835 research outputs found

    Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers

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    This Article reviews our comprehensive survey of written opinions from cases in federal courts prior to January 1, 2010, involving motions for sanctions relating to the discovery of electronically stored information (ESI) We analyzed each case for various factors, including date, court, type of case, sanctioning authority, sanctioned party, sanctioned misconduct, sanction type, sanctions to counsel, if any, and the protections provided from sanctions by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) The survey identified 401 sanction cases and 230 sanction awards and showed that sanction motions and awards have increased over time, particularly in the last five years Sanctions against counsel are rare but are also increasing Sanction motions have been filed in all types of cases and in courts across the country Failure to produce ESI is the most common basis for sanctions Courts have used a variety of different rules, statutes, and powers to sanction parties for e-disco very violations, including Rule 37 and the inherent power of the court, and courts impose many different sanction types on e-discovery violators, including the severe sanctions of dismissal, default Judgment, adverse jury instructions, and sizeable monetary awards Rule 37(e) has not provided broad protection from such sanction

    Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the Numbers

    Get PDF
    This Article reviews our comprehensive survey of written opinions from cases in federal courts prior to January 1, 2010, involving motions for sanctions relating to the discovery of electronically stored information (ESI) We analyzed each case for various factors, including date, court, type of case, sanctioning authority, sanctioned party, sanctioned misconduct, sanction type, sanctions to counsel, if any, and the protections provided from sanctions by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) The survey identified 401 sanction cases and 230 sanction awards and showed that sanction motions and awards have increased over time, particularly in the last five years Sanctions against counsel are rare but are also increasing Sanction motions have been filed in all types of cases and in courts across the country Failure to produce ESI is the most common basis for sanctions Courts have used a variety of different rules, statutes, and powers to sanction parties for e-disco very violations, including Rule 37 and the inherent power of the court, and courts impose many different sanction types on e-discovery violators, including the severe sanctions of dismissal, default Judgment, adverse jury instructions, and sizeable monetary awards Rule 37(e) has not provided broad protection from such sanction

    Relationship between perceived and actual quality of data checking

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    Data quality is critical to reaching correct research conclusions. Researchers attempt to ensure that they have accurate data by checking the data after it has been entered. Previous research has demonstrated that some methods of data checking are better than others, but not all researchers use the best methods. Perhaps researchers continue to use less optimal data checking methods because they mistakenly believe that they are highly accurate. The purpose of this study was to examine the relationship between perceived data quality and actual data quality. A total of 29 participants completed this study. Participants checked that letters and numbers had been entered correctly into the computer using one of three randomly assigned data checking methods. Afterwards, they rated the quality of their data checking method. The sample correlations between perceived and actual data quality were small to moderate and confidence intervals for the population correlations did not include high values. We conclude that the relationship between actual and perceived data quality is not high

    Introducing Disruptive Technology to Criminal Sanctions: Punishment by Computer Monitoring to Enhance Sentencing Fairness and Efficiency

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    The United States criminal justice system is the most punitive on earth. The total correctional population is nearly seven million, equating to a staggering one in thirty-eight adults. Most of the correctional population comprises offenders who are on parole or probation, and a high portion of these defendants who are on parole or probation reoffend during the sanction period. There has been a growing consensus among lawmakers and the wider community that reforms need to be implemented to reduce the cost of criminal sanctions and to improve their effectiveness. For example, the United States Sentencing Commission has recently proposed an amendment to increase the availability of sentences as alternatives to incarceration. Yet, with little hint of exaggeration, the sentencing system remains in a primitive state when it comes to adopting technological advances. This article seeks to address this failing as a means of overcoming the main shortcomings of current common criminal sanctions. Forty years ago, it was suggested that the most effective way to deal with crime was to assign a police officer to watch over each offender’s every move. The proposal was dubbed “cop-a-con,” and was unviable due to its excessive costs. Yet, technological advances now make this concept, or a similar concept, achievable in a cost-effective manner. This article argues that the sanctions that are currently utilized to deal with the most serious offenders—namely imprisonment, probation, and parole—can be replaced with technological monitoring, which can more efficiently, effectively, and humanely achieve the appropriate objectives of sentencing. Technological disruption in the criminal justice sector is not only desirable, but it is also imperative. Financial pressures and normative principles mandate that the United States can no longer remain the world’s most punitive nation. This article proposes a monitoring sanction using technological advances. This solution has the potential to more efficiently and economically impose proportionate punishment than current probation and parole systems do, while enhancing public safety

