Réduction, construction, destruction. D’un dialogue à trois : Natorp, Husserl, Heidegger

In order to introduce the question of tbe « given » and of its elaboration with respect to the motifs of reduction, construction and destruction, we take as a point of departure the first courses of Heidegger at the University of Freiburg in the years 1919-1920. Framed by a sustained debate with the different figures of Neokantianism that occupied the forefront of the philosophical scene in Germany, Heidegger’s aim is to take up and to radicalize Husserl’s phenomenological enterprise indexed to intuition of an ultimate givenness, through the question : « Was heißt “gegeben”, “Gegebenheit” — dieses Zauberwort der Phänomenologie und der “Stein des Anstoßes” bei den anderen ? » This project of taking Husserl’s phenomenlogy will lead Heidegger to reopen the ongoing debate between Husserl and Natorp about the method of reconstruction vs. reduction. So we could venture the hypothesis, according to which the Heideggerian theme of Destruktion “destruction” or “deconstruction,” if it does inherit a sense from the Husserlian Abbau (destruction), from the de-sedimentation of accumulated strata that have come to obstruct the grasp of insight (Einsicht), this theme could all the same be understood as the taking up again — in a practical reversal — Rekonstruktion, Natorpian reconstruction

Las preguntas ontológicas en la filosofía tardía de Schelling: Platón y Aristóteles*

El propósito del articulo es comprender las razones y procedimientos empleados por F. W. Schelling en su reapropiación de Platón y Aristóteles, y extraer de ello la temática auténticamente ontológica. Realiza un recorrido a través de los escritos tardíos y cartas de Schelling, para construir una mirada completa acerca de la relación entre esta reapropiación y la posibilidad de la constitución de una filosofía positiva, como ciencia particular, en oposición a una filosofía negativa, entendida como metafísica

As Investigações Lógicas de Martin Heidegger, da Teoria do Juízo à Verdade do Ser

O artigo destina-se a sugerir que a pergunta "o que é a lógica?", antes de ser extrínseca à questão fundamental da filosofia heideggeriana, é, ao contrário, indissoluvelkmente entrelaça à Seinsfrage. A ponto de a própria "questão do ser" correr o risco de permanecer opaca e inteligível se não a reconduzirmos à questão da lógica

La question des catégories : le débat entre Trendelenburg et Bonitz

1. Le contexte historico-philologique Pour aborder la problématique catégoriale, dans le cadre du renouveau profond des études aristotéliciennes en Allemagne au XIXe siècle, il est d’abord nécessaire de rappeler brièvement le contexte historico-critique au sein duquel elle se déploie : il est caractérisé par un progrès significatif de la philologie aristotélicienne qui aboutit à un remarquable travail d’édition dans le cadre de l’Académie de Berlin. Dès 1831 paraissent les deux premiers volum..

Ontological Questions in Schelling’s Late Philosophy: Plato and Aristotle

The purpose of the article is to understand the reasons and procedures employed by F. W. Schelling in his Plato and Aristotle re-appropriation, and to extract the authentically ontological thematic of it. It makes a path through the Schelling’s late writings and letters, to construct a complete view about the relation between this appropriation and the possibility of the constitution of a positive philosophy, as a particular science, in opposition to a negative philosophy, understood as metaphysics

Kant and Time

En este ensayo se explora el significado y alcance del prolongado debate de Heidegger con Kant, al realizar distintos ejercicios fenomenológicos sobre su pensamiento teórico y práctico, para elaborar concretamente la posición de la pregunta por el sentido del ser en el horizonte del tiempo. El esfuerzo Heideggeriano halla su propio espacio sin ceder a las lecturas neokantianas de la época y marcando claros deslindes con la fenomenología de Husserl, sin olvidar su principio investigativo de ir a las cosas mismas. El autor destaca el método de Heidegger según el que toda interpretación fenomenológica es en sí destrucción, confrontación y radicalización.This essay explores the meaning and scope of the extended debate between Heidegger and Kant, based on his different phenomenological exercises on Kant’s theoretic and practical thought, in order to concretely develop the position for the quest on the meaning of being within the horizon of time. Heidegger’s effort finds his proper way beyond the neokantian criticism of those years and Husserl’s phenomenology, but faithful to his investigative principle of going to the things themselves. The author highlights Heidegger’s methodaccording to which any phenomenological interpretation is destruction, confrontation and radicalization in itself