5,407 research outputs found

    Ethics in Transaction Cost Economics

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    This paper provides Aristotelian virtue ethics analysis of decisions regarding the UN internal oversight governance structures focused on Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory. We explore “probity” and “independence” transactions’ attributes through historical narrative case based research to answer to the question – Why consecutive decisions to strengthen internal oversight structures did not relieve “probity” hazards? Our analysis shows that, at the UN, increased oversight governance structures, i.e. incentives, did not relieve probity/ethics hazards as predicted in TCE (Williamson, 1999). It follows that executive powers’ as well as overseers’ systematically trumpeted the UN “rules of the game”, breaching probity/ethics, disregarding the oversight independence prerogative as well as the UN Charter failing to contribute to the “common good” and to protect the UN mission. It also follows that, as it stands by now, the internal oversight mechanism design is deffective insofar as the UN Charter, positions the Secretary-General in constant conflict of interest empowering he/she with both executive and judiciary powers. We apply Williamson’s Public and Private Bureaucracies TCE for the first time. It results that it should be modified to include “virtue ethics” behavioral assumption as a transaction costs’ reduction device and explanatory framework for ethical failures abandoning the opportunism behavioral assumption.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

    the case of the internal oversight at the United Nations through the lens of public and private bureaucracies transaction cost economics

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    Funding text: The second author of the paper acknowledges that this work was funded by Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia (UID/ECO/00124/2013 and Social Sciences Data Lab, Project 22209) by POR Lisboa (Lisboa-01-0145-FEDER-007722 and Social Sciences Data Lab, Project 22209) and POR Norte (Social Sciences Data Lab, Project 22209).Purpose: Through a case study on the governance structures of the UN, the purpose of this paper is to develop a critique of Public and Private Bureaucracies Transaction Cost Economics (PPBTCE) (Williamson, 1999) as a theoretical lens to analyze internal oversight structures. Design/methodology/approach: The authors explore “probity” and “independence” transactions’ attributes through historical narrative case-based research to answer the question – Why did numerous attempts to strengthen the governance of UN internal oversight structures not relieve “probity” hazards? Findings: The analysis shows that at the UN increasing and strengthening the governance of oversight structures, i.e., incentives, did not relieve probity/ethics hazards as predicted in PPBTCE. Secretaries-General and UN General Assembly, entities charged with oversight powers, systematically trumpeted the UN Charter, breaching probity/ethics and disregarding the supervisory independence prerogative of internal oversight structures, hence failing to contribute to the “common good” and to protect the UN mission. Originality/value: This paper is the first application of PPBTCE to internal oversight transactions within an International organization context testing probity and independence attributes. The authors find that “independence” outweighs the “asset specificity” attribute whenever decisions on the governance of internal oversight arise. As far as sourcing decisions are concerned, the authority of the sovereign and the independence of the judiciary as well as quasi-judiciary transactions are not transferable attributes and, thus, cannot be contracted along with the actors’ ethics. PPBTCE should be modified to include, e.g. “virtues ethics” behavioral assumption as a transaction costs’ reduction device and explanatory framework for “probity” hazards, abandoning the opportunism behavioral assumption.publishersversionpublishe

    Auditor independence: a qualitative study of the perceptions of auditors

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    The trustworthiness of a financial audit report rests on the perception of auditor independence. However, several factors can affect those perceptions, ultimately affecting market confidence. This study aims at providing a deep understanding of auditors‟ perceptions of auditor independence, particularly analysing whether and how their perceptions are affected either by the provision of non-audit services, competition, the size and tenure of the audit firm or the client‟s financial condition. Qualitative research was held through semi-structured interviews. Both the provision of non-audit services and tenure have generated great consensus amongst interviewees as impacting auditor independence. Rotation and litigation exposure were mainly perceived as enhancement factors.info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersio

    Proactive and politically skilled professionals: What is the relationship with affective occupational commitment?

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    The aim of this study is to extend research on employee affective commitment in three ways: (1) instead of organizational commitment the focus is on occupational commitment; (2) the role of proactive personality on affective occupational commitment is examined; and (3) occupational satisfaction is examined as a mediator and political skills as moderator in the relationship between proactive personality and affective occupational commitment. Two connected studies, one in a hospital located in the private sector and one in a university located in the public sector, are carried out in Pakistan, drawing on a total sample of over 400 employees. The results show that proactive personality is positively related to affective occupational commitment, and that occupational satisfaction partly mediates the relationship between proactive personality and affective occupational commitment. No effect is found for a moderator effect of political skills in the relationship between proactive personality and affective occupational commitment. Political skills however moderate the relationship between proactive personality and affective organizational commitment
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