BENEVOLENT GOVERNMENT NOW

Mencian benevolent government intervenes dramatically in many ways in the marketplace in order to secure the material well-being of the population, especially the poor and disadvantaged. Mencius considers this sort of intervention to be appropriate not just occasionally when dealing with natural disasters, but regularly. Furthermore, Mencius recommends shifting from regressive to progressive taxes. He favors reduction of inequality so as to reduce corruption of government by the wealthy, and opposes punishment for people driven to crime by destitution. Mencius thinks government should try to improve the character of the population by preventing or relieving poverty, by setting a good example, and by teaching people to respect and care for each other. He considers a government to be legitimate only if it has the support of the people. His recommended foreign policy is approximately the same as his recommended domestic policy: set a good example and enhance the material wellbeing and moral values of ones own people so that they will enthusiastically support their country, while foreigners will long to immigrate. These are policies of todays left. Mencius was a radical reformer in his own day. His description of benevolent government shows that he is an extreme liberal by contemporary standards, too

Aristotle\u27s Account of Courage in EN III.6-9

I shall argue that Aristotle (a) does not limit courage to life- threatening situations on the battlefield; (b) is right to maintain that courage governs both fear and confidence; (c) applies a plausible doctrine of the mean to courage; (d) appropriately distinguishes courage from continence; and (e) does not affirm that courageous acts are overall pleasant for courageous people

Aristotle\u27s Account of the Virtue of Courage in Nicomachean Ethics III.6-9

Aristotle\u27s account of courage exhibits several general principles of his architectonic. First, Aristotle applies to courage what I have called the doctrine of disjoint spheres. (1) Each virtue has its own sphere completely separate from the spheres of all other virtues. Aristotle then goes on to narrow the sphere of courage by insisting correctly that courage governs only situations involving both fear and confidence. Aristotle does not make the mistake of further restricting courage to life-threatening situations. Like his accounts of other virtues, Aristotle\u27s account of courage involves several different parameters. (2) Each virtue is a disposition for getting all of the relevant parameters right. (3) People can go wrong with respect to some parameter without going wrong with respect to the others. This produces some character traits which are often mistaken for courage because they resemble courage in some respects. People can even be excessive with respect to some parameters while being defective with respect to others. They can be rash cowards. Aristotle neglects the duration parameter of courage. On the other hand, he rightly avoids the temptation to divide courage into a fear virtue and a confidence virtue. Aristotle\u27s account of courage conforms to his doctrine of the mean. (4) For each parameter there are two ways to go wrong. (5) A disposition for going to excess with respect to any parameter(s) is one vice; a disposition for being deficient with respect to any parameter(s) is the opposite vice; and a disposition for getting all of the parameters in a mean is virtue. Aristotle is committed to the plausible thesis that, if a person goes wrong with respect to some parameter then he or she goes to excess or defect with respect to some parameter, rather than the dubious thesis that if a person goes wrong with respect to some parameter then he or she goes to excess or defect with respect to that parameter. Virtue and vice are not the only sorts of character traits. (6) A disposition for getting choice and action right despite going wrong with respect to some other parameter(s) is continence; a disposition for getting choice right but action wrong because of going wrong with respect to some other parameter(s) is incontinence. (7) A disposition for going very wrong is brutishness. As long as we recognize that fear can push people to guard their safety not only by performing cowardly acts, but also by being careful about performing courageous acts, we will see that Aristotle does not conflate courage and continence. Aristotle does not contradict himself by maintaining that courageous acts both are and are riot pleasant for the courageous. (8) He believes that virtuous actions may produce both first order pleasures and first order pains for virtuous people. (9) However, virtuous people always enjoy the realization that they are performing virtuous acts. In the case of courage, the first order pains of courageous acts typically outweigh the pleasure of knowing that one is acting rightly except in cases where the courageous act achieves its external goal. Overall, Aristotle\u27s account of courage in NE III.6-9 illustrates many of the components of Aristotle\u27s architectonic of the virtues without going wrong in the five ways that critics have suggested. Therefore, Aristotle\u27s account of courage deserves more respect

Should Research Ethics Encourage the Production of Cost-Effective Interventions?

