Assembling an Experimentalist Regime: Transnational Governance Interactions in the Forest Sector

Transnational governance initiatives increasingly face the problem of regime complexity in which a proliferation of regulatory schemes operate in the same policy domain, supported by varying combinations of public and private actors. The literature suggests that such regime complexity can lead to forum-shopping and other self-interested strategies which undermine the effectiveness of transnational regulation. Based on the design principles of experimentalist governance, this paper identifies a variety of pathways and mechanisms which promote productive interactions in regime complexes. We use the case of the EU’s Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative, interacting with private certification schemes and public legal timber regulations, including those of third countries such as the US and China, to demonstrate how an increasingly comprehensive transnational regime can be assembled by linking together distinct components of a regime complex. We argue that it is the experimentalist features of this initiative and its regulatory interactions, which accommodate local diversity and foster recursive learning from decentralized implementation experience, that make it possible to build up a flexible and adaptive transnational governance regime from an assemblage of interconnected pieces, even in situations where interests diverge and no hegemon can impose its own will

Road building, land use and climate change: prospects for environmental governance in the Amazon

Some coupled land–climate models predict a dieback of Amazon forest during the twenty-first century due to climate change, but human land use in the region has already reduced the forest cover. The causation behind land use is complex, and includes economic, institutional, political and demographic factors. Pre-eminent among these factors is road building, which facilitates human access to natural resources that beget forest fragmentation. While official government road projects have received considerable attention, unofficial road building by interest groups is expanding more rapidly, especially where official roads are being paved, yielding highly fragmented forest mosaics. Effective governance of natural resources in the Amazon requires a combination of state oversight and community participation in a ‘hybrid’ model of governance. The MAP Initiative in the southwestern Amazon provides an example of an innovative hybrid approach to environmental governance. It embodies a polycentric structure that includes government agencies, NGOs, universities and communities in a planning process that links scientific data to public deliberations in order to mitigate the effects of new infrastructure and climate change

Constructing a transnational timber legality assurance regime: Architecture, accomplishments, challenges

The emerging transnational timber legality assurance regime comprises a set of interrelated policy instruments, both public and private, aimed at controlling trade in illegally logged wood and wood products. The potentially productive interactions among these instruments in the emerging forestry regime create prospects for engendering learning, stimulating cross-fertilization, and enhancing accountability. In this article, we analyze the EU's Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative, interacting with public legal timber regulations and private certification schemes, as the core of an emerging transnational experimentalist regime. An experimentalist regime of this type may provide a promising approach to addressing contentious transnational environmental issues like forest governance where there is no global hegemon to impose a single set of rules. However, experience with FLEGT implementation suggests that there are also a number of outstanding challenges to constructing an effective timber legality assurance regime, which if unresolved could undermine its promise. The argument proceeds in three steps, based on an exhaustive analysis of recent developments. First, we outline the architecture and promise of the emerging timber legality assurance regime. Then, we review key accomplishments to date. Finally, we examine the ongoing challenges facing this innovative regime as it moves forward, and consider how they might be overcome through the adoption of a more consistent experimentalist approach

Recent smell loss is the best predictor of COVID-19 among individuals with recent respiratory symptoms

In a preregistered, cross-sectional study we investigated whether olfactory loss is a reliable predictor of COVID-19 using a crowdsourced questionnaire in 23 languages to assess symptoms in individuals self-reporting recent respiratory illness. We quantified changes in chemosensory abilities during the course of the respiratory illness using 0-100 visual analog scales (VAS) for participants reporting a positive (C19+; n=4148) or negative (C19-; n=546) COVID-19 laboratory test outcome. Logistic regression models identified univariate and multivariate predictors of COVID-19 status and post-COVID-19 olfactory recovery. Both C19+ and C19- groups exhibited smell loss, but it was significantly larger in C19+ participants (mean±SD, C19+: -82.5±27.2 points; C19-: -59.8±37.7). Smell loss during illness was the best predictor of COVID-19 in both univariate and multivariate models (ROC AUC=0.72). Additional variables provide negligible model improvement. VAS ratings of smell loss were more predictive than binary chemosensory yes/no-questions or other cardinal symptoms (e.g., fever). Olfactory recovery within 40 days of respiratory symptom onset was reported for ~50% of participants and was best predicted by time since respiratory symptom onset. We find that quantified smell loss is the best predictor of COVID-19 amongst those with symptoms of respiratory illness. To aid clinicians and contact tracers in identifying individuals with a high likelihood of having COVID-19, we propose a novel 0-10 scale to screen for recent olfactory loss, the ODoR-19. We find that numeric ratings ≤2 indicate high odds of symptomatic COVID-19 (4<10). Once independently validated, this tool could be deployed when viral lab tests are impractical or unavailable

Setting in the Forest Sector Constructing Markets for Democracy?

