of origin and legal status. From 2008 onwards, violent attacks on migrant-owned informal businesses began to escalate. This culminated in a second round of nationwide xenophobic violence in early 2015 when migrant-owned businesses were targeted by mobs. Migrants send essential remittances to family in Zimbabwe and return migration is not a viable or long-term response until Zimbabwe’s economic crisis is resolved. As a result, informal migrant entrepreneurs have adapted to hostile business conditions by adopting a range of strategies to avoid and protect themselves and their businesses from xenophobia. Against this backdrop, this report first discusses the nature of the crisis in Zimbabwe and its connections with large-scale out-migration, particularly to South Africa. The South African response to crisis-driven migration is reviewed showing how the government shifted from a predominantly coercive and control-oriented policy towards a more realistic assessment of the need to accommodate migrants through an immigration amnesty and the right to work in the formal and informal sector. One of the major challenges facing migrants and all stakeholders in South Africa is xenophobic violence. Nationwide attacks on migrants and refugees in 2008 and 2015 have been interspersed with ongoing lower-level episodes of violence. These attacks have increasingly targeted migrants and refugees, including many Zimbabweans, seeking to make a living in the country’s urban informal economy. The research for this report focused on the business activities and responses to xenophobic violence of Zimbabweans in the informal economy. Amongst the key findings were the following: • Between 20-30% of Zimbabwean migrants in South African cities are involved in the informal economy and the importance of informal sector employment to Zimbabweans has increased over time. • Zimbabweans operating enterprises in the informal economy are predominantly young (50- 75% under the age of 35) and male (60-70%). • Nearly two-thirds of the migrant entrepreneurs arrived in South Africa in the peak years of the Zimbabwean crisis between 2000 and 2010 (42%). Another 32% migrated after 2010. Less than 2% migrated to South Africa before the end of apartheid. • Economic hardship, unemployment and political persecution are the main push drivers of migration to South Africa. Pull drivers include the assistance of relatives already in South Africa and the prospect of employment. • The majority of the Zimbabwean migrant enterprises are in the retail, trade and wholesale sector, followed by services and manufacturing. Around three-quarters of the migrants relied on their personal savings to start their businesses and many worked in the formal economy first. • Business expansion has occurred despite the prime obligation of the entrepreneurs to support family still in Zimbabwe. Instead of reinvesting all of the business profits into further expansion, a portion is therefore diverted into remittance channels. Over one-third remit funds at least once per month and only 12% never send remittances. • A significant number of the entrepreneurs had been victims of or knew other who had been victims of crime such as looting and robbery, xenophobic abuse and police misconduct abuse. The report then presents the results of in-depth interviews with Zimbabwean business-owners who had experienced xenophobic violence in 2008 and 2015 or at other times. The narratives of the migrants provide insights into the unpredictable nature of the violence, their vulnerability to attack, the loss of business goods and property during mob violence and the need to restart from scratch, and the various strategies that they adopt to reduce risk. These strategies include operating in safer areas (not feasible for all), avoiding areas where corrupt police tend to operate, paying for protection and flight when xenophobic violence erupts. Return to Zimbabwe is not considered a viable option because of the economic conditions there. The interviews also provide insights into the migrants’ perceptions of government and stakeholder responses to the xenophobic violence. Almost without exception, the migrants felt that neither government (the Zimbabwean or South African) had done anything to protect or assist them during and after the violence. This perception of inaction also extended to international and non-governmental organisations. The migrants were particularly harsh in their comments about the police who were widely seen as either conniving in the violence or uninterested in protecting migrants. The perceptions of the migrants that nothing is done may simply be a function of who was interviewed and does not necessarily reflect the actual reality. The report therefore evaluates the response of the South African government to the ongoing crisis of xenophobia and concludes that some actions – such as sending in the army – are taken during episodes of nationwide violence but that ongoing daily and weekly attacks are generally ignored. There is a strong official line that these attacks are not motivated by xenophobia and. Indeed, that xenophobia does not even exist. This is clearly contradicted by the migrants who view the attacks as motivated by xenophobia. A second element of the official response is that the migrants are partially to blame for what happens to them as their business success builds resentment amongst South Africans. Government has yet