The influence of dental loupes on the quality of adhesive removal in orthodontic debonding

Objective: Bracket bonding has been a major advance in orthodontic treatment. However, the method of debonding can lead to diverse problems such as enamel fractures, enamel loss and enamel scratching. In this clinical investigation we aimed to evaluate the influence of wearing dental loupes on enamel damage during the debonding procedure. Material and Methods: 22 consecutive patients were randomly assigned in a split-mouth study to evaluate adhesive removal with and without the use of dental loupes (2.5×, LED headlight). Tooth replicas in epoxy resin were made from silicone impressions. Electron microscopic images (50× magnification) of 394 buccal enamel surfaces were evaluated according to an enamel damage index (EDI), line angle grooves (LAG) and composite residues (CR) on anterior teeth, premolars and molars. Results: The EDI revealed highly significant advantages for debonding with dental loupes, with which the EDI was significantly higher for molars, while still less than without dental loupes. We detected no differences between the tooth groups without dental loupes. We found significantly fewer LAG on anterior teeth debonded with dental loupes. CR were fewer in the dental loupes group, and we noted no significant differences between the tooth groups. Conclusions: Dental loupes affect the quality of the debonding procedure, resulting in less enamel damage and composite residue, as well as fewer LAG compared to the control group. We therefore strongly recommend the use of dental loupes in orthodontic debonding procedure

Evolutionary Markovian Strategies in 2 x 2 Spatial Games

Evolutionary spatial 2 x 2 games between heterogeneous agents are analyzed using different variants of cellular automata (CA). Agents play repeatedly against their nearest neighbors 2 x 2 games specified by a rescaled payoff matrix with two parameteres. Each agent is governed by a binary Markovian strategy (BMS) specified by 4 conditional probabilities [p_R, p_S, p_T, p_P] that take values 0 or 1. The initial configuration consists in a random assignment of "strategists" among the 2^4= 16 possible BMS. The system then evolves within strategy space according to the simple standard rule: each agent copies the strategy of the neighbor who got the highest payoff. Besides on the payoff matrix, the dominant strategy -and the degree of cooperation- depend on i) the type of the neighborhood (von Neumann or Moore); ii) the way the cooperation state is actualized (deterministically or stochastichally); and iii) the amount of noise measured by a parameter epsilon. However a robust winner strategy is [1,0,1,1].Comment: 18 pages, 8 figures (7 of these figures contain 4 encapsulapted poscript files each

Disordered Environments in Spatial Games

The Prisoner's dilemma is the main game theoretical framework in which the onset and maintainance of cooperation in biological populations is studied. In the spatial version of the model, we study the robustness of cooperation in heterogeneous ecosystems in spatial evolutionary games by considering site diluted lattices. The main result is that due to disorder, the fraction of cooperators in the population is enhanced. Moreover, the system presents a dynamical transition at $\rho^*$, separating a region with spatial chaos from one with localized, stable groups of cooperators.Comment: 6 pages, 5 figure

Different reactions to adverse neighborhoods in games of cooperation

In social dilemmas, cooperation among randomly interacting individuals is often difficult to achieve. The situation changes if interactions take place in a network where the network structure jointly evolves with the behavioral strategies of the interacting individuals. In particular, cooperation can be stabilized if individuals tend to cut interaction links when facing adverse neighborhoods. Here we consider two different types of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, and all possible mixtures between these reactions. When faced with a gloomy outlook, players can either choose to cut and rewire some of their links to other individuals, or they can migrate to another location and establish new links in the new local neighborhood. We find that in general local rewiring is more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than emigration from adverse neighborhoods. Rewiring helps to maintain the diversity in the degree distribution of players and favors the spontaneous emergence of cooperative clusters. Both properties are known to favor the evolution of cooperation on networks. Interestingly, a mixture of migration and rewiring is even more favorable for the evolution of cooperation than rewiring on its own. While most models only consider a single type of reaction to adverse neighborhoods, the coexistence of several such reactions may actually be an optimal setting for the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 12 pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in PLoS ON

Critical dynamics in the evolution of stochastic strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma

The observed cooperation on the level of genes, cells, tissues, and individuals has been the object of intense study by evolutionary biologists, mainly because cooperation often flourishes in biological systems in apparent contradiction to the selfish goal of survival inherent in Darwinian evolution. In order to resolve this paradox, evolutionary game theory has focused on the Prisoner's Dilemma (PD), which incorporates the essence of this conflict. Here, we encode strategies for the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD) in terms of conditional probabilities that represent the response of decision pathways given previous plays. We find that if these stochastic strategies are encoded as genes that undergo Darwinian evolution, the environmental conditions that the strategies are adapting to determine the fixed point of the evolutionary trajectory, which could be either cooperation or defection. A transition between cooperative and defective attractors occurs as a function of different parameters such a mutation rate, replacement rate, and memory, all of which affect a player's ability to predict an opponent's behavior.Comment: 27 pages, including supplementary information. 5 figures, 4 suppl. figures. Version accepted for publication in PLoS Comp. Bio