This project considers whether and how research ethics can contribute to the provision of cost-effective medical interventions. Clinical research ethics represents an underexplored context for the promotion of cost-effectiveness. In particular, although scholars have recently argued that research on less-expensive, less-effective interventions can be ethical, there has been little or no discussion of whether ethical considerations justify curtailing research on more expensive, more effective interventions. Yet considering cost-effectiveness at the research stage can help ensure that scarce resources such as tissue samples or limited subject popula- tions are employed where they do the most good; can support parallel efforts by providers and insurers to promote cost-effectiveness; and can ensure that research has social value and benefits subjects. I discuss and rebut potential objections to the consideration of cost-effectiveness in research, including the difficulty of predicting effectiveness and cost at the research stage, concerns about limitations in cost-effectiveness analysis, and worries about overly limiting researchers’ freedom. I then consider the advantages and disadvantages of having certain participants in the research enterprise, including IRBs, advisory committees, sponsors, investigators, and subjects, consider cost-effectiveness. The project concludes by qualifiedly endorsing the consideration of cost-effectiveness at the research stage. While incorporating cost-effectiveness considerations into the ethical evaluation of human subjects research will not on its own ensure that the health care system realizes cost-effectiveness goals, doing so nonetheless represents an important part of a broader effort to control rising medical costs

Aristotle's Peculiarly Human Psychology

For Aristotle, human cognition has a lot in common both with non-human animal cognition and with divine cognition. With non-human animals, humans share a non-rational part of the soul and non-rational cognitive faculties (DA 427b6–14, NE 1102b29 and EE 1219b24–6). With gods, humans share a rational part of the soul and rational cognitive faculties (NE 1177b17– 1178a8). The rational part and the non-rational part of the soul, however, coexist and cooperate only in human souls (NE 1102b26–9, EE 1219b28–31). In this chapter, I show that a study of this cooperation helps to uncover some distinctive aspects of human cognition and desire

Integrity and its counterfeits: Shakespeare’s Henriad

Abstract. The article will briefly and critically review philosophical views on integrity, focusing on integration, identity, standing up for moral principles and ethical decision making practice. It will explore integrity as Aristotle’s virtue of truthfulness, noting how this leads to engagement with the self and the social network. This demands the practice of responsibility, involving: critical agency (developing authorship of the ethical narrative), accountability (involving plural and mutual dialogue), and creative (positive) responsibility (involving both narrative and dialogue around action) In light of this dynamic and social view of integrity the second part the article explores counterfeit integrity. It distinguishes counterfeit integrity based in unexamined ideology and identity from counterfeit integrity based in intentional deception of others about beliefs, values and motives. Each of these are illustrated by figures from Shakespeare’s Henriad, and parallel cases in business and sport

Ten practical realities for institutional animal care and use committees when evaluating protocols dealing with fish in the field

Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee’s (IACUCs) serve an important role in ensuring that ethical practices are used by researchers working with vertebrate taxa including fish. With a growing number of researchers working on fish in the field and expanding mandates of IACUCs to regulate field work, there is potential for interactions between aquatic biologists and IACUCs to result in unexpected challenges and misunderstandings. Here we raise a number of issues often encountered by researchers and suggest that they should be taken into consideration by IACUCs when dealing with projects that entail the examination of fish in their natural environment or other field settings. We present these perspectives as ten practical realities along with their implications for establishing IACUC protocols. The ten realities are: (1) fish are diverse; (2) scientific collection permit regulations may conflict with IACUC policies; (3) stakeholder credibility and engagement may constrain what is possible; (4) more (sample size) is sometimes better; (5) anesthesia is not always needed or possible; (6) drugs such as analgesics and antibiotics should be prescribed with care; (7) field work is inherently dynamic; (8) wild fish are wild; (9) individuals are different, and (10) fish capture, handling, and retention are often constrained by logistics. These realities do not imply ignorance on the part of IACUCs, but simply different training and experiences that make it difficult for one to understand what happens outside of the lab where fish are captured and not ordered/purchased/reared, where there are engaged stakeholders, and where there is immense diversity (in size, morphology, behaviour, life-history, physiological tolerances) such that development of rigid protocols or extrapolation from one species (or life-stage, sex, size class, etc.) to another is difficult. We recognize that underlying these issues is a need for greater collaboration between IACUC members (including veterinary professionals) and field researchers which would provide more reasoned, rational and useful guidance to improve or maintain the welfare status of fishes used in field research while enabling researchers to pursue fundamental and applied questions related to the biology of fish in the field. As such, we hope that these considerations will be widely shared with the IACUCs of concerned researchers