to acknowledge that migrant-owned informal enterprises make a valuable contribution to the economy of the country, including through job creation for South Africans. The primary response to the violence of 2015 was the launching of a military-style Operation Fiela which was justified as a crime-fighting initiative but appears to have targeted migrant enterprises. The final sections of the report examine the responses and programmes of various non-governmental and international organisations to the crisis of xenophobia. During large-scale xenophobic violence there is considerable mobilisation of anti-xenophobia civil society organisations to offer protection and protest. Their effectiveness and impact tends to dissipate when the violence is more scattered and random. The South African Human Rights Commission (SAHRC) has played a major role in the past in holding government to account and articulating extensive recommendations for remedial action, most of which have not been taken up and many of which are still highly relevant. International organisations have tended to target integration and education programming at the community level but there has only been one systematic evaluation (of the UNHCR’s response) which was highly critical of the organisation. These organisations and other governments are considerably hamstrung by xenophobia denialism at the highest level because it means that government will avoid the kinds of partnership that are urgently needed to address this endemic crisis

Analysis of permanent magnets as elasmobranch bycatch reduction devices in hook-and-line and longline trials

Previous studies indicate that elasmobranch fishes (sharks, skates and rays) detect the Earth’s geomagnetic field by indirect magnetoreception through electromagnetic induction, using their ampullae of Lorenzini. Applying this concept, we evaluated the capture of elasmobranchs in the presence of permanent magnets in hook-and-line and inshore longline fishing experiments. Hooks with neodymium-iron-boron magnets significantly reduced the capture of elasmobranchs overall in comparison with control and procedural control hooks in the hook-and-line experiment. Catches of Atlantic sharpnose shark (Rhizoprionodon terraenovae) and smooth dogfish (Mustelus canis) were signif icantly reduced with magnetic hook-and-line treatments, whereas catches of spiny dogfish (Squalus acanthias) and clearnose skate (Raja eglanteria) were not. Longline hooks with barium-ferrite magnets significantly reduced total elasmobranch capture when compared with control hooks. In the longline study, capture of blacktip sharks (Carcharhinus limbatus) and southern stingrays (Dasyatis americana) was reduced on magnetic hooks, whereas capture of sandbar shark (Carcharhinus plumbeus) was not affected. Teleosts, such as red drum (Sciaenops ocellatus), Atlantic croaker (Micropogonias undulatus), oyster toadfish (Opsanus tau), black sea bass (Centropristis striata), and the bluefish (Pomatomas saltatrix), showed no hook preference in either hook-and-line or longline studies. These results indicate that permanent magnets, although eliciting species-specific capture trends, warrant further investigation in commercial longline and recreational fisheries, where bycatch mortality is a leading contributor to declines in elasmobranch populations

Mapping Dirac gaugino masses

We investigate the mapping of Dirac gaugino masses through regions of strong coupling, focussing on SQCD with an adjoint. These models have a well-known Kutasov duality, under which a weakly coupled electric UV description can flow to a different weakly coupled magnetic IR description. We provide evidence to show that Dirac gaugino mass terms map as lim μ→∞ m D gk 1 k+1 =lim μ→0 m ˜ D g ˜ k ˜ 1 k+1 under such a flow, where the coupling κ appears in the superpotential of the canonically normalised theory as W ⊃ κXk+1. This combination is an RG-invariant to all orders in perturbation theory, but establishing the mapping in its entirety is not straightforward because Dirac masses are not the spurions of holomorphic couplings in the N = 1 theory. To circumvent this, we first present evidence that deforming the Kutasov theory can make it flow to an N = 2 theory with parametrically small N = 1 deformations. This is shown to happen perturbatively in the weakly coupled theory, and we also identify the higgsing mechanism that has to take place in the dual theory. This is seen to occur correctly even when both theories are at strong coupling. Using harmonic superspace techniques we then identify the prepotential that can induce the same N = 1 deformations in the presence of electric and magnetic FI-terms. We show that the correct N = 1 scalar potential and fermion lagrangian are generated. It is then shown that pure Dirac mass terms can be induced by the same mechanism, and we find that the proposed RG-invariant is indeed preserved under N = 2 duality, and thence along the flow to the dual N = 1 Kutasov theories. Possible phenomenological applications are discussed

Worldline theories with towers of internal states

