Welfare guarantees for proportional allocations

According to the proportional allocation mechanism from the network optimization literature, users compete for a divisible resource -- such as bandwidth -- by submitting bids. The mechanism allocates to each user a fraction of the resource that is proportional to her bid and collects an amount equal to her bid as payment. Since users act as utility-maximizers, this naturally defines a proportional allocation game. Recently, Syrgkanis and Tardos (STOC 2013) quantified the inefficiency of equilibria in this game with respect to the social welfare and presented a lower bound of 26.8% on the price of anarchy over coarse-correlated and Bayes-Nash equilibria in the full and incomplete information settings, respectively. In this paper, we improve this bound to 50% over both equilibrium concepts. Our analysis is simpler and, furthermore, we argue that it cannot be improved by arguments that do not take the equilibrium structure into account. We also extend it to settings with budget constraints where we show the first constant bound (between 36% and 50%) on the price of anarchy of the corresponding game with respect to an effective welfare benchmark that takes budgets into account.Comment: 15 page

Approximate Deadline-Scheduling with Precedence Constraints

We consider the classic problem of scheduling a set of n jobs non-preemptively on a single machine. Each job j has non-negative processing time, weight, and deadline, and a feasible schedule needs to be consistent with chain-like precedence constraints. The goal is to compute a feasible schedule that minimizes the sum of penalties of late jobs. Lenstra and Rinnoy Kan [Annals of Disc. Math., 1977] in their seminal work introduced this problem and showed that it is strongly NP-hard, even when all processing times and weights are 1. We study the approximability of the problem and our main result is an O(log k)-approximation algorithm for instances with k distinct job deadlines

Bottleneck Routing Games with Low Price of Anarchy

We study {\em bottleneck routing games} where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion on any edge in the network. In the literature, bottleneck games assume player utility costs determined by the worst congested edge in their paths. However, the Nash equilibria of such games are inefficient since the price of anarchy can be very high and proportional to the size of the network. In order to obtain smaller price of anarchy we introduce {\em exponential bottleneck games} where the utility costs of the players are exponential functions of their congestions. We find that exponential bottleneck games are very efficient and give a poly-log bound on the price of anarchy: $O(\log L \cdot \log |E|)$, where $L$ is the largest path length in the players' strategy sets and $E$ is the set of edges in the graph. By adjusting the exponential utility costs with a logarithm we obtain games whose player costs are almost identical to those in regular bottleneck games, and at the same time have the good price of anarchy of exponential games.Comment: 12 page

Vector Bin Packing with Multiple-Choice

We consider a variant of bin packing called multiple-choice vector bin packing. In this problem we are given a set of items, where each item can be selected in one of several $D$-dimensional incarnations. We are also given $T$ bin types, each with its own cost and $D$-dimensional size. Our goal is to pack the items in a set of bins of minimum overall cost. The problem is motivated by scheduling in networks with guaranteed quality of service (QoS), but due to its general formulation it has many other applications as well. We present an approximation algorithm that is guaranteed to produce a solution whose cost is about $\ln D$ times the optimum. For the running time to be polynomial we require $D=O(1)$ and $T=O(\log n)$. This extends previous results for vector bin packing, in which each item has a single incarnation and there is only one bin type. To obtain our result we also present a PTAS for the multiple-choice version of multidimensional knapsack, where we are given only one bin and the goal is to pack a maximum weight set of (incarnations of) items in that bin

Design of a control with multiple inputs multiple outputs by decoupling

In industry, most processes can be modeled by a system of equations that can be monovariable or multivariable. In our case, we will present a multivariable system more adjusted to real cases and on which a control system is available. This article presents a decoupling control method for two inputs two outputs through a centralized multivariable controller using a decoupling network and a diagonal controller, this technical advantage allows reduction in computing time. It shows the methodology by which a multivariate system can be represented as the composition of different coupled systems in this way that the control of the variables involved in it can be done separately, facilitating the control system, this implies a modification in the outputs to be affected. In the same way, the two-inlet with 2-outlet distillation system was also studied. © Published under licence by IOP Publishing Ltd

