The Politics of the Labor Movement Revitalization: The Need for a Revitalized Perspective

[Excerpt] Unions everywhere are struggling. Globalization, with its supporting neo-liberal ideology, encourages employers and governments to push vigorously against the constraints of employment regulation. Unions have to fight to protect past gains, resist decline and find new allies. To some extent, labor is always on the defensive in a capitalist economy, where ownership and economic decision-making lie largely beyond the reach of workers and unions. Yet the competitive pressures of today\u27s increasingly global capitalism accentuate the pressure. Firms have new options and increasing mobility, far beyond those that most workers and unions can claim. One response is common to all of our country cases, despite other differences. Unions are everywhere re-launching themselves as \u27political subjects\u27, as actors engaged not just in collective bargaining and workplace regulation, but also in the broader aggregation of political and social interests (Pizzorno, 1978). Labor movement politics today go well beyond traditional links with lab our-friendly parties and negotiations with governments, to involve grass-roots politics and local campaigns. The exact forms taken by such political strategies are shaped differently in each country according to the challenges faced, existing institutions and opportunity structures. But in all cases, the shift toward a fuller political subject orientation lies at the center of contemporary strategic adaptation and revitalization

Kapitalismus braucht Wachstum – aber es gibt kein Patentrezept

Die europäischen Länder unterscheiden sich nicht nur hinsichtlich ihrer Wohlstandsniveaus. Auch die Art und Weise, wie etwa die Institutionen des Wohlfahrtsstaats oder der Arbeitsbeziehungen auf die Wirtschaft einwirken, unterscheidet sich von Land zu Land. Der neue Forschungsbereich „Politische Ökonomie von Wachstumsmodellen“ am MPIfG untersucht, wie in den europäischen „Spielarten des Kapitalismus“ Wachstum erzeugt wird. Ein Vergleich zwischen Deutschland, Großbritannien, Schweden und Italien legt die Strategien offen, mit denen sich die für wirtschaftliches Wachstum notwendige Nachfrage generieren lässt

Civil Society Meets the State: A Model of Associational Democracy

At a time in which the state is in disrepute, civil society is often proposed as an alternative.1 In advanced countries, the crisis of dirigiste policy-making has spurred reflections on the role of social actors in the conception and execution of public policy (see Levy, 1999; Putnam, 1993 and 1995; Cable, 1995).Associational democracy Unresolved issues in the associational democratic project Concluding remarks Reference

Civil Society, NGOs, and Decent Work Policies: Sorting Out the Issues

This rather abstract paper is motivated by an eminently practical concern. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has recently restructured itself to emphasize the notion of “decent work.” “Decent work,” as argued by the ILO’s Director General in his report to the 1999 International Labour Conference, “means productive work in which rights are protected, which generates an adequate income, with adequate social protection.Acknowledgements 1. Introduction 2. The Notion of Civil Society 3. NGOs and Development theory 3.1 The Dark Side of NGOs 3.2 The More Luminous Side of NGOs 3.3 NGO Contribution to Decent Work Policies 4. Concluding Remarks Bibliography Table and Figure 1 Table 2, 3 and 4 Appendice

Mind the gap: National and local partnership in the Irish public sector

This article uses case study data from a major Irish city council to investigate and explain public sector worker attitudes towards social partnership at local and national level. It is argued that the more sceptical attitudes to workplace partnership reflect structural differences between local and national arrangements, which have enabled public sector employers to use ‘social partnership’ as a constraint in the implementation process of a pre-determined public sector reform agenda

Has the “External Constraint” Contributed to Italy’s Stagnation? A Critical Event Analysis

Has the strategy of the “external constraint” (voluntarily limiting the country’s policy-making discretion by tying it to the European mast) contributed to Italy’s stagnation over the past twenty-five years? The existing literature is divided on this question. The dominant interpretation is that Italy’s stagnation is due to insufficient liberalization, and that the external constraint has had no negative and even a positive influence. An alternative interpretation emphasizes the demand compression and supply-side effects of the external constraint. Based on three case studies of public debt management, privatization, and labor market policy, this paper reconstructs the process by which the external constraint has affected outcomes. It argues that it has had a negative impact, but more as a necessary condition than as a sufficient one. In other words, it would probably have been possible to manage the external constraint differently to produce better outcomes, but without the external constraint, the stagnation would likely have been less deep.Hat die Strategie des „äußeren Zwangs“ (die freiwillige Einschränkung der politischen Gestaltungsmacht eines Landes durch seine Unterwerfung unter europäische Vorgaben) zu Italiens Stagnation in den letzten 25 Jahren beigetragen? Die vorliegende Literatur ist in dieser Frage zwiegespalten. Die vorherrschende Deutung besagt, dass Italiens Stagnation einer unzureichenden Liberalisierung geschuldet ist und der äußere Zwang keinen negativen, sondern im Gegenteil einen positiven Einfluss gehabt hat. Eine alternative Interpretation verweist jedoch auf die einbrechende Nachfrage und die Angebotseffekte, die der äußere Zwang verursacht. Auf der Grundlage dreier Fallstudien zum öffentlichen Schuldenwesen, zur Privatisierung und zur Arbeitsmarktpolitik rekonstruiert dieser Beitrag den Prozess, durch den der äußere Zwang Resultate beeinflusst hat. Er vertritt die These, dass dieser Zwang zwar einen negativen Einfluss ausgeübt hat, dies jedoch eher als notwendige denn als hinreichende Bedingung. Es wäre, anders ausgedrückt, also wahrscheinlich möglich gewesen, anders mit dem äußeren Zwang umzugehen, und zwar so, dass bessere Resultate erzielt worden wären; ohne diesen Zwang wäre die Stagnation allerdings wohl weniger einschneidend verlaufen.Contents 1 Introduction 2 Explanations of the Italian decline 3 External constraint as a critical event 4 Adoption of the external constraint The 1970s The Maastricht Treaty Entry into EMU 5 Consequences of the external constraint Management of public debt Privatization Industrial relations and labor market policy 6 Concluding remarks Appendix A Appendix B Reference

Organizational Determinants of Wage Moderation

This article contributes to the political economic literature regarding the effects of industrial relations institutions on national economic outcomes. Based on an econometric analysis of the determinants of wage moderation in sixteen industrialized countries between 1974 and 2000, it argues that the organizational characteristics of trade unions have a significant impact on wage dynamics. Controlling for a number of institutional and economic factors, the countries in which trade union confederations directly involve workers in the process of collective bargaining ratification have on average lower wage growth relative to productivity than others. The authors also find that collective bargaining coordination and contract ratification magnify each other's wage-dampening effect. Through case studies of Ireland and Italy, the article examines the causal mechanisms underlying the uncovered statistical regularities and concludes that, particularly at a time in which classic political exchange is waning, worker involvement in contract ratification allows confederation leaders to resolve conflicting claims inside their organizations at lower wage levels than are achieved by a less participatory governance proces