Generating functions for computing the Shapley value in games restricted by a cooperation index

Treballs Finals de Grau de Matemàtiques, Facultat de Matemàtiques, Universitat de Barcelona, Any: 2022, Director: Mikel Álvarez-Mozos[en] Our goal in this paper is to describe a generating function method to compute the Shapley value in games restricted by a cooperation index. Once we have described the method, we study the computational complexity for computing the required generating function and show an implementation of the method and an example

Semblanza del Grupo Comunicación y Salud

Para aproximarse a la realidad del Grupo Comunicación y Salud y entender a que se debe su heterogeneidad, la diversidad de temas que aborda, los centenares de horas docentes que ofrece a los Médicos de Familia y la presencia de sus miembros en las Plataformas más activas que rondan la Atención Primaria en España, es interesante acercarse a cómo empezó el grupo y a quiénes fueron los pioneros de las diferentes actividades y metodologías que utiliza el grupo. Dar a conocer su origen como grupo de pretensión docente, su enriquecimiento con aportaciones del exterior y su voluntad de vanguardia en temas de comunicación con los pacientes es el interés de este artículo

A new Deegan-Packel inspired power index in games with restricted cooperation

Treballs Finals del Màster d'Economia, Facultat d'Economia i Empresa, Universitat de Barcelona. Curs: 2023-2024, Tutor: Mikel Álvarez MozosWe propose a new power index, which we call the essential coalitions index. The new index is fit to analyze influence in the formation of stable coalitions to run a government or a company board. Within the field of power indices, it extends the Deegan-Packel power index to situations with restricted cooperation; more specifically, to the class of games introduced by Amer and Carreras in [2]. In general, these are not simple games. We will use the essential coalitions as an analogue to the minimal winning coalitions of a simple game, since they generalize some relevant properties. Similarly to the index that inspires it, we will first define the new index in terms of three reasonable assumptions, resembling those used in [5] for the Deegan-Packel index. Then, we formally characterize the index, using suitable modifications of the properties introduced in [2] to characterize the Shapley value in restricted games. Finally, through numeric examples, we compare the essential coalitions index to the similarly inspired, albeit more constrained, probabilístic Deegan-Packel index. We will see that, in the latter’s domain, the two indices only differ in their normalization

The complexity of power indices in voting games with incompatible players

We study the complexity of computing the Banzhaf index in weighted voting games with cooperation restricted by an incompatibility graph. With an existing algorithm as a starting point, we use concepts from complexity theory to show that, for some classes of incompatibility graphs, the problem can be solved efficiently, as long as the players have "small" weights. We also show that for some other class of graphs it is unlikely that we can find efficient algorithms to compute the Banzhaf index in the corresponding restricted game. Finally, we discuss the complexity of deciding whether the index of a player is non-zero

The essential coalitions index in games with restricted cooperation

We propose a new power index, which we call the essential coalitions index. Within the field of power indices, the new measure extends the Deegan-Packel power index to situations with restricted cooperation. In general, the class of games we study are not simple; with this in mind, we will introduce the essential coalitions as an analogue to the minimal winning coalitions of a simple game, since they generalize some relevant properties. We will first define the new index in terms of three reasonable assumptions, with a similar flavor to those used for the Deegan-Packel index; then, we will formally characterize the index. Finally, through numeric examples, we compare the essential coalitions index to the probabilistic Deegan-Packel index. We see that, in the latter's domain, the two indices only differ by a constant factor. Moreover, the new index is fit to analyze power in the formation of stable coalitions to run a government or a company board

Evidence of dopant type-inversion and other radiation damage effects of the CDF silicon detectors

xix, 213 p.Se han estudiado los efectos producidos por la radiación sobre los detectores de silicio del experimento CDF, en particular el fenómeno de inversión del tipo de dopante y la evolución de las corrientes de polarización

Género y políticas educativas

En el presente artículo la autora hace una revisión sobre las políticas educativas desarrolladas desde el siglo XIX hasta la actualidad en nuestro país y cómo estas políticas han contemplado las diferencias de género contribuyendo a una mayor o menor discriminación de las mujeres.____________________________________ In this article the author makes a revision about educative policies which have been developed from XIX century until nowadays in Spain. She pays special attention to how these policies have studied the differences of gender: It also focus on the impact which these policies have had towards women discrimination