D0-D4 brane tachyon condensation to a BPS state and its excitation spectrum in noncommutative super Yang-Mills theory

We investigate the D0-D4-brane system for different B-field backgrounds including the small instanton singularity in noncommutative SYM theory. We discuss the excitation spectrum of the unstable state as well as for the BPS D0-D4 bound state. We compute the tachyon potential which reproduces the complete mass defect. The relevant degrees of freedom are the massless (4,4) strings. Both results are in contrast with existing string field theory calculations. The excitation spectrum of the small instanton is found to be equal to the excitation spectrum of the fluxon solution on R^2_theta x R which we trace back to T-duality. For the effective theory of the (0,0) string excitations we obtain a BFSS matrix model. The number of states in the instanton background changes significantly when the B-field becomes self-dual. This leads us to the proposal of the existence of a phase transition or cross over at self-dual B-field.Comment: a4 11pt Latex2e 40 pages; v2: typos fixed, refined comments on renormalisation, refs added, v3: ref added, version publishe

Improving the Price of Anarchy for Selfish Routing via Coordination Mechanisms

We reconsider the well-studied Selfish Routing game with affine latency functions. The Price of Anarchy for this class of games takes maximum value 4/3; this maximum is attained already for a simple network of two parallel links, known as Pigou's network. We improve upon the value 4/3 by means of Coordination Mechanisms. We increase the latency functions of the edges in the network, i.e., if $\ell_e(x)$ is the latency function of an edge $e$, we replace it by $\hat{\ell}_e(x)$ with $\ell_e(x) \le \hat{\ell}_e(x)$ for all $x$. Then an adversary fixes a demand rate as input. The engineered Price of Anarchy of the mechanism is defined as the worst-case ratio of the Nash social cost in the modified network over the optimal social cost in the original network. Formally, if \CM(r) denotes the cost of the worst Nash flow in the modified network for rate $r$ and \Copt(r) denotes the cost of the optimal flow in the original network for the same rate then [\ePoA = \max_{r \ge 0} \frac{\CM(r)}{\Copt(r)}.] We first exhibit a simple coordination mechanism that achieves for any network of parallel links an engineered Price of Anarchy strictly less than 4/3. For the case of two parallel links our basic mechanism gives 5/4 = 1.25. Then, for the case of two parallel links, we describe an optimal mechanism; its engineered Price of Anarchy lies between 1.191 and 1.192.Comment: 17 pages, 2 figures, preliminary version appeared at ESA 201

Not all Online Sexual Activities Are the Same

Young people's use and participation in online sexual activities (OSA) has increased in the past two decades and has changed their behavior in the area of sexuality. The existing literature has some important limitations, concerning the assessment of the construct and its orientation toward problematic use, while ignoring its healthy use or social participation and its relationship with well-being. The main objective of this study was to analyze the relationships between the three types of OSA (compulsive, isolated, and social) proposed by Delmonico and Miller, as well as offline sexual behavior, and psychosexual well-being. It was also necessary to evaluate the factor structure of the Internet Sexual Screening Test (ISST). Participants were 1, 147 university students of both sexes, aged between 18 and 26 years, who completed a battery of online questionnaires. The main finding of the study is that, when controlling for other online sexual behavior, different types of OSA evaluated relate differently to offline sexual behavior and to psychosexual well-being, and that most young people made healthy use and participation of OSA. It also presents a new structure of the ISST. The discussion emphasizes the need to recognize the positive consequences of OSA to implement programs for the promotion of sexual health

NeuroSpeech

NeuroSpeech is a software for modeling pathological speech signals considering different speech dimensions: phonation, articulation, prosody, and intelligibility. Although it was developed to model dysarthric speech signals from Parkinson's patients, its structure allows other computer scientists or developers to include other pathologies and/or measures. Different tasks can be performed: (1) modeling of the signals considering the aforementioned speech dimensions, (2) automatic discrimination of Parkinson's vs. non-Parkinson's, and (3) prediction of the neurological state according to the Unified Parkinson's Disease Rating Scale (UPDRS) score. The prediction of the dysarthria level according to the Frenchay Dysarthria Assessment scale is also provided