We study particle theories that have a tower of worldline internal degrees of freedom. Such a theory can arise when the worldsheet of closed strings is dimensionally reduced to a worldline, in which case the tower is infinite with regularly spaced masses. But our discussion is significantly more general than this, and there is scope to consider all kinds of internal degrees of freedom carried by the propagating particle. For example it is possible to consider towers corresponding to other geometries, or towers with no obvious geometric interpretation that still yield a modular invariant theory. Truncated towers generate non-local particle theories that share with string theory the property of having a Gross-Mende-like saddle point in their amplitudes. This provides a novel framework for constructing exotic theories which may have desirable properties such as finiteness and modular invariance

No. 49: Gender, Migration and Remittances in Southern Africa

Migrant remittances have become an important source of income for many developing countries, exceeding official development assistance. As a result, migration and remittance behaviour are becoming a growing focus of international attention. Understanding the processes and patterns of remittance behaviour can help shed light on their usage and impact, both on recipient households and on wider socio-economic development in migrant-origin countries. One key aspect of such an understanding is the gender dynamics of migration and remittance practices. Globally, there is evidence of the feminization of migrant flows, with women increasingly migrating as independent migrants in their own right. Female migrants maintain strong ties to family members in their home countries. These include significant flows of remittances, of both cash and goods, sent to family members at home. Southern Africa has a long history of cross-border migration and associated flows of remittances. Although cross-border economic migration in the region has been dominated by male migrant labour to the South African mining industry, women have also engaged in movement across the region’s borders for purposes of seeking work. Evidence suggests that female migration in the region, especially to South Africa, has increased significantly over the past 10-15 years. Little is known about the nature of migrant women’s remittances and their impact on the households that receive them, nor about the changing patterns of male and female migration over the past decade. SAMP devised the Migration and Remittances Surveys (MARS) to provide nationally-representative data on remittance flows and usage at the household level for five SADC countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. SAMP-led research teams in each country conducted the survey using a standardized questionnaire and sampling strategy. Households were randomly selected and included in the survey only if they had members who were cross-border migrants working outside the country. The MARS survey collected two different types of data: data on individual household members, both migrant and non-migrant, and data on migrant-sending households. In total, 4,700 household interviews were conducted in the five countries and information collected on over 30,000 people. In addition to questions about migrant destinations, occupations and demographics, questions were asked about remittance behaviour, the methods used for remittance transfer, the role of remittances in the migrant-sending household economy, and the impact of migrant remittances on migrant-sending households. Gender-related variables were included in the survey through a question asking the sex of individual household members, and also in terms of household headship, marital status, relationship to the head of household, and household type (e.g. female- or male-centered; nuclear or extended). The overall survey findings have been presented in an earlier SAMP report (Migration Policy Series No. 44). Building on that earlier report, this report presents a gender breakdown and analysis of the MARS findings. As the Botswana sample included only a very small number of female migrants, Botswana has been left out of the analysis and so the report covers the four countries of Lesotho, Mozambique, Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Gender analysis reveals significant gender-based differences in migrant demographics, including divergent patterns and trends between male and female migrants in terms of their age and marital status. Yet it also reveals striking similarities between male and female migrants in terms of the nature, role and impact of their remittances. The main findings in terms of migrant demographics and migration trends for men and women are as follows: Cross-border migration in the region remains dominated by men. Overall, just over 15% of the migrants identified in the MARS sample were women. The proportion of women amongst migrants varies widely from country to country. Zimbabwe stands out as the country with by far the highest proportion of migrants who are female, at 43.6%, with Lesotho a distant second at 16.4%. In the other countries surveyed, the proportion of migrants who are female was found to be below 10%. Although the lack of reliable benchmark data makes it impossible to quantify, the MARS data suggests that there has been an increase in female migration over the period 1994-2004. Compared to female migrants, a relatively higher proportion of male migrants had been migrating for periods of over a decade - except in the case of Zimbabwe, where extensive out-migration is a more recent phenomenon for both men and women. The type of women who migrate appears to have undergone significant changes. Migration surveys conducted by