Nota: Las reglas de escritura de las referencias bibliográficas pueden variar según los diferentes dominios del conocimiento. Este documento está protegido por la ley de derechos de autor. La utilización de los servicios de Érudit (comprendida la reproducción) se rige por su política de utilización que se puede consultar en el UR

Codes of Conduct and Standard Setting in the Forest Sector : Constructing Markets for Democracy?

In an age of globalization, there is a growing perception that state regulatory instruments may be an inadequate means of regulating firm conduct. Increasingly, scholars are evaluating how corporate codes of conduct may operate as regulatory mechanisms. This article examines competing codes of conduct in the forest sector. Through a detailed case study of code adoption, innovation, and diffusion in the forest sector, focusing on mechanisms of vertical, horizontal and competitive diffusion, it is found that non-governmental organization (NGO) codes have placed competitive pressure to adopt higher standards on competing schemes. However, NGO schemes have been limited in constructing fluid markets for their own goods. The article examines which strategies for codes regimes are most likely to diffuse high standards throughout contemporary markets.À notre époque de mondialisation, il existe une tendance à croire que les instruments de régulation étatique apparaissent comme des moyens inadéquats pour réglementer la conduite des entreprises transnationales. De plus en plus, les intellectuels se penchent sur la façon dont les codes de conduite des entreprises peuvent servir de mécanisme de régulation. Cet article analyse des codes de conduite concurrents dans le secteur forestier. Nous décrivons dans le détail un cas d’adoption, de création et de diffusion de codes de conduite concurrents, en retenant des mécanismes de diffusion horizontale, verticale et concurrente de marchandises codifiées. La réflexion se poursuit en se demandant quelles sont les stratégies des systèmes de codes les plus susceptibles de propager des standards élevés à travers les marchés actuels.Dans cette étude, nous abordons un cas dans lequel la compétition entre deux systèmes d’établissement de normes, un premier tiré de l’industrie et un deuxième d’une organisation non gouvernementale (ONG) représentant des groupes à intérêts diversifiés, est sensée avoir engendré « une course au sommet » dans l’établissement de standards. Le code de conduite et le schéma de monitoring de l’ONG ont connu un succès remarquable en élevant la barre des standards éthiques de production dans l’industrie, c’est-à-dire qu’ils ont mis de l’avant des valeurs démocratiques dans les codes, dans leur participation à la société civile et dans leur degré de transparence. De plus, le succès de ce modèle représentant des intérêts multiples aurait apparemment incité les compétiteurs de l’industrie à accroître la qualité sociale de leurs propres standards et à maintenir une position concurrente sur ces mêmes standards. Au même moment, les codes de l’ONG ont toutefois été gênés par leur inaptitude à fournir aux détaillants une offre suffisante de marchandises à haut standard.Les données de l’étude de cas laissent croire que, pour étendre l’application de ces codes de façon plus fructueuse, des éléments ou des lieux verticaux et horizontaux de coordination économique sont particulièrement importants. La coordination horizontale, c’est-à-dire la coordination au sein des associations de l’industrie, entre autres efforts, a créé des espaces pour l’ensemble des industries permettant la réalisation de décisions conjointes en vue d’atteindre un nouveau niveau de production et de fournir des mécanismes pour s’occuper des problèmes de tension chez les retardataires. La coordination horizontale, par des associations d’industries, quand elle se produit, permet à des secteurs de cheminer vers des buts de qualité sociale coûteuse en tant que groupe, évitant ainsi la menace des coûts sur le « premier initiateur » et dégageant un espace chez les leaders de l’industrie servant à discipliner les retardataires. Dans le cas d’un régime basé sur l’industrie, les résultats de la coordination horizontale ont apparemment connu une propagation plus rapide, quoiqu’à un niveau de standard plus bas que celui connu par l’ONG à intérêts multiples.De la même manière, la coordination verticale, telle quelle est illustrée par l’étude de cas, prend de l’importance au moment de traiter de la nature de la production confiée de plus en plus en sous-traitance. Au fur et à mesure que la mondialisation s’étend et que l’organisation de l’économie tend à être perçue comme une série de liens de collaboration et de compétition entre des opérations autrement isolées, des liens qui enjambent les frontières nationales et qui évitent les modes plus conventionnels de régulation, l’étude de cas permet de croire que la chaîne de l’offre devient plus importante comme une orientation vers des standards de qualité sociale. Cependant, encore là, le modèle de l’ONG à intérêts multiples dans le secteur de la foresterie a lutté en vue de présenter une offre approuvée contenant assez de liens dans la chaîne de manière à engendrer des marchés fluides pour leurs marchandises à haut standard. L’étude de cas illustre un nombre de tentatives innovatrices de la part de la communauté des ONG en réagissant de façon à mettre en place des stratégies visant à établir des marchés fluides pour des marchandises approuvées. La régulation de ces expériences horizontales, verticales et concurrentielles de diffusion de standards prend de l’importance parce que c’est seulement par l’identification de « moyens efficaces » de propagation des pratiques à haut standard que les codes de conduite pourront fondamentalement transformer la nature de l’organisation contemporaine de l’économie.En la era de la globalización, hay una percepción creciente que los instrumentos de regulación del estado pueden constituir medios inadecuados para regular la conducta de las empresas. Cada vez más, los científicos evalúan cómo los códigos de conducta de las corporaciones pueden operar como mecanismos reguladores. Este artículo examina los códigos de conducta en entran en concurrencia en el sector forestal. A través de un estudio de caso detallado de la adopción, innovación y difusión del código en el sector forestal, y focalizando los mecanismos de difusión competitiva vertical y horizontal, se demuestra que los códigos de las organizaciones non gubernamentales (ONG) ejercen una presión competitiva para adoptar estándares mas elevados en los esquemas competitivos. Sin embargo, los esquemas de las ONG han sido limitados en cuanto a la construcción de mercados fluídos para sus respectivos bienes. Este artículo examina cuáles son las estrategias respecto a los regimes de códigos que son mas propicias para difundir estándares mas elevados en los mercados contemporáneos