    Amateur-to-Amateur

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    Copyright, it is commonly said, matters in society because it encourages the production of socially beneficial, culturally significant expressive content. Our focus on copyright\u27s recent history, however, blinds us to the social information practices that have always existed. In this Article, we examine these social information practices, and query copyright\u27s role within them. We posit a functional model of what is necessary for creative content to move from creator to user. These are the functions dealing with the creation, selection, production, dissemination, promotion, sale, and use of expressive content. We demonstrate how centralized commercial control of information content has been the driving force behind copyright\u27s expansion. All of the functions that copyright industries once controlled, however, are undergoing revolutionary decentralization and disintermediation. Different aspects of information technology, notably the digitization of information, widespread computer ownership, the rise of the Internet, and the development of social software, threaten the viability and desirability of centralized control over every one of the content functions. These functions are increasingly being performed by individuals and disaggregated groups. This raises an issue for copyright as the main regulatory force in information practices: copyright assumes a central control requirement that no longer applies for the development of expressive content. We examine the normative implications of this shift for our information policy in this new post-copyright era. Most notably, we conclude that copyright law needs to be adjusted in order to recognize the opportunity and desirability of decentralized content, and the expanded marketplace of ideas it promises

    Erasing the Bias Against Using Artificial Intelligence to Predict Future Criminality: Algorithms are Color Blind and Never Tire

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    Many problems in the criminal justice system would be solved if we could accurately determine which offenders would commit offenses in the future. The likelihood that a person will commit a crime in the future is the single most important consideration that influences sentencing outcomes. It is relevant to the objectives of community protection, specific deterrence, and rehabilitation. The risk of future offending is also a cardinal consideration in bail and probation decisions. Empirical evidence establishes that judges are poor predictors of future offending—their decisions are barely more accurate than the toss of a coin. This undermines the efficacy and integrity of the criminal justice system. Modern artificial intelligence systems are much more accurate in determining if a defendant will commit future crimes. Yet, the move towards using artificial intelligence in the criminal justice system is slowing because of increasing concerns regarding the lack of transparency of algorithms and claims that the algorithms are imbedded with biased and racist sentiments. Criticisms have also been leveled at the reliability of algorithmic determinations. In this Article, we undertake an examination of the desirability of using algorithms to predict future offending and in the process analyze the innate resistance that human have towards deferring decisions of this nature to computers. It emerges that most people have an irrational distrust of computer decision-making. This phenomenon is termed “algorithmic aversion.” We provide a number of recommendations regarding the steps that are necessary to surmount algorithmic aversion and lay the groundwork for the development of fairer and more efficient sentencing, bail, and probation systems

    Technological Incarceration and the End of the Prison Crisis

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    The United States imprisons more of its people than any nation on Earth, and by a considerable margin. Criminals attract little empathy and have no political capital. Consequently, it is not surprising that, over the past forty years, there have been no concerted or unified efforts to stem the rapid increase in incarceration levels in the United States. Nevertheless, there has recently been a growing realization that even the world’s biggest economy cannot readily sustain the $80 billion annual cost of imprisoning more than two million of its citizens. No principled, wide-ranging solution has yet been advanced, however. To resolve the crisis, this Article proposes a major revolution to the prison sector that would see technology, for the first time, pervasively incorporated into the punishment of criminals and result in the closure of nearly all prisons in the United States. The alternative to prison that we propose involves the fusion of three technological systems. First, offenders would be required to wear electronic ankle bracelets that monitor their location and ensure they do not move outside of the geographical areas to which they would be confined. Second, prisoners would be compelled to wear sensors so that unlawful or suspicious activity could be monitored remotely by computers. Third, conducted energy devices would be used remotely to immobilize prisoners who attempt to escape their areas of confinement or commit other crimes. The integrated systems described in this Article could lead to the closure of more than 95% of prisons in the United States. We demonstrate that the technological and surveillance devices can achieve all of the appropriate objectives of imprisonment, including the imposition of proportionate punishment and community protection. In our proposal, only offenders who have committed capital offenses or equivalent crimes, or who attempt to escape from technological custody, would remain in conventional brick-and-mortar prisons. As a result, our proposal would convert prisons from a major societal industry to a curious societal anomaly. If these reforms are implemented, the United States would spend a fraction of the amount currently expended on conventional prisons on a normatively superior mechanism for dealing with society’s criminals

    Amateur-to-amateur: The rise of a new creative culture

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    This 2006 article argues: It is commonly said that copyright matters because it encourages the production of socially beneficial, culturally significant expressive content. Excessive focus on copyright law and policy, however, can obscure other information practices that also produce beneficial and useful expression. The functions that make up the creative cycle -- creation, selection, production, dissemination, promotion, sale, and use of expressive content-- have historically been carried out and controlled by centralized commercial actors. However, all of those functions are undergoing revolutionary decentralization and disintermediation. Different aspects of information technology, notably the digitization of information, widespread computer ownership, the rise of the Internet, and the development of social networking software, threaten both the viability and the desirability of centralized control over the steps in the creative cycle. Those functions are being performed increasingly by individuals and disorganized, distributed groups. This raises questions about copyright as the main regulatory force in creative information practices. Copyright law assumes a central control structure that applies less well to the creative content cycle with each passing year. Copyright law should be adjusted to recognize and embrace a distributed, decentralized creative cycle and the expanded marketplace of ideas it promises
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