SAMP in the late 1990s showed that female migrants were more likely to be older and to be married than male cross-border migrants. MARS findings show that today’s female migrants are younger and less likely to be married than male migrants. The proportion of female migrants in the younger, 15-24 age bracket is significantly higher than the equivalent proportion for males in Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland. In these same three countries, men are correspondingly over-represented in the older, 40-59 age bracket compared to women. Zimbabwean male and female migrants’ age profiles were roughly equivalent, with the majority in the 25-39 age bracket. In all four countries, and especially in Mozambique and Swaziland, the category containing the highest proportion of female migrants was ‘daughter’ – almost three-quarters of the female migrants in Mozambique and two-thirds in Swaziland. These countries’ female migrants thus most closely conform to the historical pattern of migration to South Africa being dominated by young, unmarried adults. On the male side of the equation, migration appears to be increasing among older, married heads of household. Some 76% of male migrants from Lesotho and 61% of those from Swaziland are heads of their household. Male migration from Mozambique is still dominated by sons (49%); that from Zimbabwe is more or less equally divided between sons and household heads. This suggests that for men, migration is becoming a career path rather than just a temporary phenomenon at a particular stage in younger men’s lives, whereas young single women are engaging in migration practices traditionally found amongst young single men. In Lesotho, Mozambique and Zimbabwe, female migrants revealed higher levels of divorce, separation, abandonment and widowhood than their male counterparts. This is especially true of Lesotho, where 24% of female migrants are widows and a further 20% divorced or separated. These women are likely to be the primary or sole breadwinner for their families. Female migration and female household headship appear to be closely linked. Among female migrants, the proportion coming from female-centred households, having no husband or male partner, was 43% for Lesotho, 41% for Mozambique, 31% for Swaziland and 28% for Zimbabwe. In addition, 24% of the female migrants from Lesotho and 17% of those from Zimbabwe, the two countries with the highest proportions of women among their migrants, were themselves household heads. Male migrants hail predominantly from male-headed, nuclear or extended-family households. Female migrants from Lesotho and Swaziland are better educated than male migrants. Men from these countries are over-represented in the categories of ‘none’ or ‘primary’ education, while women migrants are more likely than men to have some secondary schooling. Mozambique has the least educated migrants of the four countries, with close to three quarters of both male and female migrants having only primary education. Zimbabwean male and female migrants have roughly equivalent education profiles, with a highly educated migrant cohort in which over 75% have secondary education or above. The geographical and economic profiles of male and female migration also display both similarities and divergences. Here, the main findings are as follows: For both male and female migrants, the main destination is South Africa. Lesotho’s migration is almost entirely (99%) to South Africa, as is that of Swazi men. Some women migrants from Swaziland can be found working in countries beyond the region (13.5%). Mozambique sends small numbers of migrants, especially women, to Swaziland, Botswana and other SADC countries in addition to South Africa. Zimbabwe is again the exception, with only one third of its migrants (male and female) in South Africa and 40% working in countries beyond Southern Africa. Perhaps the greatest difference between male and female migrants is in their activity and employment profiles. Minework is still the predominant form of employment for male migrants from Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique. Almost 80% of male migrants from Lesotho and two-thirds from Swaziland work on the South African mines. In the case of Mozambique, the figure is one-third. Male migrants from Mozambique also work in a range of non-mining occupations including skilled and unskilled manual labour (18%). Zimbabwe’s more educated male migrants work in professional and service occupations, while others are engaged in trade. Few men from the other three countries listed trade as an occupation. In general, women migrants are spread across a wider range of occupations than their male counterparts. Relative to male migrants, female migrants are less likely to be in formal employment and more likely to be engaged in informal economic activity. Trading is a significant economic activity for female migrants from all four countries, with trade being particularly important as an occupation for women from Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Domestic service is a more significant form of employment for women from Lesotho and Swaziland. Informal sector production is another important occupation for female migrants. Agricultural, manual and ‘other service’ work occupy a small but significant number of migrant women. Among more skilled women, professional and office occupations are common, and 16% of Zimbabwe’s