Externismo de Davidson

Donald Davidson ha tenido un papel extremamente importante en lo que hoy se llama Externismo. Sin embargo, la formulación exacta de su externismo no es obvia porque sus compromisos están dispersos a lo largo de muchos de sus artículos. El objetivo de este trabajo es explorar los detalles de su externismo. Indicaremos que Davidson, sin duda defiende, que la mente no está auto-contenida. No obstante, tal idea tiene por lo menos dos sentidos distintos en su trabajo: por un lado, estados y contenidos mentales deben ser individuados, en parte, respecto a factores externos a la piel de uno, porque fueron causados por ellos; y por otro lado, estados y contenidos mentales deben ser individuados por factores externos porque la mente está constituida por conocimiento. Indicaremos que la relación entre estos dos niveles explicativos, aparentemente armoniosa, se vuelve conflictiva dentro del mismo programa davidsoniano. ______________________________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACTDonald Davidson has deeply contributed to what is nowadays called Externalism. However, the exact formulation of his externalism is not obvious since his externalist commitments are spread along many of his papers. The aim of this work is to explore the details of his externalism. We will point out that Davidson clearly defends that the mind is not self-contained. Nonetheless, this idea acquires at least two different senses under his view: on the one hand, mental states and contents must be individuated in part by factors external to one’s skin because the former were caused by the latter; and on the other hand, mental states and contents must be individuated in part by external factors because the mind is constituted by knowledge. We will point out that the apparently harmonious relation between those two levels of explanation turn out to be conflictive at a certain point within the very Davidsonian program

The genomic and transcriptional landscape of primary central nervous system lymphoma

Primary lymphomas of the central nervous system (PCNSL) are mainly diffuse large B-cell lymphomas (DLBCLs) confined to the central nervous system (CNS). Molecular drivers of PCNSL have not been fully elucidated. Here, we profile and compare the whole-genome and transcriptome landscape of 51 CNS lymphomas (CNSL) to 39 follicular lymphoma and 36 DLBCL cases outside the CNS. We find recurrent mutations in JAK-STAT, NFkB, and B-cell receptor signaling pathways, including hallmark mutations in MYD88 L265P (67%) and CD79B (63%), and CDKN2A deletions (83%). PCNSLs exhibit significantly more focal deletions of HLA-D (6p21) locus as a potential mechanism of immune evasion. Mutational signatures correlating with DNA replication and mitosis are significantly enriched in PCNSL. TERT gene expression is significantly higher in PCNSL compared to activated B-cell (ABC)-DLBCL. Transcriptome analysis clearly distinguishes PCNSL and systemic DLBCL into distinct molecular subtypes. Epstein-Barr virus (EBV)+ CNSL cases lack recurrent mutational hotspots apart from IG and HLA-DRB loci. We show that PCNSL can be clearly distinguished from DLBCL, having distinct expression profiles, IG expression and translocation patterns, as well as specific combinations of genetic alterations

The genomic and transcriptional landscape of primary central nervous system lymphoma

Primary lymphomas of the central nervous system (PCNSL) are mainly diffuse large B-cell lymphomas (DLBCLs) confined to the central nervous system (CNS). Molecular drivers of PCNSL have not been fully elucidated. Here, we profile and compare the whole-genome and transcriptome landscape of 51 CNS lymphomas (CNSL) to 39 follicular lymphoma and 36 DLBCL cases outside the CNS. We find recurrent mutations in JAK-STAT, NFkB, and B-cell receptor signaling pathways, including hallmark mutations in MYD88 L265P (67%) and CD79B (63%), and CDKN2A deletions (83%). PCNSLs exhibit significantly more focal deletions of HLA-D (6p21) locus as a potential mechanism of immune evasion. Mutational signatures correlating with DNA replication and mitosis are significantly enriched in PCNSL. TERT gene expression is significantly higher in PCNSL compared to activated B-cell (ABC)-DLBCL. Transcriptome analysis clearly distinguishes PCNSL and systemic DLBCL into distinct molecular subtypes. Epstein-Barr virus (EBV)+ CNSL cases lack recurrent mutational hotspots apart from IG and HLA-DRB loci. We show that PCNSL can be clearly distinguished from DLBCL, having distinct expression profiles, IG expression and translocation patterns, as well as specific combinations of genetic alterations

Interpretando la Paradoja de Moore: la irracionalidad de una oración mooreana

Este trabajo ofrece una lectura de la Paradoja de Moore que pone énfasis en su relevancia para nuestra comprensión de la racionalidad y de la interpretación lingüística. Mantiene que las oraciones que dan origen a la paradoja no necesitan entenderse en términos de ausencia de una contradicción, sino más bien en términos de ausencia de racionalidad, entendida esta como un término más amplio que el de coherencia y consistencia lógica. Se defenderá tal posición por medio de tres tesis, dos de las cuales se derivan de los enfoques dominantes (aunque insuficientes) a la paradoja: el de Moore, el de Wittgenstein y el de Shoemaker. This paper offers an interpretation of Moore’s Paradox that emphasizes its relevance for our understanding of rationality and linguistic interpretation. The sentences that originate the paradox do not need to be thought of in terms of the absence of a contradiction, but in terms of absence of rationality, where rationality is understood as a broader notion than coherence and logical consistency. This is defended through three theses, two of which stem from the dominant (but insufficient) approaches to the paradox: Moore’s, Wittgenstein’s and Shoemaker’s.This paper offers an interpretation of Moore’s Paradox that emphasizes its relevance for our understanding of rationality and linguistic interpretation. The sentences that originate the paradox do not need to be thought of in terms of the absence of a contradiction, but in terms of absence of rationality, where rationality is understood as a broader notion than coherence and logical consistency. This is defended through three theses, two of which stem from the dominant (but insufficient) approaches to the paradox: Moore’s, Wittgenstein’s and Shoemaker’s

WHEN EXTERNALISM AND PRIVILEGED SELF-KNOWLEDGE ARE COMPATIBLE AND WHEN THEY ARE NOT

This paper is dedicated to the incompatibilist debate between externalism and privileged self-knowledge, such as it appears in the literature under two privileged contexts of discussion: the slowswitching cases and the reductio ad absurdum arguments. My aim is to defend a compatibilist position although recognising some exceptions to it. I will defend, on the one hand, that the incompatibilism reached by slow-switching cases is sustained only in case we maintain a specific but problematical view about self-knowledge. On the other hand, the incompatibilism reached by reductio ad absurdum arguments is only sustained if we maintain a narrow conception of externalism