Assembling an Experimentalist Regime: Transnational Governance Interactions in the Forest Sector

Transnational governance initiatives increasingly face the problem of regime complexity in which a proliferation of regulatory schemes operate in the same policy domain, supported by varying combinations of public and private actors. The literature suggests that such regime complexity can lead to forum-shopping and other self-interested strategies which undermine the effectiveness of transnational regulation. Based on the design principles of experimentalist governance, this paper identifies a variety of pathways and mechanisms which promote productive interactions in regime complexes. We use the case of the EU\u27s Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative, interacting with private certification schemes and public legal timber regulations, including those of third countries such as the US and China, to demonstrate how an increasingly comprehensive transnational regime can be assembled by linking together distinct components of a regime complex. We argue that it is the experimentalist features of this initiative and its regulatory interactions, which accommodate local diversity and foster recursive learning from decentralized implementation experience, that make it possible to build up a flexible and adaptive transnational governance regime from an assemblage of interconnected pieces, even in situations where the interests diverge and no hegemon can impose its own will

Assembling an Experimentalist Regime: Transnational Governance Interactions in the Forest Sector

Transnational governance initiatives increasingly face the problem of regime complexity in which a proliferation of regulatory schemes operate in the same policy domain, supported by varying combinations of public and private actors. The literature suggests that such regime complexity can lead to forum-shopping and other self-interested strategies which undermine the effectiveness of transnational regulation. Based on the design principles of experimentalist governance, this paper identifies a variety of pathways and mechanisms which promote productive interactions in regime complexes. We use the case of the EU’s Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative, interacting with private certification schemes and public legal timber regulations, including those of third countries such as the US and China, to demonstrate how an increasingly comprehensive transnational regime can be assembled by linking together distinct components of a regime complex. We argue that it is the experimentalist features of this initiative and its regulatory interactions, which accommodate local diversity and foster recursive learning from decentralized implementation experience, that make it possible to build up a flexible and adaptive transnational governance regime from an assemblage of interconnected pieces, even in situations where interests diverge and no hegemon can impose its own will