female migrants are employed in the health sector. Given this gender difference in occupation and employment, any similarities or differences between men and women in their remittance practices, and in the extent to which their households depend on those remittances, are of interest. The MARS findings outlined below demonstrate the extent and significance of remittance income to recipient households. For most migrant-sending households, migrant remittances form the main source of household income, although male migrants’ remittances are more likely to be the primary or sole source of income for their households. Lesotho has the highest incidence of households reporting remittance earnings, followed by Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Swaziland. Households reporting remittance income from male and female migrants respectively in each of the four countries was: Lesotho 96% (M) and 90% (F); Zimbabwe 85% (M) and 78% (F); Mozambique 77% (M) and 65% (F); and Swaziland 63% (M) and 64% (F). The amounts of money remitted by female migrants are significantly lower than those of male migrants, in part reflecting women migrants’ lower levels of income and employment security. Gender differences are most stark in Mozambique and Lesotho. Zimbabwe’s more gender-equivalent migration profile is again borne out in the remittance data, with men and women remitting similar amounts. The median annual values of remittances received by male migrant-sending households were: R9,600 in Lesotho; R2,011 in Mozambique; R2,400 in Swaziland; and R1,093 in Zimbabwe. For households sending female migrants, median remittance receipts were: R3,600 in Lesotho; R302 in Mozambique; R1,800 in Swaziland; and R1,093 in Zimbabwe. Despite remitting less than men, Lesotho’s female migrants still remit larger sums than female migrants from any of the other three countries: twice as much as second-placed Swaziland, three times as much as women from Zimbabwe, and ten times as much as women from Mozambique. This probably reflects the higher incidence of household headship among Lesotho’s women migrants, possibly along with higher earnings than women from other countries (e.g. as domestic workers rather than informal traders). Lesotho’s migrant-sending households displayed the highest dependence on remittance earnings, reporting fewer alternative sources of income. By contrast, many households in the other three countries had remittances as part of a bundle of incomeearning strategies, including wage work, casual work and formal or informal business, although remittances remain their primary source of income. Multiple sources of income were found especially among households sending female migrants. Female migrants remit lower sums, making other household income sources a necessity. Women are also less likely than men to be household heads, which means that they are often members of households with other working adult members. The proportion of female migrants sending home goods is slightly higher than the equivalent proportion of male migrants, especially in Zimbabwe (72% of women, 62% of men) and to a lesser extent Lesotho (23% of women, 20% of men). In Mozambique and Swaziland, male and female migrants were equally likely to remit goods, at 65% and 16% respectively. Zimbabwe and Mozambique had the highest incidence of non-monetary remittances, whereas monetary remittances were much more significant in Lesotho and Swaziland. The significance and impact of both male and female migrants’ remittances is evident in the contribution of remittances to household expenditure and the stated importance of remittances by recipient households: Household expenditure data show that the main household purchases for both male and female migrant-sending households are the basic commodities of food, domestic fuel and clothing, and fundamental services such as schooling, health care and transport. While the rank order of items purchased is broadly similar or even identical for male and female migrant-sending households, gender differences emerge in the actual proportion of households reporting a particular expenditure. In Lesotho, in almost every category, expenditure in the past month was reported by more male than female-migrant households. Gender-based patterns are more mixed in Mozambique, although lower proportions of female migrant-sending households reported expenditure in the key categories of food, clothing, medical expenses, education and transport. In Swaziland, there is no clear or consistent overall difference based on migrant gender. Zimbabwe displays the strongest similarity between expenditure in male and in female migrantsending households, consistent with findings from the rest of the survey in that country. Certainly in Lesotho and Mozambique, female migrant-sending households do thus appear to be poorer than male migrant-sending households. There are also important gender differences, as well as differences between countries, in the estimated amounts of monthly expenditure on particular categories of expenses. Women migrants from Lesotho and Mozambique come from households with lower monthly expenditures, in almost every category, than households with male migrants. Swaziland displays the opposite gender pattern. Swazi households where the migrant members are female spend more in each category than households with male migrant members. Zimbabwe again stands out as the country with strongest gender similarity, suggesting that its male and female migrants come from similar sorts of households in socio-economic terms. As the primary source of income for the majority of households, remittance earnings are vital in enabling households to meet their basic needs. Food is the most common annual expenditure of remittance money in all four countries and in both male and female migrant-sending households. Second in all countries is either clothing or school fees. Clothing or school fees also rank third in all countries except Swaziland, where purchases of agricultural inputs rank above clothing. Remittances do not appear to be spent on non-essential or luxury items; but nor are they commonly directed towards savings or investment in business or other productive activities. They are, however, significant in sources of investment in children’s education. Remittance-receiving households confirmed the significance of remittances to food purchases. The most consistent importance rating, across countries and migrant genders, is food, with school fees and clothes also rated highly by many. There are some gender differences, with men’s remittances seemingly more crucial to the purchase of basic livelihood items such as food, than women’s. Given that men are older, more likely to be married, and more often the heads of households than female migrants, it is perhaps surprising that this gender difference is not greater. Remittances of goods are also focused on basic household commodities. The ‘typical’ male or female migrant sends home money, which their households use to buy food and other basic goods and services, and brings home clothing, food and other goods. Some consumer goods and other ‘luxury’ items (e.g. electronic goods) are also sent home, as they are more readily available and cheaper in South Africa. In addition to making regular remittances, migrants send home money in times of need, or to meet unexpected costs (such as funerals). Some gender differences are evident in these emergency remittances, although this is not consistent across all four countries. In Lesotho and Mozambique, a higher proportion of male migrants send money in times of need, whereas in Swaziland female migrants are more likely to do so. In Zimbabwe, once again, there is very little difference based on the gender of the migrant. Emergency remittances are clearly important to the households receiving them. They are seen as important or very important by over 90% of migrant-sending households in each of the four countries, with only very small differences on the basis of migrant gender. Emergency remittances appear to be especially significant to households in Swaziland and Zimbabwe. Perceptions of the overall impact of migration reinforce the overall positive contribution made by migrants: There is a generally favourable view of cross-border migration. Respondents in Zimbabwe are the most positive. Close to 90% regard the impact of migration as either positive or very positive, with only a small difference based on the gender of the migrant. Respondents in the other three countries were broadly positive, although more so for male than for female migration. Close to 70% of the male migrant-sending household respondents in Lesotho, Mozambique and Swaziland regard migration as having positive or very positive impacts. The respective values for each country’s female migrant-sending households were 59%, 53% and 64%. Perceptions of the positive impacts of working in another country reinforce the findings from income, expenditure and deprivation data i.e. that migrants support their households, improve living conditions and provide household income. Female migration is seen as providing the same sorts of benefits as male migration. While the economic benefits of migration are recognized, so too are some of its personal and social costs. These include loneliness, being away too long, and placing too much responsibility on family members left behind. The broad patterns are the same, irrespective of whether the migrant is male or female. Remittances clearly play a vital role in supporting Southern African households. Not only do migrants, whether male or female, demonstrate an unusually high tendency to send money home to their families, but those remittances are fundamental in enabling families to meet their everyday needs. Remittance behaviour and the role of remittances in the household economy differ only slightly based on the gender of the migrant. This demonstrates that women’s migration, while lower in volume than male migration, is nevertheless highly important to the migrant-sending household. Given that so many female migrants come from female-centred households, with no husband or male partner, women’s migration is especially significant to such households as the primary – often only – source of household income. The MARS data also suggest that differences between male and female migration, and between male and female migrants, are starting to diminish. Certainly young, unmarried women appear to be engaging in ‘economic’ migration more than they did previously, while male migration is extending into broader spheres of economic activity, both formal and informal, as well as into older age cohorts. If the patterns and trends identified here are both valid and sustained, women’s cross-border migration in the region looks set to increase in extent and socio-economic significance